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A Critical Legal 
Of all the scholars associated with the Critical Legal Studies movement, none 
has garnered greater attention or higher praise than Roberto Unger of 
Harvard Law School. In this Article, William Ewald argues that Professor 
Unger's reputation as a brilliant philosopher of law is undeserved. Despite 
the seeming erudition of his books, Professor Unger's work displays little fa­
miliarity with the basic philosophical literature, and the philosophical, legal, 
and political analysis in those works-in particular, the celebrated critique of 
liberalism in Knowledge and Politics-is so riddled with logical and histori­
cal errors as to be unworthy of serious scholarly attention. 
t Jun ior Research Fellow, The Queen's College, Oxford. I should l ike to thank Robert Alexy, 
Delf Buchwald, Robert Clark, Jonathan Cohen ,  Ralf Dreier, Ronald Dworkin ,  Charles Fried, Geof­
frey Hazard, Susan Hurley, Geoffrey Marshal l ,  Brian McGuinness, Derek Parfit, Gunther Patzig, 
H ilary Putnam, W.V. Quine, Eric Rakowski, John Rawls, Joseph Raz, Paul Seabright ,  Thomasz 
Studnick i ,  and Robert Summers for their encouragemeqt and suggestions. M uch of the writing was 
done at the University of Gottingen under the auspices of the Alexander von H umboldt Stiftung; I am 
grateful to both institutions for their generous support. 
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I. INTRODL'CTION 
In his first book, Professor Roberto l\1angabeira Unger of Harvard 
Law School announced that he had discm·ered "the context of ideas and 
sentiments within which philosophy and politics must now be practiced."1 
Since that time, he has become a prominent thinker in Critical Legal 
Studies (CLS), a movement that, in his own words, "has undermined the 
central ideas of modern legal thought and put another conception of law 
in their place."2 
If anyone in CLS can claim to have undermined the central ideas of 
modern legal thought, that person is Professor Unger. There is wide­
spread agreement that he is the philosophical leader of CLS and that his 
most inOuential work is the critique of liberalism in his first book, Knowl­
edge and Politics.3 
His books on political and legal theory4 range over the whole of the 
Western philosophical tradition. They cite authors from Aristotle to 
Quine, from Hobbes to Hegel to Emil Lask. They bristle with footnotes 
to works in German, French, Latin, Italian, Greek, and Dutch. They 
1. R. L'v;ER. K:--:OII'LEDCE .\:\D PoLITICS 1 (197)) [hereinJI'ter KP ]. 
1 l'nger. The Critical Legal Studies .\Io,·ement. 96 H.\R\' L. Rr:v. )61. 561 (1983) [hereinafter 
CLS\1]. 
3. Thi> book hJs been cJ!Ied "the most extensi1e and influential critique of liberalism in recent 
menl<Jrl· .
.. 
Lninsl;n. Book Re1ie1,·. 96 H.\RV. L. Rn·. 1466. 1466 n.4 (1983). Opponents and propo­
nents of \ .. :LS agree about l'nger·s importance and about the importance of KP to CLS . See. e.g .. 
. \ckerm;;:;. Foreu•ord: Lau· in an :\ctil'ist State. 92 \'\u LJ. 1083. 1127 & n.78 (1983) (KP is 
"[t]he most significant theoretical ,,·ork" of communitarian form of "de,·iationist legal doctrine''): Fiss. 
The Death of the Lazi'?. 72 CoR:\ELL L. Rr.v. I. 10 (1986) (l'nger's 11·ork is "the true inspiration of 
the [CLS] mo1ement''): Hunt. The Theory of Critical Legal Studies. 6 OxFORD J .  LEGAL STt'D. I. 6 
& n.l4 ( 1986) (L.nger's l'alue to CLS is in his "general theoretical critique of liberalism,'' and his 
''influence within [CLS] is primarily through his earlier text Knowledge and Politics"); Hutchinson 
& \fonahan, Law, Politics and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American 
Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REv. 199 . 231 n.141 ( 1984) (Unger's CLSM "builds on his earlier 
\\'Ork. Knowledge and Politics and Law in ,\Iodern Society"); see also infra note 234 and text accom­
panying note 7); Schwanz, \\'ith Gun and Camera Through Darkest CLS Land. 36 STAN . L. REV. 
413, 416 ( !984) ("If Kennedy is the Pope of CLS, Unger is the Christ figure"); Stick, Can .\'ihilism 
be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REv. 332, 334 n.9 (1986) ("Roberto Unger's study of liberalism, 
Knowledge and Politics," is one of "[t]he seminal legal texts that gave rise to legal nihilism"). Ob­
serve that all of these quotations appeared after the publication of Unger's article on CLS-an article 
which had been widely disseminated before it appeared in print. 
4. In addition to Knowledge and Politics, Unger has written Law in .Hod ern Society ( 1976); 
Passion: An Essay on Personality ( 1984); and Politics, A. Work in Constructive Social Theor)' (3 vols. 
1987). CLS�f, supra note 2, also appeared as a book, The Critical Legal Studies .Hovement ( 1983); 
my page references will be to the article. In this article I shall discuss the two works that have had the 
most inOuence on CLS-i.e., KP and CLS!\1-and Unger's encyclopedic new project, Politics. Law 
in ,Hodern Society is shorter than KP, heavily dependent on its theses. concerned with sociology rather 
than with philosophy, and less frequently cited in the CLS literature. Passion is largely superseded by 
Politics. Unger's "Note" at the beginning of Law in Modern Society remarks: "This study builds 
upon my Knowledge and Politics (Free Press, 1975). To make the present work intelligible to readers 
unfamiliar with Knowledge and Politics, it was necessary in some cases to restate ideas developed in 
the earlier work." Similarly, in one of the volumes of Politics Unger points out: "The argument of the 
fragment on cultural revolution stands in close relation to the main pan of my book, Passion: ,-In 
Essay on Personality." R. CNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIA"i SociAL THEORY IN 
THE SERVICE Of RADICAL DEMOCRACY. PART I Of Poi.ITics, .'\ WoRK IN CoNSTRUCTIVE SoCIAL 
THEORY 630 (1987) [hereinafter FN ]. Accordingly, I shall not discuss these two works. 
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purport to show that "no coherent theory of adjudication is possible 
within liberal pol itical thought , ' '11 and they embark on a "search for 
changes in social life that might serve as the basis , or as the inspiration, of 
a nonliberal doctrine of mind and society ."6 These books received a num­
ber of favorable reviews. For example :  
Law in Modern Society is  a truly profound book.  I t  defies coherent 
summarization in a few hundred words. I t  contains more fundamen­
tal insights into the human condition than any other book I have 
read by a living author. The sheer breadth of Unger's knowledge 
and the unrelenting force of his analysis can only be regarded with 
something approaching awe.  One leaves this  book with the feeling 
that a century from now scholars may stil l be poring over it , much as 
they now do with the works of Marx, Durkheim and Weber.7 
Unger has also been compared to Spinoza, Dante, and Virgil .8 
Unger's own claims have not been modest .  He compares his fellow 
professors of law to "a priesthood that had lost their faith and kept their 
jobs" -until the gospel of C LS liberated the legal academy .9  
More recently, Unger has published three volumes, forming the first 
part of Politics: A Work in Constructive Social Theory.10 In this work, 
too, Unger makes grand claims: He  says he aims to provide a new theo­
retical vision for the left-a radical alternative to both Marxism and so­
cial democracy. 1 1 Having noticed that radical social theory was "an in­
stance of illusion passing into prejudice," he wanted to write a book "to 
set things straight ."12  Again, his fol lowers have been supportive. One con­
tributor to the Northwestern University Law Review 's Symposium on 
Politics, while noting that "neither Politics nor theory nor the human in­
tellect can work the redemption of humanity ," nevertheless holds that 
"Politics is a remarkable achievement. I t  warrants study, attention, and 
celebration. I t  contributes aid to the rescue of humanism from the failures 
of liberal democracy, Marxism, modernism, and Christendom."13 
5. KP, supra note 1 ,  at 98. 
6. Id. at 20. 
7. Monahan, Book Review, 61 Soc. & Soc. REs. 43 1 ,  432 ( 1 977). 
8. See Boyle, Book Review, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1 066, 1 079 ( 1 985) ("the Spinozian latticework of 
epistemological argument that characterizes Unger's earlier works"); H utchinson & Monahan, The 
"Rights" Stuff: Roberto Unger and Beyond, 62 TEx. L .  REv. 1 477 ,  1 49 1  ( 1 984) (passage comparing 
Unger's work to Dante and Virgil quoted infra note 234). 
9. This comment occurs in  the conclusion to CLSM, supra note 2, at 675 ;  the passage is quoted 
in  ful l  infra p. 756. 
1 0. Individually entitled: ( 1 )  Social Theory: Its Situation and Task. A Critical Introduction to 
Politics, a Work in Constructive Social Theory ( 1 987) [ hereinafter ST]; (2) FN, supra note 4; and 
(3) Plasticity into Power: Comparative-Historical Studies on the Institutional Conditions of Eco­
nomic and Military Success. Variations on Themes of Po(itics, a Work in Constructive Social Theory 
( 1 987) [ hereinafter PP] .  Unger also plans a Part II of Politics. See FN, supra note 4, at 630. 
1 1 .  FN, supra note 4,  at I. 
12. ST, supra note 1 0, at 79. 
1 3 . Bal l ,  The City of Unger, 8 1  Nw. U.L. REv. 625 , 627 ( 1 987). This Symposiu m  is to be 
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I propose to  examine the  accuracy of al l  these claims-to see  w hether 
Unger's philosophy is as impressive as he and his admirers say . 
Unger's work fal ls  into three areas: phi losophy,  law,  and pol i t ics .  I 
shall accordingly proceed in  three stages. I begin by discussing the most 
philosophical of Unger's works, Knowledge and Politics, concentrating on 
the passages that are most relevant to CLS. In  this Section , I shall try to 
gauge the quality of his scholarship ,  and to explain what I th ink is askew 
with his philosophy. Next I turn to his essay on The Critical Legal Stud­
ies Movement, and say something about the relationship of h is  phi losophy 
to law and legal theory. Final ly ,  I turn to the concrete political recom­
mendations of Politics-speci fi cal ly ,  to Unger's theory of cultural revolu­
tion. These recommendations seem to me deeply troubling, for reasons I 
shall explain in  due course. I f  my analysis is correct , there i s  a l inear 
progression from the philosophy , through the law ,  to the polit ics ,  and the 
seeds of Unger's recent pol it ical  views are already to be found in his early 
philosophy. 
Throughout this discussion, I shal l  try to be intell igible to a general 
audience, even if this means explaining points that will be obvious to pro­
fessional philosophers. And I shall try not to presuppose any previous 
acquaintance with Unger's writ ings, even if this means summarizing ar­
guments that will be familiar to his readers .  My goal is  to obtain a clear 
view of the "sheer breadth of Unger's knowledge and the unrelenting 
force of his analysis ." Neither, I argue, is  as great as his fol lowers bel ieve. 
But before we start, a few words about the movement of which Unger 
is the philosophical leader may be in season .  I shall in particular try to 
explain why his crit ique of l iberalism is important to CLS and what sig­
nificance my criticisms of Unger have for C LS as a whole.  
To begin with, I should emphasize that CLS is a diverse movement. 
Professor Duncan Kennedy,  one of the leaders of CLS, described i t  as "a 
ragtag band of leftover '60s people and young people with nostalgia for 
the great events of 15  years ago ." 14 Not all  of its members claim to be 
philosophers, and not all  of those who do bui ld directly u pon U nger. So a 
refutation of Unger is not by itself enough to "refute C LS" ;  the movement 
is too complex, too multi farious, for such a simple refutation to be possi­
ble. Nevertheless, al l  members of the movement agree, with varying de­
grees of intensity, on the following theses: first, that tradit ional legal doc­
trme IS "incoherent"15  or "impossible"16 or "contradictory and 
published as  a book by the Cambridge U niversity Press. 
1 4. Eastland, Radicals in the Law School, Wall St. ]. ,  Jan.  1 0 ,  1 986, at 1 6 , col .  4.  
1 5 . See, e.g. , Excerpts from Critical Legal Studies Q & A ,  38 HARV. L .  BuLL. 22 (Summer 
1 987) [ hereinafter Excerpts] ("Kennedy identified three basic CLS propositions about traditional legal 
doctrine: it is  neither coherent nor determinate nor objective; i t  is  the basis of corporate capital ism, 
and as such dictates who gets how much in the society; and its outcome is radica l ly  u njust."). 
1 6. KP, supra note I, at 97 ("a coherent theory of adjudication or of legal justice is not possible 
on the premises of l iberal thought") ;  Kairys, Introduction, in  THE PO!.ITICS OF LAw: A PRoCRES-
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manipulable"/7 second, that the ex1stmg legal order is "radically unjust" 
and "contributes to the legitimization of an oppressive social order"/8 
and,  third, that existing social and legal arrangements ought to be trans­
formed so as to create a society that will be free from the "hegemony" and 
"hierarchies" that prevail at present . 1 9 In consequence of these views, 
CLS deprecates traditional legal scholarship  and traditional legal educa­
tion. Instead of behaving l ike the "toadying jurists" of the past, instead of 
treating the existing legal materials as "given" and "rigidly defined,"20 
CLS attempts "to free us from the i l lusion of the necessity of existing 
social arrangements. "21 Professor Kennedy's opinion is characteristic, and 
shows how these theses are connected: 
To say that law school is ideological is  to say that what teachers 
teach along with basic skil ls is wrong, is nonsense about w hat l aw is 
and how i t  works; that the message about the nature of l egal compe­
tence, and its distribution among students, is  wrong, is  nonsense; that 
the ideas about the possibi l i ties of l i fe as a lawyer that students pick 
up from legal education are wrong, are nonsense. But all  this i s  non­
sense with a tilt; i t  is  biased and motivated rather than random er­
ror. What it says is that it is  natural, efficient, and fai r  for law 
firms, the bar as a whole, and the society the bar services to be or­
ganized in their actual patterns of hierarchy and domination . 22 
These views have drawn heated criticism, and the resulting dispute has 
attracted the attention of the mass media,23 but i n  fact there is much here 
SIVE CRITIQUE 3 (D. Kairys ed. 1 982) [ hereinafter POLITICS OF LAw] ("[ t ]here is no legal reasoning 
in the sense of legal methodology or process for reaching particular, correct results") .  
1 7 .  CLSM, supra note 2 ,  a t  5 6 3  n . 1 (CLS emphasizes "the contradictory and manipulable char­
acter of doctrinal argument") .  
1 8. See Excerpts, supra note 1 5 ; Kennedy, Cost-Reduction Theory as Legitimation, 90 YALE L.J.  
1 27 5 ,  1 27 6  ( 1 98 1 ) ;  see also Note, Round and Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to 
Critica l Legal Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. Rt�V. 1 669,  168 1  n.80 ( 1 982) (citing further references in  
similar vein) .  
1 9 . E.g. , CLSM, supra note 2,  at 587 ("The guiding and unifying a im of the cultural­
revolutionary pract ice I have in  mind l ies perhaps in  the systematic remaking of a l l  d irect personal 
connections-like those between superiors and subordinates or between men and women-through 
their progressive emancipation from a background plan of social division and hierarchy.") ;  see also 
Unger's theory of "Organic Groups" (discussed infra Section II. E); Professor Tushnet's call for a 
"community of understanding" in which "we wi l l  destroy the need for constitutional theory," 
Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of lnterpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 
HARV. L. REv. 78 1 ( 1 983); Klare, Critical Theory and Labor Relations Law, in PoLITICS OF LAw , 
supra note 1 6 , at 65 ,  84 (withering away of law). 
20. "The dominant view treats the existing i nstitutional structure as given. I t  regards the imagi­
native scheme of models of possible and desirable human association, including the contrast of contract 
to community, as rigidly defined." CLSM, supra note 2 ,  at 633.  For the remark on toadying jurists, 
see id. at 570. 
2 1 .  Klare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a New Historiography of Collective Bargaining Law, 
4 INDUS. REL. L.j. 450, 482 ( 1 98 1 ) .  
22. Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, i n  PoLITICS OF LAw, supra note 1 6 , 
at 40. For similar sentiments, see also CLSM, supra note 2, at 668-70. 
23 .  See Margol ick, The Split at Harvard Goes Down to its Foundation, N.Y.  Times, Oct. 6 ,  
1 985 ,  § 4 ,  at  7 ,  col .  1 ;  Lacayo. Critical Legal Times at  Harvard, TIME , Nov.  1 8, 1 985 ,  at 87 ;  Tri l l in ,  
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that any lawyer might agree with. That the law contains deep confl icts; 
that the legal system is frequently unjust; that the wealthy are more l ikely 
to receive justice than the poor; that legal education is imperfect-these 
ideas are not new to C LS.  Likewise, when C LS attempts to reth ink fun­
damental legal concepts, or searches for speci fic  examples of injustice, or 
proposes new methods of resolving disputes, i t  is  engaged in a famil iar 
and important enterprise which all lawyers might applaud.  The actual 
proposals put forward by C LS are often less radical than the flamboyant 
rhetoric would suggest;24 Unger's three-point program for governmental 
reform in The Critical Legal Studies Movement is  an example . 2� 
In  fact, one may well wonder whether CLS i s  as novel as i t  
claims-whether lawyers real ly  need to be freed "from the i l lusion of the 
necessity of existing social arrangements ."  Oliver Wendell H olmes long 
ago poured cynical acid on the "brooding omnipresence" theory of law, 
arguing vigorously that our legal system cannot "be worked out l i ke math­
ematics from some general axioms of conduct ."26 The Legal Real i sts' 
elaboration of Holmes's theory has indelibly marked our jurisprudence . 
The idea that law is malleable, a human creation, an i nstrument for serv­
ing social ends has been a central tenet of American legal thought for 
generations. I t  is not news. 
This is a point in favor of C LS .  For when critical legal scholars devote 
themselves to the analysis of relatively concrete legal problems, they some­
times, despite the rhetoric, engage in a perfectly traditional form of legal 
scholarship.  To take an example, Unger's analysis of Anglo-American 
contract law, despite being encased in  a welter of five levels of  "visions" 
and "countervisions," is, in  the end, nothing more than a proposal for 
reforming the law of contract .27 This scholarship can be very able (as in 
A Reporter at Large: Harvard Law School, NEw YoRKER, M ar. 26 ,  1 984, at 53 ;  see also Kennedy ,  
Rebels from Principle: Changing the Corporate Law Firm From Within , H ARV.  L. BuLL. ,  Fa l l  
198 1 , at 36. 
24. !1. good example is furnished by a student piece in the Harvard Law Review. Note, supra 
note 18. The Note begins with a nourish of radical rhetoric: "!1. radical scholarsh ip  of practice would 
enmesh legal scholars in activity, in  endeavors that, beginning with a transformative objective, would 
explore the capacity of social structure to respond to efforts toward fundamental change ."  !d. at 1 687. 
But this "radical scholarship of practice" is not , in fact, as extreme as i t  sounds. On the contrary, it 
resembles a typical cl inical program at almost any American law school :  
Scholars might, for example, create situations that would b lur  the  boundary between pol i tical 
and legal discourse by setting up conOict-resolution mechanisms in  which communi ty members 
served as arbitrators of neighborhood disputes. Community organ ization, perhaps inviting the 
participation of law students, would i nvolve scholars in the implementation of participatory 
democracy and place them in environments in which property, contract, or tort doctrines could 
be imaginatively recast. Total environments-prisons, hospitals, or workplaces-could provide 
unique opportunities for the involvement of relatively homogeneous populations i n  act ivities 
that would explore the possibi li ties for sustained social and political engagement. 
!d. ( footnote omitted and emphasis added). 
25 .  See infra text accompanying note 267. 
26. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 1 0  HARV. L. REv. 457, 465 ( 1 897). 
27. This point is made by Finnis, On 'The Critical Legal Studies Movement, '  in 3 OXFORD 
EsSAYS ON jURISPRUDENCE 1 54-58 (J Eckelaar & J Bell eds. 1 987). For further discussion, see 
infra text accompanying notes 2 57-60. I follow Finn is here, and more genera l ly  in his  evaluation of 
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Professor Horwitz's Transformation of American Law28), or rather less 
so. Because my concern is with philosophy, I shall make no attempt to 
decide how much of the narrowly legal C LS l i terature fall s  into the for­
mer category and how much into the latter: That is ultimately a matter 
for the legal community to establ ish. My point is that some C LS scholar­
ship is not as extreme a departure from the tradition as it may seem-that 
it may be doing the same sort of thing as Holmes and the Realists, and 
doing i t  very wel l .  
But although some CLS scholarship  is i n  the tradition of Holmes and 
Legal Realism, the differences are as striking as the similarities. To begin 
with, CLS is much more extreme in its conclusions. The attitude of 
Holmes might be paraphrased l ike this: "Do not suppose that the law is a 
set of eternal truths, given to you by Logic or by Nature and incapable of 
change. Law is a human creation and must be made to serve the interests 
of the community; it must be reformed in the light of the best insights of 
economics and history and phi losophy. "29 Holmes did not doubt that law 
exists, that i t  can be said to function either well or badly; he did not deny 
the importance of meticulous legal scholarshi p  or the value of legal educa­
tion. His attitude was not that "law is nonsense," or that it is  just the 
interests of the rich, or that there are no right answers in l egal disputes, 
or that "trashing . . .  [ i s ]  the most valid form of legal scholarsh ip  avai la­
ble at the moment. "30 He and his Realist successors were practitioners, 
and they were deeply involved at the bench and bar-in the w riting of 
treatises, in  the drafting of legislation, in the l i tigation and adjudication of 
cases. Whatever their criticisms of the existing legal system, they took it 
seriously enough to try to work within i t .  
C LS ,  in contrast, has been largely a movement of theoreti cians and phi­
losophers. Its members have not been heavily engaged in the practice of 
law, nor do they recognize an obligation to be the "technical assistants" of 
judges and legislators .31 A good example is furnished by M ark  Tushnet, 
another leading figure in the movement. Like Unger, Professor Tushnet 
Unger's theory of contract. 
28. M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW ( 1 977). 
29. E.g. , Holmes, supra note 26, at 465-78 (importance of history , economics, and jurisprudence 
in shaping law). 
30. Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1 229 ,  1 229 ( 1 98 1  ) . 
3 1 .  Unger is explicit on this matter: 
So when asked whether deviationist doctrine can suitably be used by judges, we answer as 
follows. We are neither servants of the state (not at least in the conventional sense) nor their 
technical assistants. We have no stake in  finding a preestablished harmony between moral 
compulsions and institutional constraints. We know, moreover,  that the received views of insti­
tutional propriety count for lit tle except as arguments to use against those who depart too far 
from professional consensus. Most of what courts actual ly do-brokering smal l  deals  against a 
background of disputed facts and uncontested though vaguely conceived rights and supervising 
the police and prosecutors as they decide which violent members of the u nderclass to im­
prison-hardly fits those conceptions of inst i tutional competence. 
CLSiv1, supra note 2 ,  at 581 . 
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has little use for practlcmg lawyers. He  i s  a theorist, devoted t o  the 
''world of scholarship ."  He regrets that law professors are led by their 
ambition into the world of public affairs; he contrasts the "corruption" 
and "moral obtuseness" of Laurence Tribe with the purity of those schol­
ars who strive for "intellectual substance."32 The claim seems to be that 
CLS owes its primary allegiance to learning and high theory , not to prac­
tical lawyering: What matters is the philosophy. This aspect of C LS-this 
repudiation of legal practice-is novel :  So far as I am aware, there has 
never been anything like i t  in English or American law. 
Now, I agree with CLS that philosophy has an important role to play 
in the legal academy, but if you are going to make this kind of argument, 
if you are going to reject the legal system and describe yourself as a phi­
losopher, then your philosophy had better be up to professional standards. 
There is little merit in  a philosophy of law that makes no contributions to 
law or to philosophy. In particular, if  you want to write about H obbes or 
mathematical logic or Aristotle's metaphysics, you would do well  to pro-­
ceed with a certain degree of care: These are not topics for amateurs. 
Perhaps for this reason, the leaders of C LS have been eager to claim 
the mantle of high scholarship .  Professor Kennedy says: 
I believe in high standards of academic excellence, and I don't think 
the debate is about that at all .  I think the real danger of the move­
ment is that people who have produced work which meets the high­
est possible academic standards will be denied tenure because of 
their political agendas, and I think that has already happened at the 
[Harvard Law] School in  one case. 33 
32 .  Professor Tushnet's remarks are  contained i n  h i s  review of Laurence Tribe's A merican Con-
stitutional Law. Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, 78 MICH. L. REv. 694 ( 1 980). Tushnet says: 
I hope that what has gone before raises a serious puzzle: how could so moral ly obtuse a work 
be taken so seriously? The answer can be found in Professor Tribe's ambition, w hich, like that 
of constitutional scholars generally, l ies outside the world of scholarship and in  the world of 
contemporary public affairs. Not that there is anything intrinsical ly wrong with ambit ion.  Its 
rewards, enumerated by Ward Just as honor, power, riches, fame, and the love of women, are, 
with one obvious modification, nothing to be sneered at. Most of us have imagined ourselves as 
Justices of the Supreme Court, and Professor Tribe, whose chances are better than those of the 
rest of us,* would surely be a better Justice than many. 
The question, though, is  to what activities the rewards of ambition accrue. In the world of 
public affairs, they accrue not necessari ly to intel lectual substance. One who addresses the real 
questions of justice is  by that fact alone disqualified from serious consideration for public 
position and influence, because raising those questions raises i n  turn questions about  the world 
of the posi tions that now exist, to be occupied or influenced. Under the circumstances, I take 
some pleasure, not however unmixed with regret, in noting that the Framers would have un­
derstood the phenomenon that Professor Tribe's work represents: they called i t  corruption. 
*[Tushnet's footnote: ]  I do offer Professor Tribe two bits of gratuit ious advice. The track 
record of appointments of academics to the Supreme Court is  weak indeed, as some of Profes­
sor Tribe's own colleagues could tell h im. And I pass on an observation by J udge Henry 
Friendly, who ought to know about this question: "Don't take one job expect ing that it wi l l  
lead to another." 
!d. at 7 1 0  & n.SO (footnotes otherwise omitted). 
33. Excerpts, supra note 1 5, at 23 (quoting D uncan Kennedy). 
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I propose to take the leaders of CLS at their word. My discussion wil l  
be resolutely non-political , and wil l  focus on the central issue of academic 
qual ity. This procedure is in any case the only way to evaluate the deci­
sion of the leading philosophers of the movement to remain aloof from the 
practice of law .  That decision rests on the claim that (as Professor Ken­
nedy says) law is "nonsense," that legal doctrine is "contradictory and 
manipulable" and wil l  remain so until l iberal society has been radically 
reformed. If this exciting thesis is  correct, then Tushnet's remarks about 
Tribe are fully justified. There is no point in  tinkering with minor aspects 
of the legal system-in using bandages on an i l lness that needs the knife .  
Of course, C LS scholars cannot merely assert that law is "nonsense"; 
they need an argument. But here, too ,  they have a straightforward an­
swer, namely, that they have applied "philosophy, social theory, h istory, 
psychology and anthropology" to legal thought34 and their i nvestigation 
has establ ished the "nonsense" theory of law. 
It is  at precisely this point that Unger's Knowledge and Politics be­
comes crucially important to C LS .  Unger is the most renowned thinker in  
the movement. Knowledge and Politics i s  (as we shall see) h is  most schol­
arly work. His critique of l iberalism ("the most extensive and influential 
critique of l iberalism in recent memory"36) is  the most sophisticated argu­
ment C LS has produced for the thesis that "no coherent theory of adjudi­
cation is possible within l iberal political thought."36 Moreover, he i s  the 
only C LS theorist who has attempted to describe his "vision" of a new 
society-of "organic groups" and of "the practical and spiritual ,  i ndivid­
ual and collective empowerment made possible by the disentrenchment of 
formative structures. "37 I shall therefore concentrate on these aspects of 
his work. 
I I .  KNOWLEDGE AND Pouncs 
I begin by discussing Knowledge and Politics. I shall examine this 
work in detail because it gives Unger's ful lest argument against the possi­
bility of a l iberal legal theory. His later writings build on thi s  argument, 
so it wi l l  be worthwhile to examine it closelv . 38 
I 
A. Unger's Argument 
Let us start by taking a brief survey of the book as a whole. It divides 
into three parts. Part One describes a philosophical theory, shows the 
34. See Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 209, 210 
( 1 979). 
35. Levinson, supra note 3, at 1466 n.4. 
36. KP, supra note I, at 98. 
37. CLSM, supra note 2 ,  at 650. 
38. In claiming that Unger's later writi ngs build u pon Knowledge and Politics I am fol lowing the 
authors quoted supra note 3. 
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baleful consequences of its acceptance, and argues that it is self­
contradictory . Parts Two and Three attempt to replace it with something 
better. 
Unger cal ls the theory he deplores "liberalism," and it is important to 
observe at the outset that his use of the term "liberal" is not the famil iar 
one whereby politicians are classified as "l iberal" or "conservative . "  As 
defined by Unger, l iberalism is not just a political attitude, but a Weltan­
schauung-an all -pervasive vision embracing our attitudes towards ethics, 
society, human personality, the social and natural sciences , pol i tics, meta­
physics, jurisprudence, epistemology , and psychology. Despite this seem­
ing multipl icity of subject-matter, l iberal ism is "a single mode of 
thought. . . .  The premises of this vision of the world are few ;  they are 
tied together; and they are as powerful in their hold on the mind as they 
are unacknowledged and forgotten ."39 Although unacknowledged and for­
gotten, the premises of l iberalism are nevertheless "the dominant and cen­
tral element in modern thought. "40 
The heart of Unger's argument is the connection he draws between 
liberal epistemology and the social organization of the l iberal state : that i s ,  
between the "knowledge and politics" of  his title. In his  view, the modern 
state is  both the reflection and the protector of l iberal thought. This fact is 
of great importance for three reasons. First ,  the disintegration and resig­
nation experienced by those who live in modern societies can be explained 
as the consequence of the deficiencies of the l iberal theory. Second, the 
fact that these theoretical defi ciencies have remained undetected for so 
long can be explained by pointing out that the l iberal ideas are deeply 
entrenched within the organization of society (they are, Unger says, "a 
way men have in fact come to experience their moral l i fe"41 )-a fact 
which also explains why a radical crit ique ("total criticism") is now nec­
essary . Third, by bringing the inner contradictions of liberal thought to 
light, Unger wil l  be able to expose the flaws in  l iberal social organization; 
thus , the l ink between knowledge and politics proves to be the entire sys­
tem's undoing. I shall elaborate these points i n  turn. 
1 .  The Sins of Liberalism 
First , consider the practical fai l ings of l iberalism. These may be treated 
under two headings: the moral predicament of the individual , and the po­
l i tical predicament of modern society. 
The predicament of the individual is  that he is subject to two "seem­
ingly opposite" moral sentiments, each of which "is, in a sense, the truth 
of the other and brings to the fore what is  hidden as a secret in its coun-
39. KP, supra note 1 ,  at 3. 
40. Id. at 7. 
4 1 .  Id. at 1 7 .  
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terpart. "42 The first sentiment is that of disintegration .43 The second is 
that of resignation: "Resignation is a despairing submission to a social 
order whose claims are inwardly despised. It is the governing idea and 
emotion of the pecul iar Stoicism in which the bureaucratic and profes­
sional classes of the welfare-corporate state so deeply participate."44 These 
two sentiments "share a common view of the relation of thought to l i fe" in  
which the public realm of  factual and technical discourse i s  severed from 
"an intimate world of feeling. Within the cage of private emotion all rel i ­
gion, art, and personal love i s  arrested, and from it  a l l  rational thought is 
banished."46 In consequence, "[ t ]he self is  spl it  i n  two, each half finding 
the other first incomprehensible, then mad. Thus, the subversion of the 
standards of sanity and madness is a consequence of the progress of these 
sen tim en ts. "46 
Unger's principal aim inK now ledge and Politics is to extricate us from 
this predicament: "There is a moving hand behind the crit ique of l iberal 
thought. It is  the desire to escape from the condition of the moral senti­
ments I have described into that state of simultaneous union and division 
of self and world in which all resignation becomes immanence and all 
disintegration transcendence."47 His ambition is not hopeless, because, 
"for all its power, the liberal doctrine is not powerful enough to subjugate 
the full  range of our feelings and ideas."48 There remain a number of 
ideals which l iberalism has been unable to eradicate!9 As for the political 
and social predicament, it too is caused by the dominant consciousness in 
the l iberal state, and Unger describes it eloquently.60 
42. !d. at 26. 
43. 
!d. 
Its characteristics are the fal l ing apart of different elements of the self, and revu lsion against 
the external world, especially against the social world. Disintegration i s  the defi n i ng experi­
ence of the culture of modernism. I t  i s  the fate of the dejected, the defeated, and the damned, 
who have never shared the consciousness of which the l iberal doctrine i s  a phi losophical 
expression. 
44. !d. 
45.  !d. at 27 
46. !d. 
47. !d. at 28. 
48. !d. 
49. For example, there remains: 
an ideal, which l iberalism never succeeded in stamping out and whose force was acknowledged 
even by many of the l iberal phi losophers. It is the view that the conscious self should be, and 
in  a sense always is, related to nature, to others, and to its own concrete l i fe and station, yet, in 
another sense, remains independent from them. The ideal of the relation between self and 
nature I call natural harmony, that of the relation between self and others sympathy, and that 
of the relation between the abstract and the concrete self concrete universality. 
!d. at 2 1 -22. 
50. 
The dominant consciousness in the l iberal state i ncludes a characteristic view of the relation 
between man as an agent or a thi nker and the external world, between man and h is  fellows, 
and between man and his work or social place. With respect to the first, i t  emphasizes the 
subjection of nature to human wi l l  as the ideal of action and the choice of efficient means to 
given ends as the exemplary procedure of reason. With regard to the second, it u nderl ines the 
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Not only does l iberalism warp people's relationships to themselves and 
to others: It distorts their i ntel lectual l i fe as wel l .  Unger's own experience 
bears this out. He  says that, having turned his mind to some problems of 
legal theory , he found that "the house of reason in which I was working 
proved to be a prison-house of paradox whose rooms did not connect and 
whose passageways led nowhere" ;  i t  was this discovery, he says, that 
caused him to write his book.111 
2. Partial Criticism 
Unger does not suppose that these problems have hitherto gone wholly 
unremarked . He says that there have been attempts to solve the di lemmas 
of liberalism in a piecemeal fashion, but these attempts have not met with 
success: "Our approaches to social study are nothing but partial assaults 
on a mode of thought they have neither repudiated nor understood in its 
entirety. "112 So long as we proceed in  this way, we shall get nowhere: 
"The sciences are simply partial critiques of the classical theory. It is  the 
partiality of their criticism, rather than the criticism i tself, that both sepa­
rates the sciences from each other and enslaves them to the theory from 
which they already imagine themselves free. "113 
Why should partial criticism be doomed to fai lure ? Because of the in­
terconnections of knowledge and polit ics :  specifical ly ,  because of the recip­
rocal dependence of l iberal theory and the l iberal social order.114 The fai l ­
ure of the partial assaults "shows the unbroken tyranny that the classical 
theory, in  this case the l iberal doctrine, exercises over the minds of those 
separateness of person [ sic], the artificial character of society, and the t ies of reciprocal need 
and hosti lity among individuals. As to the th ird ,  i t  focuses on the ambivalent value of work as 
both a manifestation and a surrender of personality. 
These three aspects of consciousness express a more general view of the world, the religion 
of transcendence, which asserts the radical separation of God and man, heaven and earth ,  soul 
and body. But transcendence takes a secularized form in the liberal mental ity. The conse­
quences of secularization are so far-reaching that they ult imately imply a radical transforma­
tion of the dominant consciousness itself. 
!d. at 19.  
5 1 .  !d. at 3 .  
52. !d.  at 5 .  
53.  !d. a t  2. 
54. Consider, for instance, what Unger says about the di fficulty of critici z ing l iberal theory's 
"Principle of Analysis": 
The axiom of analysis stands opposed to any attempt to pass, i n  the d iscussion of l iberal 
thought, from partial to total criticism. I t  always points toward the study of i nd ividual 
problems by denying that there i s  any whole in the tradition of l iberal ism except a collection of 
particular ideas entertained al d i fferent limes. The emperor of Japan, separated by a screen 
from his groveling subjects, could not have hoped for a better h iding place than the one this 
view of knowledge gives to the l iberal doctrine. 
The principle of analysis may owe much of its appeal to a particular form of social order, to 
whose perpetuation i t  in turn contributes: the situation in which each man's social existence is 
divided into a d iversity of roles. . A fractured social existence can only produce a fractured 
knowledge of the social order. 
!d. at 48. 
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who believe they have extricated themselves from its clutches. "�>�> And the 
partial criticism of l iberal ism has suffered "the fate of all partial criticism: 
to remain enslaved by that from which i t  claims to be free. "156 
Even such great thinkers as Marx, D urkheim , and Weber did not "suc­
ceed in establ ishing a psychology that escaped the implications of the l ib­
eral distinction of reason and desi re, and this fai lure in psychology runs as 
a poison through thei r pol i t ical ideas ."�>7 
3. Total Criticism 
How is one to overcome the l imitations of partial criticism ? By resort­
ing instead to what Unger calls total criticism. It is  not enough to attack 
the l iberal doctrine in a fragmentary fashion. "Liberalism must be seen all 
of a piece, not just as a set of doctrines about the disposition of power and 
wealth, but as a metaphysical conception of the mind and society . Only 
then can its true nature be understood, and its secret empire 
overthrown. »r>s 
Total criticism requires the cnt1c to work with concepts of great ab­
straction. The first step in Unger's argument is therefore to uncover what 
he calls  the "deep structure" of l iberal thought. The deep structure is 
defined by six interconnected principles, three of which come from psy­
chology , and three from pol i tical theory. The deep structure is not some­
thing that all l iberal thinkers have believed; i ndeed, "there is no one 
thinker who accepts the l iberal theory, in the form in which I present i t ,  
as  a whole, or  whose doctrines are completely defined by i ts tenets. "�>9 In 
other words, h is  "deep structure" is to be an idealization of historical l ib­
eralism.60 Without an understanding of this "deep structure," Unger says, 
his task would be hopeless.61 
The deep structure of l iberalism having been described, the next step in  
Unger's program of  total criticism is t o  show that the s ix  principles defin­
ing the socio-politico-metaphysical deep structure of l iberal ism are self­
contradictory: "that they produce antinomies that cannot be resolved 
within the system itself. "62 As for the implications of this i nvestigation for 
55 .  Jd. at 5 .  
56. Id. at 1 0. 
57. ld. 
58. /d. at 6. 
59. !d. at 8. 
60. See infra Section I I .  C.2 ("Unger's Logic"). 
6 1. 
The critique of the metaphysical framework of our ideas about knowledge and pol i t ics would 
be reduced to an endless game of h ide-and-go-seek. In the game the one who h ides wi l l  change 
position each time the one who seeks draws near, and the chaser wi l l  be trapped in a ha l l  of 
echoes i n  which the mocking voice of h i s  quarry will seem to come from everywhere and 
nowhere. 
KP, supra note 1, at 9. 
62. !d. at 13 (Unger defines an antimony as "a contradiction among conclusions derived from the 
same or from equally plausible premises"); see a lso id. at 1 8  ("the contradictions of l iberal thought"). 
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legal theory, " [a ]n especially important conclusion is that no coherent the­
ory of adjudication is possible within l iberal poli tical thought ."63 
Unger is not under the i l lusion that "a philosopher's trick"64 will suf­
fice to overthrow the empire of l iberalism. For "liberalism is a ruling con­
sciousness as well as a metaphysical theory,"65 and " [e ]ach of the theoreti­
cal problems wi l l  be seen to correspond to a problem in l i fe that only the 
transformation of experience through politics can truly resolve. "66 This 
interconnection of theory and experience causes Unger to consider a plan 
for "the transformation of the conditions of social l ife, particularly the 
circumstances of domination, that produce the experience of the contin­
gency and arbitrariness of values. "67 
Part Two of Unger's book is his theory of the emerging "vVelfare­
Corporate State" and of "its distinctive features of consciousness and or­
ganization. "68 Unger says that " [ i ]nsofar as they foreshadow a possible 
union of transcendence and i mmanence in consciousness and of autonomy 
and community in social organization, the welfare-corporate and the so­
cialist state change the experience of which the l iberal doctrine is both a 
part and a metaphysical representation. "69 B ut the "Theory of the W el­
fare-Corporate State" does not "define adequately what the new theory 
might be";70 Unger undertakes this project in  Part Three. There he out­
lines a "theory of the self" whose aim is "to define what a u nion of tran­
scendence and immanence, autonomy and community, would mean ."7 1  H e  
then tries to show "how the ideal o f  the self can b e  accompl ished in  soci­
ety through a transformation of the welfare-corporate and the socialist 
state ."72 He describes a community whose institutional features are de­
rived from the theory of the self, and he calls this community the organic 
group or the community of life.13 H e  says that organic groups wi l l  help 
the world to achieve "natural h armony, sympathy, and concrete universal­
ity."74 But he does not believe that organic groups can be easily attained: 
"An actualization of the ideal that broke through the logic of the everyday 
and the extraordinary would require, if it could be accomplished at al l ,  
the reformation of society. "75 
Unger's book ends with a section on religion, and the famous conclud-
63 .  !d .  at 98 .  
64. !d. at 1 7 .  
65 .  !d. at 24-25. 
66. !d. at  1 7 . 
67. !d. at  1 03.  
68. !d. at 20.  
69.  !d.  at 2 1 .  
70. !d. 
7 1 .  !d. 
72. !d. a t  237. 
73 .  !d. at  260-6 1 .  
74. !d. at 23. 
7 5 .  !d. 
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ing paragraph: "But our days pass, and still we do not know you fu lly . 
Why then do you remain silent ? Speak, God . m6 
Throughout the book, the l ink between epistemology and social organi­
zation-the "knowledge and politics" of his ti tle-plays the central role .  
This l ink is what allows Unger to make the transition from his crit ique of 
l iberal metaphysics to his conclusions about l iberal pol itics; as he empha­
sizes , this connection will "serve as the key that wil l  al low us to escape 
from the prison-house, just as it was the chain with which the gates were 
long ago locked by the bui lders. "77 
B. Remarks on Strategy 
The boldness of Unger's program is refreshingly unequivocal. He  says 
that he will ( 1 )  launch a total assault on a doctrine that (al though its 
premises are "forgotten," and although no single thinker held all its ten­
ets) forms the "deep structure" both of modern thought and of modern 
society. Specifically, he will (2) show that these principles are self­
contradictory. All this will take three chapters-a little over a hundred 
pages. In the remainder of the book he wil l  (3) point the way to a new 
kind of thought and a new kind of social l i fe ,  i ntimated by the theory of 
organic groups. These are the three most striking and important elements 
of his book; particularly the first two, which amount to a claim to have 
refuted the central core of modern thought. I shall discuss these three ele­
ments-the methodology, the antinomies, and the theory of organic 
groups-later; but first, let me say a few words about Unger's project in 
general . 
Although I shall have many crit icisms of the details ,  I am entirely sym­
pathetic to the kind of enterprise Unger i s  engaged in .  His work tackles 
an impressive range of problems and attempts to solve them by exploiting 
a deep connection between epistemology and poli tical organization. The 
connection, l ike the Loch Ness monster, has often been glimpsed. Al­
though nobody has ever brought back i rrefutable evidence, I suspect that 
it exists and that it is as important as Unger says :  If his  spectacular claims 
are correct , they have implications far beyond the narrow world of legal 
theory. I too share Unger's admiration for the tradition of Continental 
philosophy; on this issue he is ahead of many Anglo-American philoso­
phers. I also feel some sympathy for the enthusiasm his enterprise has 
evoked among his followers. Most academic moral philosophy i s  dry, diffi­
cult, and-superficial ly ,  at least-uninspiring. Unger, in  contrast, displays 
a refreshing will ingness to make breathtaking claims that most profes­
sional philosophers are too unimagil!ative or too timid or too prudent to 
76. !d . at 295. 
77.  /d. a t  4 .  
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make; few works of academic  philosophy begin by announcing the refuta­
tion of modern thought or end by saying, "Speak, God ." 
Of course, the ability to make breathtaking claims is not enough: You 
also have to support them. And here the detai ls  matter. It is the detai ls ,  
after all ,  that make the difference between the thri l ls  of the astrologer and 
the more austere excitement of the astronomer, or between the claims of 
The National Enquirer and those of The Washington Post. In particular, 
Unger has an obligation to satisfy the basic standards of historical exposi­
tion and of philosophical argumentation.78 Everything in his refutation of 
l iberalism depends upon these two requirements. For if the history is 
wrong, he will have achieved nothing more substantial than victory over a 
straw-person; and if the argumentation is careless, his adversary, even if  i t  
be of straw, will survive the battle unscathed. 
My strategy wil l  therefore be straightforward. I shall proceed through 
the stages of Unger's argument, and at each stage I shall ask: How accu­
rate is his history ? And how sound are his arguments ? I shall then con­
sider h i s  theory of  organic groups. In  particular, I shall ask: 
(1) JIIIethodology. What is "l iberalism" ? Does i t  have a "deep struc­
ture" ? And is the methodology of "total criticism" logically coherent ?  
(2) The Antinomies. Do U nger's six principles embody a dist inct ,  his­
torically  important philosophical theory ? (That is :  Do the classical l iberal 
thinkers generally accept Unger's six principles, and do the non-l iberals 
reject them ?) And do Unger's arguments show that the principles lead to 
contradictions ? 
(3) Organic Groups. Does this theory offer a plausible replacement for 
modern social l ife and for modern political theory ? 
To the first of these questions I now turn. 
C .  Unger's Methodology 
1 .  What Is Liberalism? 
Unger says that l iberalism took its classical form in the seventeenth cen­
tury in the works of Thomas Hobbes, who rejected the Aristotelian meta­
physics and moral psychology .79 A close examination of U nger's book 
yields the following list of l iberals: Hobbes, Locke, H ume, S pinoza, Rous­
seau, Kant, Bentham, Mi l l ,  von H umboldt, T .H.  Green ,  Strawson, 
Rawls,  Dworkin .80 The l ist of post-Hobbesian non-l iberals i s  rather 
shorter: Although Dewey, James, Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Scheler, and 
78. Unger might argue that these standards are themselves a product of l iberal ism, hence part of 
the object of his attack , and thus not appl icable to h i s  work. I discuss th is argument infra notes 
94- 1 1 3  and accompanying text. 
79. KP, supra note 1 ,  at 5 .  
80. !d. at 9 ,  88, 298, 303, 306-08. 
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Hartmann are mentioned as providing "partial critiques" of l iberal 
thought,81 nobody is l isted as a clear opponent of the l iberal doctrine. 
I f  by "l iberal" Unger meant simply "modern" (so that "non-l iberal" 
would mean "pre-modern") ,  then the two l ists would not be so puzzling; 
but he explicitly rules out this interpretation.82 He thereby leaves us with 
the problem of trying to understand why the l ist of non-l iberals is  empty, 
and what his "l iberals" have in common apart from having l ived and 
written after the Peace of Westphalia .  The problem is compounded by the 
fact that the term "liberal" already exists in ordinary usage and i s  ambig­
uous enough that Unger's readers may be tempted to read their own in­
terpretation of l iberalism into his argument. Even at the level of concrete 
pol itical discourse, the term is notoriously vague. Historically ,  the word 
dates from the years fol lowing the French Revolution; it designated a 
loose cluster of political principles-on the one hand, opposition to au­
thoritarian forms of pol itical organization (such as monarchy) and to the 
excessive power of the state; on the other hand, a concern for polit ical 
l iberties (freedom of speech and of religion) ,  for democratic  polit ical insti­
tutions, for the separation of church and state, and for electoral reform. 
Even at this concrete l evel , these principles can come into confl ict with one 
another, and l iberalism soon split into branches, such as laissez-faire eco­
nomic l iberalism, movements for national self-determination, l ibertarian­
ism, and New D eal l iberalism-to mention only a few.83 It is  a famil iar 
observation that a pol itician can be "l iberal" on one issue and not on 
another, and that the positions identified as "l iberal" change over t ime. In 
addition, there is the sense of "liberal" that can be used to classify mem­
bers of the Soviet Politburo or the South African Parliament as "liberal" 
or "conservative ."  
Once one moves to  the  more abstract level of  pol itical theory and 
searches for the philosophical underpinnings of l iberalism, matters become 
still more confusing. Hobbes, for instance, Unger's prime l iberal , was an 
advocate, not of i ndividual rights, but of monarchy and the absolute power 
of the state. On the other hand, his theory of sovereignty, his account of 
the social contract, his secularism, his i ndividualism, his empiricism, and 
his posi tivism exerted a profound influence on subsequent poli t ical theory, 
including that of British l iberals like Mi l l ,  Bentham, and Sidgwick. (His  
influence on continental l iberals l ike  Kant and von Humboldt was mini­
mal . )  So Hobbes' claim to be called "l iberal" is not entirely un­
problematic. Even i f  we restrict our attention to philosophers who can be 
81 . !d. at 1 0 , 1 5 , 30 1 .  
82. "First, what I shall call l iberalism is not tantamount to moderni ty. M uch in  modern thought 
is  irreconcilable with l iberal principles; the polemic against them dates back to the time of their 
original formulation ."  !d. at 8. 
83. For a helpful account of the history of the word " l iberal ," see J .  RITTER & K .  GRUNDER, 
HISTORISCHES WORTERBUCH DER PHILOSOPHIE  ( 1 980). 
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fairly uncontroversially classifi ed as "l iberals" -such as Kant, Bentham, 
Mi l l ,  von Humboldt, Green,  Dewey ,84 and Rawls-the amount of meta­
physical , epistemological , psychological , and even pol it ical diversity is 
striking.86 So Unger's use of the vauge and ambiguous term "l iberal" 
to designate a single politico-metaphysical -socio-cultural -psycho­
epistemological theory adhered to by all these thinkers needs considerable 
historical justification. 
In the interest of clarity , U nger should have supplied an h istorical ex­
position of "l iberal ism" and disentangled it from his cri t ique; he ought at 
the least to have given a clear l ist of modern l iberals and non-l iberals ,  and 
he ought perhaps to have used a more precise term (like C .B .  MacPher­
son's "possessive individualism") to describe the doctrine he opposes. To 
these objections Unger might reply ,  first, that he i s  not so much concerned 
to enumerate a set of l iberals as to refute a set of ideas that have been 
influential in modern thought; and, second, that his presentation of  the 
"deep structure" gives a precise account of the phi losophy of  " l iberal ism." 
But a brief glance at  one of  Unger's six "principles of l iberal ism" -the 
"principle of i ndividualism" -illustrates the difficulties with this reply. 86 
This principle i s  vague to the point of emptiness . Moreover, as stated, i t  
contains an  obvious fallacy , and to the extent that this principle has any 
identifiable meaning i t  i s  explicit ly rejected by Rawls (who says he i s  fol ­
lowing von H umboldt on this point) .87 I can see no justifi cation for attrib­
uting i t  to any influential thinker who actually existed. 
Of course, Unger i s  entitled to call h is  s ix principles by w hatever name 
he chooses. But i t  is important to remember that these six princi ples must 
be shown to determine an historically important philosophical theory. A 
mere redefinition i s  not enough. A simple example of an argument that 
84. Pace Unger; see J .  DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION ( 1 935) .  
85. If Hegel is added to the l is t ,  as many scholars have argued he should be, then my claim 
becomes even stronger. See R. DREIER, Bemerkungen zur Rechtsphilosophie Hegels, i n  RECHT­
MORAL-lnwwc;n: ( 1 98 1  ) ; j. RITTER, HEGEL UND DIE FRANZOSISCHE REVOLUTION ( 1 9 57) ;  S .  
AVINERI ,  HEGEL's THEORY OF  THE Mom:RN STATE ( 1 972); Pelczynski, The Hegelian Conception 
of the State, in H EGEL's PoLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1 (Z. Pelczynski ed. 1 97 1 ) . 
86. 
[A ] group is simply a collection of i ndiv iduals; i n  other words, the attributes of a group are the 
sum of the attributes of i ts individual members. [This i s ]  the principle of indiv idual ism, or 
simply individualism. 
I f  we take the group as the whole and the members as parts, the principle of i ndiv idual ism 
affirms that the whole is just the sum of i ts parts. In  this sense, i t  is formally analogous to the 
principle of analysis, which states that al l  complex knowledge (the whole) can be analyzed 
back into the elementary ideas or sensations (the parts) with which it was bu i l t .  This formal 
analogy wi l l  later turn out to be the outward sign of a profound connection . 
KP, supra note 1 ,  at 8 1 .  Note in passing that the first sentence in the above q uotation contains a 
fallacious inference. To say that "a group is simply a col lection of individuals" is qu i te d ifferent from 
saying that "the attributes of a group are the sum of the attribu tes of i ts i ndividual members." A table 
is simply a collection of atoms. A table has the attribute of being a table, but atoms do not have this 
attribute. For the poin t  about Rawls, see J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTICE 520-29 ( 1 97 1 )  and infra 
text accompanying notes 226-32. 
87. J. RAWLS, supra note 86, at 523 n.4. 
1 98 8 ]  Unger's Philosophy 683 
commits the "redefinitional fal lacy" wil l  clarify this point .  " I  wish to 
prove that tuna fish do not exist. I begin by defining tuna fish to be mer­
maids; that is , they are mythological creatures, half human and half pis­
cine. But it is physiologically impossible for a single organism to be both 
warm-blooded and cold-blooded. This is an antinomy, from which it fol­
lows that tuna fish do not exist ."  
Professor Unger's usage of the word "liberal" commits precisely this 
fallacy. I shall show later that his "six principles of l iberalism" do not, in 
fact , constitute an historically important theory . His "refutation" of what 
he cal ls  "liberal ism" refutes, at best, only what he calls "l iberal ism"; it 
refutes historical liberalism only by redefinitional equivocation . For this 
reason Unger's usage must be carefully distinguished from the ordinary 
political and philosophical usages. In what follows, I shal l write i t  as LIB­
ERALISM in order to keep the senses distinct. My subsequent discussion 
will show that much of the plausibility of Unger's argument depends on 
confusion-specifically ,  on confusing LIBERALISM with l iberalism. 
A further objection addresses the logical form of Unger's argument. 
The problem is that his LIBERALISM is meant to serve, not merely as a 
rational reconstruction of historical l iberalism, but as a target for refuta­
tion. There is an important logical difference between the two enterprises. 
If you wish to support a political thesis or to uphold a phi losophical tradi­
tion, you need only produce a single theory that supports that thesis or 
that falls within the tradition and then argue for its truth .  If other theo­
ries in the tradition fall short of the truth, so much the worse for them: 
Your theory still stands. But i f  you wish to refute a philosophical tradi­
t ion, it is not enough to refute a single theory. For one of the other theo­
ries in the tradition might be true, and then so much the worse for your 
refutation. 
2. Unger's Logic 
Obviously, it would be tedious to examine and refute each separate the­
ory in the LIBERAL tradition. If that laborious work is eschewed, as Unger 
has eschewed it, there remain three strategies for refuting this collection of 
theories. It is important to distinguish the strategies, because one of them 
is fal lacious, and the other two impose different constraints on the form of 
the refutation. 
The first strategy-call i t  the ideal strategy-is to ( 1)  single out some 
one theory T (which may be an idealization or rational reconstruction) ,  
(2) show that i t  is the best of all the theories, and (3 )  show that i t  never­
theless fails .  One can then argue, that T's weaker cousins would also fail .  
This strategy is rather l ike establishing your prowess a t  fisticuffs by beat­
ing up the neighborhood bully;  you hope it won' t  be necessary to fight 
everyone else on the block as well. Of course, logically speaking, this sort 
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of argument does not prove that you would not be  thrashed by the bully's 
l i ttle s i ster; and, logical ly speaking, it may be that one of the other theo­
ries would not succumb quite so easily as T. But i t  is  not very l ikely, 
provided that T is clearly stronger and more plausible than all the other 
candidates , and provided that the other candidates are apt to fail for the 
same sort of reason that T failed. The crucial point is  that T m ust not be 
made of straw ; otherwise the argument shows nothing. 
The second strategy-the core strategy-is  to show that all  theories in 
the tradition share a common set of assumptions ,  and that these assump­
tions lead to unacceptable conclusions or to a contradict ion. This strategy , 
unlike the ideal strategy , does, as a matter of logic, imply that all  the 
theories fai l . 88 And it imposes a different responsibility on the argument: 
to show that all theories in  the tradition have these principles in  common. 
I t  is obviously not enough to grab a few theses from here and a few from 
there and then show that they lead to a contradiction. The argument must 
be directed against the intersection of the theories, not against their union; 
for, as a logical matter, the latter strategy shows nothing. 
The third strategy-the agglomeration strategy-makes precisely this 
mistake. It confuses the sum of a few theses gathered from here and there 
with the central core of the theory. It is as though you were to argue :  
"Jack and Ji l l  share a common theory o f  the authorship of Hamlet. Jack 
thinks it was written by Shakespeare; Jill thinks it was w ri tten by Bacon. 
This is an antinomy; ergo , their theory is untenable ." If this argument 
shows anything, i t  is  that the supposed "common theory" does not exist. 
There are thus three possible strategies, attacking respectively the ideal , 
the common core, or the agglomeration of the theories. Which one does 
Unger choose ? Not the ideal strategy, for his six principles are not 
presented in anything l ike the detail that would be required to make them 
the best possible version of LIBERALISM. 89 ( Indeed, as will appear, his six 
88.  In practice, there wi l l  often be some overlap between the ideal and the core strategies, for the 
fol lowing reason. i\n ideal-strategy argument shows that  al l  theories "sufficiently s imi lar" to the ideal  
wil l  fai l ;  and the notion of "sufficiently s imi lar" wi l l  often be detai led enough to mark out a common 
core. For example, when Francis Bacon argued against Aristotle's account of science, he was at the 
same time attacking assumptions that had been made by all of Aristotle's medieval fol lowers; so he 
was simultaneously making a valid core argument and a valid ideal argument. There i s  clearly noth­
i ng wrong with making an argument that is valid on both counts, but the two strategies are logical ly  
distinct, and if  you confuse them you risk making an argument that  i s  val id on neither count. 
89. To be more precise, the historical facts I discussed earlier suggest that no  un i tary socio­
pol i t ical -metaphysical ideal-strategy argument could be made to work against l iberal ism. The d iver­
sity of ways in which phi losophers have argued for l iberal political v iews makes i t  un l i kely that one 
could construct a single theory which everybody would agree to be the best version of l iber­
al ism-there are several strong contenders, and they have di fferent philosophical u nderpinnings. Just 
as a victory over the best boxer in town does not show that one could beat the l ocal b lack-belt, so a 
victory over even the best uti l itarian-based l iberal pol i tical theory does not i n  i tself refute the best 
Kantian-based theory. So if one wishes to pursue the ideal strategy, one has to pursue it against each 
of the principal types of l iberal pol i tical theory-that is, one has to select the best representative for 
each of the three or four principal types of l iberalism and defeat each of these theories separately. 
Unger argues against a si ngle, weak theory rather than against several strong ones, from which I i n fer 
that he is nut fol lowing the ideal strategy. 
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principles are l i ttle more than a straw-person:  They are too vague to be 
plausible,  and they do not define an historically important theory . )  Nor 
does he follow the core strategy , for he tel l s  us ,  not only that h is  s ix prin­
ciples are not held in  common by all LIBER A L  th inkers , but that n o  LIB­
ERAL holds al l s ix .90 In  fact (as a detai led examination of h is  argument 
will show),  he appears to be employing the fallacious agglomeration strat­
egy ,  in which case his argument can show nothing more interesting than 
that LIBERALISM is not a political theory-a concl usion that I have al ­
ready given grounds for bel ieving.91 
Unger gives a curious justification for his procedure. H e  does not dis­
cuss the genuine-indeed fatal-logical difficult ies that beset the agglom­
eration strategy; instead, he worries (in the section enti tled "The Problem 
of Language") about a logical matter which he treats as a problem, al ­
though in fact he should have welcomed i t .  He says that he intends to 
show, fi rst, "that the principles informing l iberalism are related to one 
another and, second, that they produce antinomies that cannot be resolved 
within the system itself. "92 But a worry then strikes him: 
Should the antinomies of l iberal thought prove to be indeed in solu­
ble, would we not have to abandon the claim that l iberal principles 
are interdependent ? If  we did, however, it would then no longer be 
clear in what sense the principles constituted a system , even though , 
as a contingent matter, they might coexist in certain minds .93  
This sounds as though Unger has noticed the central difficulty with the 
agglomeration strategy-that Ji l l ' s  principles plus Jack's principles do not 
constitute a system. But in fact what seems to be bothering him here is not 
a doubt about the agglomeration strategy, but something quite different: 
"It cannot in  fact be demonstrated that the different premi ses of the lib­
eral doctrine follow from one another by a strict logical necessity, nor 
would such a demonstration be consistent with the discovery that these 
premises lead to contradictory conclusions. "94 
90. "[T]here is no one thinker who accepts the l iberal theory, in  the form in which I present it ,  as 
a whole, or whose doctrines are completely defined by i ts tenets." KP, supra note 1 ,  at 8 .  
9 1 .  I t  should be observed that the  "redefinitional fallacy" and the agglomeration strategy are 
related. They are both examples of equivocation, but they equivocate in d i fferent ways. Unger com­
mits the agglomeration fallacy when he takes incompatible theses from distinct theories , agglomerates 
them into an artificial theory, shows that the art i ficial theory is inconsistent, and concludes that he has 
refuted the original theories. He commits the fallacy of redefi ni t ion when he dubs the artificial theory 
" LI BERALISM," and concludes that, in refuting it, he has refuied historical l iberal ism. These fal lacies 
have to be exposed in d ifferent ways. The argument against the agglomeration fal lacy is logical, and 
consists in  pointing out the gap in Unger's reasoning. The argument against the redefin i tional fallacy 
is historical, and consists in pointing out that, because the "six principles of LIBER ALISM" do not 
constitute a theory that any phi losopher has ever held, there is no warrant for cal l ing them 
"liberal ism." 
' 
92. KP, supra note 1 ,  at 1 3 . 
93. /d. 
94. !d. at 1 5 . 
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On the contrary: If Unger were making a valid core argument (as he 
sometimes seems to take himself to be doing) , then such a demonstration is  
precisely what he ought to hope for. For it has the consequen ce that all 
the premises of LI BERALISM must be abandoned; otherwise the antinomies 
could be resolved by dropping one or another subset of the principles and 
keeping the others.95 The logical form of an argument of the sort Unger 
proposes is in fact well known and has nothing paradoxical about it. 
Here, for instance, is Bertrand Russel l arguing against "naive realism" :  
"Naive realism leads to physics, and physics , i f  true, shows that naive 
realism is false. Therefore, naive realism, if true, is false; therefore it is 
false . "96 Arguments of this sort are perfectly familiar. They come in many 
different forms , and although they are usually more compl icated than 
Russel l ' s  argument they are just as reconcilable with the laws of logic. So 
the "quandary" Unger discusses is merely a pseudo-problem: He need not 
have worried. 
But his proposed solution lands him in the logical soup. I shall l inger 
over it, because in a very brief compass it shows the quality of Unger's 
scholarship as well as of his reasoning .  
Unger begins the defense of his methodology by raising the following 
problem: "The methods of proof and argument are part of the theory to 
be criticized. In  what form then is total criticism to bring its suit ,  and by 
what law are its claims to be judged ?"97 He next argues that L I BER­
ALISM 's methods of proof and argument-its "familiar modes of explana­
tion" -are engendered by LIBERALISM's separation of the "order of ideas" 
from the "order of events" :  
Much of the history of modern philosophy can be understood as a 
series of attempts to elucidate the relationship between the order of 
ideas and the order of events. First, the order of events was reduced 
to that of ideas so that logic provided the key to all explanation ( ra­
tionalism).  Then the order of ideas was reduced to that of events so 
that causality served as the basis of a unified science of the  world 
(empiricism). 98 
One wonders what to make of the assertion that empiricism reduced "the 
order of ideas . . .  to the order of events." I t  would have been more accu­
rate to say that the empiricists ( in particular, Berkeley and B urne) tried 
to show precisely the reverse, namely ,  that physical events and objects 
95.  This is a straightforward appl ication of what logicians cal l  the "completeness theorem for 
propositional logic." The basic idea is this .  Consider the s implest case, where there are only two 
premises, X and Y. Suppose that premises X and Y taken together lead to a contradiction. Now, if X 
impl ies Y, then both X and Y must be abandoned. But  i f  X does not imply Y, then you can abandon Y, 
retain X, and avoid the contradiction. 
96. B.  RussELL, AN INQUIRY INTO M EANING AND TRUTH 1 3  ( 1 9 62). 
97 .  KP, supra note 1 ,  at 1 2 . 
98. !d. at 1 3- 1 4. 
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could be explained in terms of mental events and objects : what H ume 
called "impressions and ideas ,"  and what later empiricists cal led "sense­
data ." And as for causal i ty ,  H ume argued, in one of the most famous texts 
in the history of philosophy , that there is no such thing as causality " in 
the object , "  but that  the basis of causal i ty is rather to be found in  "the 
association of ideas" :  that the "power and necessi ty" involved in  causation 
are "qualit ies of perceptions, not of objects. "99 Ever since Hume, causal i ty 
has been a problematic concept for empiricists . Bertrand Russel l ' s  opinion 
is typical :  "The law of causal i ty ,  I believe ,  l i ke much that passes muster 
among phi losophers, is a rel ic  of a bygone age, surviving, l i ke the monar­
chy , only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm. " 1 00 
Unger's remarks on the rationalists are equally untenable. In  the first 
place, the rationalists were not interested in  the reduction of "events" to 
"ideas" so much as in try ing to elucidate the connections between the 
mental and the physical . This remark is especially true of Descartes, who 
was (notoriously) a dual is t , 1 01 but it also holds for Spinoza and Leibniz .  
Second, the rationalists did not take logic to be the key to al l  explanation. 
Spinoza scarcely mentions the word "logic";  Descartes does so only once, 
and says that he found the subject useless for his purposes. 102 And al­
though Leibniz wrote about logic, his ideas were not published until the 
present century . Logic, in  fact ,  had i ts heyday under Aristotle and the 
Schoolmen,103 not under the rationalists .  Unti l  the mathematical develop­
ments of the nineteenth century , the standard view was that of Kant: that 
Aristotle had said the last word on logic, a subject that was all  very well 
in its place, but of l i t t le use for the discovery of new truths. 1 04 
So Unger's description of the content of the views of the rationalists and 
99 .  D .  HUME, A TREATISE OF HuMAN NATURE bk. 1 ,  pt. 3 ,  §§  1 2 , 1 4  ( 1 740) (L .  Selby-Bigge 
ed. 1 958) .  For a detai led discussion and a lengthy bibl iography, see J. MACKIE, THE CEMENT OF 
THE UNIVERSE ( 1 974) .  
1 00 .  B. RussELL, AJysticism and Logic, in MYSTICISM AND LoGIC AND OTHER EssAYS 1 80 
( 1 9 1 8) 
1 0  I .  Descartes was the originator of "Cartesian dual ism," the doctrine that mmd and body are 
two radically distinct substances. 
1 02 .  
I observed in  respect to Logic that the syl logism and the greater part of the other teaching 
served better in explaining to others those th ings that one knows (or l ike the art of Lully, in 
enabl i ng one to speak without judgment of those things of which one is ignorant) than in 
learning what is new. And al though i n  reality Logic contains many precepts which are very 
true and very good, there are at the same time mingled with them so many others which are 
hurtful or superfluous, that it is almost as difficul t  to separate the two as to draw a Diana or a 
Minerva out of a block of marble which is not yet roughly hewn. 
R .  DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD OF RIGHTLY CONDUCTING THE REASON pt. Il (E. 
Haldane & G.  Ross trans. 1 9 1 1 ) . 
1 03.  I .e . ,  the scholastic phi losophers of the middle ages, who were reviled by l ater generat ions for 
their al legedly excessive use of logic. The effects of this revi lement can be seen i n  the etymology of two 
famil iar English words. Students in medieval Oxford were expected to study logic, grammar, and 
rhetoric, three subjects that were collectively known as the trivium; from this root grew our word 
trivial. And onr of the greatest logicians of the middle ages, Duns Scotus, had his name corrupted by 
Renaissance anti-logicians into dunce. 
1 04. See I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, B vi i i- ix ( 1 794) .  
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the empiricists is inaccurate .  I t  is  also irrelevant. For he is trying to j ustify 
the methodology of his argument, and so he ought to have considered the 
methodology that rationali sts and empiricists used to make their argu­
ments. Not that thei r methodology would help him. The rationalists do 
not argue purely from logic, nor do the empiricists argue purely from 
causal ity . 1 05 
And, in  fact ,  the rational ists have no unique claim to logicality .  Ratio­
nalists and empiricists , Aristotle and the Schoolmen, logical positivists and 
their Quinean successors-all (not very surprisingly) accept the basic laws 
of logic; and they would reject as invalid any argument that relied on the 
agglomeration strategy-the problem that Unger should have discussed, 
but didn't. 
Unger invokes this history to support the fol lowing argument. Recal l  
that he is facing "the fundamental problem of method engendered by the 
disjunction of the order of ideas and the order of events . " 1 06 H e  says  that 
he intends to solve this methodological problem by developing a different 
mode of explanation: "The objective is  to work toward a situation in 
which the crit ique of l iberalism will i tself forge a method of  in terpretation 
more adequate than logical analysis ,  a result only to be achieved ful ly 
through the construction of a nonliberal system of thought ." 1 07 Bu t  Un­
ger's excursion into the history of philosophy i s  not l ikely to persuade 
anybody to "embrace that third and yet undefined mode of explanation 
that stands beyond the boundaries of formal logic and causal i ty . " 1 08 S uch 
a drastic step ought to be supported by arguments, and the arguments 
1 05 .  For example, Descartes's !Vleditations begin w i th  Descartes i n  h is  room reflecting on h i s  
dreams and on  the  mal leabi l i ty o f  a piece of wax; he i s  led, v i a  universal doubt, to the  cogito argument 
(which assures him of his own existence) ; then to a causal proof of the existence of God (which 
assures him of the existence of an external world, of the truth of mathematics) .  This argument de­
pends heavily upon extra-logical premises, and, in part icular,  upon premises about causal i ty ;  it is not 
an exercise in pure logic. S imi larly,  Berkeley's ideal ism rests on a logical analysis of the concept of 
matter, on an argument that the notion of material substance i s  logical ly self-contradictory; it i s  not an 
exercise i n  causal explanation. 
1 06. KP, supra note 1 ,  at 1 4. 
1 07 .  !d. at 1 5 . Unger adds: "This procedure wi l l  require the  i ntroduction of certa in plausibl e  but 
contingent empirical assumptions at various points  of the exposit ion and the abandonment of strict 
demonstration i n  favor of suggestive argument." !d. But this does not help him, and would not do so 
even i f  he were subsequently clear about which "empirical assumptions" he i ntroduces. You can add 
as many empirical premises to a logica l ly  flawed argument as you l ike, and the flaw remains: 
" 1 + 1 = 3, ergo 2 + 2 = 5" is not improved if you change it to, " 1 + 1 = 3 and snow i s  wh i te ,  ergo 
2 + 2 = 5 ." In any case, the agglomeration strategy is i n  no sense a "suggestive argument"; i t  is simply 
muddled. 
1 08 .  !d. Compare Unger's argument to the fol lowing: "The natural sciences are subject to a dis­
junction between the mathematical sciences and the physical sciences. I wish to construct a new sci­
ence which will transcend both. In  the argument for my science, I shall have to resort to equations 
that state that 2 + 2 = 7 .  This may look odd, but you should remember that the mathematicians do 
everything in terms of numbers, and the physicists do everyth ing in terms of physica l  objects. Because 
I am attempting to find a method of i nterpretation more adequate than mathematical analysis ,  I 
cannot be held to the methodology of the mathematicians." Obviously, the chief fal lacy i n  th i s  argu­
ment is the assumption that only the mathematicians have an i nterest in the laws of elementary arith­
metic; Unger's historical remarks about the rationalists and the empiricists seem to me to make pre­
cisely the same mistake, but for logic rather than mathematics. 
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ought to be solid as bricks . But Unger's sol itary argument is that, because 
his book is not going to adhere to the standards of logic, because he i s  
going to employ the agglomeration strategy , we need "a method of inter­
pretation more adequate than logical analysis": "The need to deviate from 
logical analysis compels us to prefigure that other and more complete sort 
of explanation to which we have aspired, and which must constitute the 
cornerstone of another theory . " 109 Not only are we to "deviate from logi­
cal analysis ," we are to do so in the interests of a "mode of explanation" 
that wil l  not emerge unti l  LI BERALISM has been overcome: "If  both the 
problem [of methodology ] and the disjunction that produces it are them­
selves bound up with the fate of the l iberal system, it will not be possible 
to go from the name of the solution to the solution until we have found an 
alternative to l iberali sm." 1 1 0  But because the overthrow of LIBERALISM 
will ,  as Unger stresses, require "the reformation of society, " 1 1 1 he spares 
himself the necessity of answering any embarrassing questions about how 
the new "mode of explanation" will work, or about what l ife wil l  be like 
in a society that has rejected the laws of logic. 
Unger i s  in fact mistaken in his premise that logic is ideologically 
tainted. Political attacks on logic and the natural sciences (as being "bour­
geois" or "non-Aryan" or "male supremacist") have been tried before, 
and they have never had much success .  Generally  speaking, they are ad­
vanced by people whose arguments cannot stand close scrutiny ,  and whose 
abilities at logical argument are not particularly strong. In fact, modern 
formal logic is the creation of social ists (Russell ) ,  anti-Semites (Frege) , 
l iberals (Hilbert) ,  Jews (Tarski) ,  women (Rasiowa) , and the non-political 
(Godel) .  The logicians Jean van Heijenoort (who was Trotsky ' s  private 
secretary) and :tviichael D ummett (a passionate campaigner against Brit­
ish racism) both agree that Frege was the greatest l ogician since 
Aristotle . 1 12 
Unger's argument in this passage has little to recommend i t . 1 1 3  He ap-
1 09. !d. at 1 6. 
1 1 0. !d. at 1 4- 1 5 . 
1 1 1 .  !d. at 23. 
1 1 2. See M. DuMMETT, FREGE: PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE xii ( 1 973);  J.  VAN H EIJENOORT, 
FROM FREGE TO G6DEL 1 -5 ( 1 967). 
1 1 3 .  The argument, "Logic is a product of LIBERAL society; I am trying to reform LIBERAL soci­
ety; ergo, I am entitled to deviate from the l aws of logic," is  qui te a muddle, and it certainly does not 
remove the Oaw in  the agglomeration strategy. Nor is i t  particularly new. The l i terature of pseudo­
science is fi lled with exchanges of the following general form: "Look at these equations' I 've proved 
that mathematics is  i nconsistent'"-"No you haven't .  Look here: You've divided by zero."-"So 
what? I told you mathematics was rotten to the core." M adame Blavatsky, a nineteenth-century spiri­
tualist, wrote about vril, a mysterious cosmic energy mastered by the i nhabitants of Atlantis which, 
she said, had provided the power for John Keely's perpetual motion machine. I n  the 1 920's, a Chi­
cago businessman, Robert T. Nelson, Jr. ,  began to sell brass cyl inders containing a substance cal led 
vrilium. The cylinders were supposed to emit radiation for 20 feet, thereby repel l ing bacteria and 
ki l l ing germs within the body. In  1 950, the United States government revealed that the cyl inders 
contained nothing but a cheap rat poison; furthermore, this rat poison was found to have no effect on 
geiger-counters. "I believe," replied Nelson, "that we have an unrecognized form of radioactivity." 
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pears to have sensed the logical difficulties with his melhodology , but to 
have realized neither exactly what they were nor exactly how they were to 
be avoided; instead of eradicating the problem, he tries to patch it with a 
deeply confused discussion of the history of logic. Fortunatel y  for Unger, 
his practice is better than his theory , and most of his cri t ique of LI B ER ­
A L I S M  can be read as a coherent argument.  But ,  unfortunately ,  he is 
marching into battle against a theory nobody ever held, a straw-person, 
and he is marching without the benefit of any knowledge of elementary 
logic. It remains to be seen who will win .  
3 .  Recapitulation 
This will be a convenient place to take stock . I began by observing that 
Unger's argument needs to be up to the mark both in its h istorical asser­
tions and in its reasoning. I then noted that the details of h is six princi ples 
of LI BERA LISM are given in the discussion of the antinomies rather than 
being separately presented; I accordingly postponed the examination of 
their historical accuracy until later. I then reviewed the uses of the word 
"l iberal ," and expressed doubt that any interesting "ideal version" could 
be constructed for a set of pol it ical theories that covers so much ground 
and that contains so many sharp internal differences-especially when the 
"deep structure" is to be given by principles as broad as the "principle of 
analysis ."  This conclusion was important because it ruled out the possibil­
ity that Unger could make successful use of the ideal strategy . He h imself 
rules out the core strategy , and appears to adopt the fallacious agglomera­
tion strategy . S ince the agglomeration strategy cannot, as a matter of logic, 
demonstrate what he wants to prove, I cast a critical eye on his discussion 
of logic. 
I t  seems to me that Unger's refutation of LIBERALISM col lapses before 
he exits from his Introduction. If I merely wished to show that h i s  argu­
ment fails, I would end my discussion here. But  one might object that 
even if Unger's argument is defective in its broad outlines, i t  is neverthe­
less valuable and original in the detail s :  He may have gotten "the big 
picture" wrong, but the i ndividual arguments contain profound insights. 
And perhaps I have been too quick in ruling out the possibi l i ty that he i s  
fol lowing the  ideal strategy. Perhaps the  s ix  principles are the best version 
of LIBERALISM; or perhaps Unger, in his separate arguments against the 
individual principles, manages to refute at least some historically impor­
tant political theories. 
In order to meet these objections, I must examine Unger's arguments 
against the six principles. I shall show that they are as implausible as the 
observations on logic that I have just discussed. I must also examine Un-
See M.  GARDNER, FADS AND FALLACIES IN THE  NAME OF  SciENCE 2 1 0  ( 1 957) .  
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ger's historical assertions. This examination is important for three rea­
sons. First, I promised to investigate whether "the sheer breadth of Un­
ger's knowledge . . .  can only be regarded with something approach ing 
awe ." 1 14 Second, and more importantly, I wish to show that his argument 
commits the redefinitional fallacy-that is ,  that the "six principles of LIB­
ERALISM" do not correspond to an historically important theory . Third, 
recall that the heart of Unger's book is the profound link he claims to 
have discovered between knowledge and politics . LIBERAL metaphysics 
and LIBERAL society are supposed to be mutually reinforcing, and it is this 
link that allows Unger to make the transition from his metaphysical argu­
ment to his social and political conclusions.  N1ore specifical ly ,  the six 
principles of liberal ism are supposed to characterize the "deep structure" 
of LIBERALISM and to distinguish the LIBERAL from the pre-LIBERAL era. 
This historical claim is not mere window-dressing; it is ,  as U nger says, 
"the key that will allow us to escape from the prison-house, just as i t  was 
the chain with which the gates were long ago locked by the builders . " 1 1 5  
If the s ix  principles do not in  fact characterize any  theory or set o f  theo­
ries and distinguish this theory or set from other, non-LIBERAL theories, 
then Unger's central thesis cannot stand. 
Let us examine more precisely what qualities Unger's argument de­
mands of his six principles. I f  P is any one of the six characterizing prin­
ciples of LIBERALISM, then P must satisfy three conditions. First ,  P must 
not be so vague that i t  states no recognizable principle at all .  Second, 
LIBERALS (or at least some LIBERALS) must accept P, otherwise the "deep 
structure" will not pick out an historically important theory. Third, P 
must distinguish LIBERALS from pre-LIBERALS (of whom Plato and Aris­
totle are Unger's paradigm examples) . For i f  both LIBERALS and pre­
LIBERALS agree that P is true (or false)-that is, i f  P holds both in the 
Greek city-state and in the modern, industrial nation-state-then P is not 
doing the classificatory work it  i s  supposed to do. I f  Unger's principles do 
not satisfy these three conditions, then both his claim to have uncovered 
the "deep structure" of LIBERALISM and his claim to have established a 
deep connection between metaphysical theories and socio-political struc­
tures will collapse. 
I shall show that each of Unger's six principles violates one or more of 
these conditions. The principles are not definitive of any movement that 
could plausibly bear the name "liberal"; indeed, they are so vague that, as 
Unger has stated them, i t  i s  dubious that they were ever held by anybody 
at all .  
1 1 4 .  Monahan, supra note 7 ,  at 432. 
1 1 5 . KP, supra note 1 ,  at 4. 
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Unger's refutation of LIBERALISM i s  presented in  the first three chap­
ters. Chapter One-"Liberal Psychology" -discusses LIBERALISM's  theory 
of personality (which, remember, is responsible for the sentiments of res­
ignation and disintegration) .  Note that by "psychology" Unger does not 
mean everyday empirical psychology . He uses the term to embrace ethics, 
epistemology , and metaphysics; why he uses the term "psychology" I do 
not know. He first discusses something called "the antinomy of theory and 
fact" ; this discussion turns out to be the heart of his argument .  He then 
discusses the three principles of LIBERAL psychology : "the principle of 
reason and desire," "the principle of arbitrary desire," and "the principle 
of analysis"; he argues that these principles lead to antinomies. In Chap­
ter Two-"Liberal Political Theory"-he describes the three principles of 
LIBERAL social and pol itical thought: "the principle of rules and values," 
"the principle of subjective value," and "the principle of i ndividualism. "  
Again ,  he urges that these three principles are self-contradictory. Chapter 
Three-"The Unity of L iberal Thought"-attempts to show that the 
three psychological components of LIBERALISM correspond to the three po­
l i tical components , and that there is only one way to escape the antino­
mies, namely, to construct a new vision of metaphysics and society. 
So the "deep structure" of LIBERALISM looks l ike this: 
The Antinomy of Theory and Fact 
I \ 
Psychological Principles 
( 1) Reason and Desire --
(2) Arbitrary Desire ____. 
(3) Analysis --
Political Principles 
(4) Rules and Values 
(5) Subjective Value 
( 6)  Individualism 
The three psychological principles correspond to the three poli t ical  princi­
ples; the "antinomy of theory and fact" i s  the taproot of the contradic­
tions. Unger himself says that the "antinomy of theory and fact" and 
principles (1) and ( 4) are the "fundamental problems of l iberal doc­
trine ." 1 16 Because the "antinomy of theory and fact" is the phi losophical 
core of the book, and because it  i ntroduces the metaphysical considerations 
on which the remainder of his argument rests, I shall pay close attention 
to the five-and-a-half pages he  devotes to this subject; then, more b riefly ,  I 
shall discuss the other principles, particularly ( 1 )  and ( 4) .  
1 1 6. Jd. at 1 33 .  
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Unger's discussion of "the antinomy of theory and fact"-the central 
theoretical passage of his book-commences with a puzzl ing paragraph 
that seems entirely irrelevant to anything else in his book. I d iscuss i ts 
shortcomings in a footnote. 1 1 7 
b. Intelligible Essences 
Unger next i ntroduces a notion that wil l  figure prominently in every­
thing that follows: the doctrine of intelligible essences. The denial of this 
doctrine not only l ies at the root of the "antinomy of fact and value ,"  but 
"is the ultimate basis of the principle of subjective value" 1 18-and is thus 
responsible for the impossibil ity of  a LIBERAL theory of adjudication , for 
the LIBERAL distortion of the self, and so onY9 
1 1 7. The paragraph begins as  follows: 
Imagine the world as a field of space and a continuum of t ime that are the scene of facts or 
objects-events. . Objects-events exist i ndependently of our perception of what they are or of 
what they should be. Ei ther we assume that everything that happens in nature happens neces­
sari ly ,  or we say that we do not know why things happen. The latter conception, however, 
impl ies unintell igible chance, which is also a k ind of necessity. So, in either case, the field of 
objects-events  is given to us as a necessity. We call this necessi ty experience. 
!d. at 3 1 .  The paragraph is pecul iar because it is not clear whose theory Unger is describing-his 
own, or the l . l BERA t.s' . I f  it is the latter, and he means to ascribe this argument to some Oesh-and­
blood thinker, then he should have provided at least a footnote. For there is quite a lot wrong with 
this definition of experience. In the first place, the sentence beginn ing "either we assume" contains a 
glaring logical fallacy. It appears to be an attempt to apply the logical "law of the excluded middle." 
(This law says that ,  for any property X, either everything has property X or something does not have 
property X.) But Unger, or whoever he i s  quoting, seems to have confused this law with something 
quite d ifferent: "Either everything has property X, or noth ing does." This l atter proposi tion is clearly 
invalid; it would imply, for instance, that either everything i s  blue, or nothing is .  But if we rewrite 
Unger's sentence so that i t  i s  logical ly val id, then we get: "Either everything that happens in nature 
happens necessari ly ,  or something that happens i n  nature does not happen necessari ly ."  But  then "the 
latter conception" does not imply that "the field of  objects-events" is subject to "unintel l ig ible chance" 
or that "we do not know why things happen." (Y cu can i nsert Unger's words "we assume" or "we 
know" or "we say that we know" symmetrical ly on both sides of the "or" and sti l l  get a plausible 
reinterpretation of Unger's sentence, but not one that is logica l ly  valid. For i t  is not the case that, for 
any proposition p, either we know that p or we know that not-p. (Consider, for example, the proposi­
tion, "This coin wi l l  come up tails .") U nger's sentence is mult iply ambiguous; I have tried to i nterpret 
i t  in the most charitable way.) Furthermore, one would l ike to know what philosopher ever held the 
view that "unintell igible chance is also a kind of necessity" -which sounds rather like saying that 
"black is a kind of white." Finally, i f  this defin i t ion of experience is supposed to be a characterization 
of the standard LIBERAL view, then i t  suffers from the drawback that i t  is not couched in terms that 
would be accepted by any philosopher of h istorical importance. Traditional ly ,  experience i s  defined, 
not i n  terms of the necessity of "the field of objects-events" (whatever those are) , but in terms of the 
sensations and ideas of  a perceiving subject. I t  i s  unclear what this odd definit ion of  experience is 
supposed to accomplish; i t  does not seem to play a role i n  anything that fol lows. Perhaps U nger i s  
stating his own view, but  i f  so  i t  is hard to  see why he chooses to do so here. 
1 1 8. Jd. at 79. 
1 1 9 .  Unger defines "intell igible essences". as fol lows: 
Something has an i ntell igible essence if i t  has a feature, capable of being apprehended, by 
virtue of which i t  belongs to one category of things rather than to another category. According 
to such a view, a stone is di fferent from a plant because it has a quality of stoneness, i f  you 
l ike, wh ich we can grasp immediately. 
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Later I shall discuss the  claim about "subjective value . " For the mo­
ment I shall only make an observation about the historical pedigree of 
"intelligible essences . "  This term is, after LIBERALISM, the most important 
theoretical concept in Knowledge and Politics. It plays a crucial rol e  in 
everything that follows. It  is not a standard term in the phi losophical vo­
cabulary; i t  needs to be explained. In a long and impressive-looking foot­
note (with learned references in Greek, Latin ,  and German) ,  Unger 
presents the historical scholarship for "intell igible essences," as found in 
Aristotle, Spinoza, and Kant. The five sentences he devotes to Aristotle 
contain eight major b lunders; as for the doctrines he ascribes to Spinoza 
and Kant, they are the precise negation of the views those thinkers in fact 
held. The errors here are serious-so serious that one almost suspects a 
joke; one is left wondering, not only what "intel l igible essences" are, but 
whether Unger has a firm enough grasp on the hi story of philosophy to be 
able to say . 1 20 
. Now this doctrine is truly  a master principle, for i ts friends have drawn from it conclu­
sions about language, morals ,  and politics. They have reasoned that because everything has an 
essence, everything can be classified u nder the word which names its category. And the sup­
porters of the doctrine of intel l igibl e  essences have gone on to hold that the standards of right 
and wrong must also have essences which thought can comprehend. Plato's ethics and Aqui­
nas'  theory of natural l aw exempl ify this l i ne of argument. 
!d. at 3 1 -32 (endnote omitted). 
1 20. Unger's endnote begins as follows: 
For the authoritative statement of the doctrine of intell igible essences, a doctrine that may be 
understood as a revision of Plato's theory of ideas, see Aristot le, Metaphysics, bk. 7. . . The 
essence is the form that by becoming embodied in  matter lends each being its distinctive iden­
tity. For the development of the Aristotelian view, see Christian Wolff, Philosophia Prima sive 
Ontologia . . In this tradi tion,  essence is defined by contrast to accident ,  on the one hand, 
and to existence, on the other hand. I t  is  both TO TL fv ELvm and ovaux . . .  The classical 
doctrine of intel l igible essences has been revived in  the phenomenology of Brentano and 
H usser!. 
!d. at 297 (endnote 1 ) .  
The errors i n  Unger's accoun t  of Aristotle are  as fol lows. First, Aristotle's Book Zeta, to w hich 
Unger refers, is perhaps the single most problematic text in the history of philosophy; only Kant's 
Transcendental Deduction of the Categories has received comparable scholarly attention. Al though i t  
is only a few pages long, there exist  (not cou nt ing the n um('rous medieval commentaries) many 
lengthy exegeses; the latest and most detailed (that of Patzig and Frede, at press) runs to nearly 500 
pages. The difficulties of in terpretation are formidable; so when Unger cites Zeta as  the "authoritative 
statement" of the "doctrine of intel ligible essences" he leaves us in some perplexity about just what 
the doctrine is. 
Second, the phrase TO n fv ELvm i s  one of the most obscure i n  the annals of phi losophy. Professor 
Anscombe's exasperated comment is  typical: "I wish Greek grammarians cou l d  determine something 
about the expre�sions 'to ti en einai, to ti en einai A, to einai A, to A einai' (A being a dative') with 
which the Metaphysics i s  strewn.  . . . To translate 'to ti en einai': 'the essence' produces gibberish 
. . . .  " Anscombe, The Principle of Individuation, in 3 ARTICLES ON ARISTOTLE 88, 92 (J. Barnes, 
M. Schofield & R. Sorabji eds. 1 979)  (emphasis in  original) .  
Third, the words " intel l igible essence" do not occur i n  Zeta, nor elsewhere in Aristotle's Metaphys­
ics. (I am grateful to Gunther Patzig for this point . )  This increases the perplexity, for it is not clear 
which Aristotel ian doctrine Unger is referring to. The issue here is not a mere terminological quibble. 
As I shall show, Unger sometimes treats "intel l igible essences" as though they were non- l inguistic 
universals; sometimes as though they were abstract particulars; and sometimes as  though they were 
essential properties. But these notions must be kept distinct. Triangularity i s  a non- l inguistic un iver­
sal; triangles are abstract particulars; being triangular is an essential property of three-sided figures; 
the predicate "x i s  a triangle" is a l inguistic universal . Some phi losophers contend that the only 
universals are l inguistic universals; some deny the existence of necessary truths and essential proper-
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c. Quine and the Antimony 
Unger next contrasts the ancient "theory of intelligible essences" with 
"the modern conception of nature ."  He describes the modern view in 
t ies ;  some do both;  some do nei ther. In  other words, the concepts are independent. Unger is in confu­
sion on these matters, and as soon as the d istinctions are properly drawn, many of h i s  arguments wi l l  
be seen to be fal lacious. See infra text accompanying notes 1 72-79. 
Fourth, Aristotle does not draw a d isti nction between "essence" and "existence." This disti nction is 
a product of the late middle ages; it postdates Aristotle by about 1 800 years. The development of the 
essence/existence dist inction is chronicled in the article Existen:z., existenzia , i n  2 HISTORISCHES 
WiiRTERBUCH DER PHI LOSOPH I E  (j . Ri tter ed. 1 972) .  Owens says of "essence": 
The word conveys to modern ears a sort of opposit ion to "existence." . . In  the lv!etaphysics 
there is no trace of any such opposition in the terminology of Being. The Greek has only the 
one verb for the English "to be" and "to exist" and their derivative forms. There is noth ing to 
express an opposition of "essence" to "existence." 
j. 0 W t:NS,  TH E  DoCTRI N E  OF BEING IN THE ARISTOTELIAN fvfF.TAPHl'SICS 70 ( 1 95 1  ). 
Fifth ,  the reference to Wolff and the undocumented references to Brentano and Husser! add a 
further layer of confusion. If the "classical doctrine of intel l igible essences" is a theory that is sup­
posed to have been "stated" i n  Zeta, "exempli fied" in Plato and Aquinas, "developed" in  Wolff, and 
"revived" in Brentano and Husser! , then I am at a loss to know what theory Unger has in mind. I t  is 
rather l ike being told that Adam Smith, Marx, Keynes, and M ilton Friedman share a "classical 
doctrine of capital"-except that these economists actually use the word "capita l ," wh i le Unger's 
philosophers do not use the words " intel l igible essences." 
Sixth, to describe Aristotle's metaphysics as a "revision" of Plato's theory of  the Ideas i s  l ike 
describing The Origin of Species as a "revision" of Genesis. Aristotle attacked the Platonic metaphys­
ics so thoroughly that the Platonic doctrines never revived. 
Seventh, Unger says that for Aristotle "the essence i s  the form that by becoming embodied i n  matter 
lends each being i ts disti nctive ident i ty ." But this i s  precisely the Platonic picture that Aristotle was 
opposing ("here the form; over here t he matter"). Unger should have followed standard usage and 
said "being embodied," not "becoming embodied." 
Eighth ,  as we have seen, Unger says of the doctrine of intel l igible essences that "this doctrine is 
truly a master principle, for i ts friends have drawn from it conclusions about l anguage, morals, and 
pol i t ics." He gives Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas as examples. He is right about Plato (or, at any rate, 
abou t Plato in the period when he wrote the Republic) ; but he is wrong about Aquinas and Aris­
totle-particularly about Aristotle, who, in his ethical w ri t ings, explicitly (and famously) rejected the 
Platonic strategy of basing ethics on metaphysics. This matter i s  discussed i n  greater detail infra notes 
1 74-79 and accompanying text. 
I now proceed to the next paragraph of the endnote. Unger says: 
lvlodern metaphysics takes one of two approaches toward the problem of essences. The first is 
to reject the classical doctrine outright . . . .  The second is to attempt to accommodate some 
version of intel l igible essences. There are in turn two main variants of this latter tendency. For 
some, the essence means whatever is needed to make something possible and i ntel ligible; it 
describes nothing in the empirical world. See Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der 
Naturwissenschaft, preface, Kants Werke, ed. Prussian Academy (Berl in ,  Gruyter, 1 968), vol. 
IV,  p. 467. For the rationalists, however, the essence that makes understanding possible also 
makes existence necessary because the orders of ideas and of events are the same. See Spinoza, 
r:thica, pt. 2 ,  def. 2, Spinoza Opera, ed. C. Gebhardt (Heidelberg, Winter, 1 972) ,  vol. I I ,  p. 
84. 
KP, supra note 1 ,  at 279 (endnote 1 ) . 
The notion of "essence" (Wesen) plays l itt le role i n  Kant; the word appears only twice in the 
publ ished writings (once in the footnote to which U nger refers), and the Kantian usage, which Unger 
has misunderstood, i s  radically different from Aristotle's. For a lengthy discussion of the Kantian 
usage, see H. GRAUBNER, FORM UNO WESEN 1 -92 ( 1 972). Kant's i nnovation was to d ist inguish 
sharply between the logical essence and the real essence. The former belongs to logic and to the realm 
of analytic judgments, the latter to metaphysics and the realm of synthetic judgments; the former 
appl ies to concepts, the latter to objects. In the Letter to Reinhold (May 1 2 , 1 789) ,  reprinted in I .  
KANT, BRIHWECHSH. 377-85 (Schondorffer e d .  1 986), Kant says that w e  can have n o  knowledge of 
the latter. Intelligibility pertains to the logical essence only, and thus only to concepts; i t  does not 
pertain to the real essence. See also I. KANT, LoGIK § 1 1 6 & I ntro. ( 1 800). Unger has m isquoted the 
passage to which he refers, which is d iscussing the real essence, and which reads: " Essence is the first, 
inner pri nciple of all that belongs to the possibi l i ty of a thing." ("Wesen ist das erste innere Prinzip 
696 The Yale Law Journal [Vol .  97: 665  
terms which he attributes to his  Harvard colleague ,  \V .V .  Quine . 1 2 1  But  
Quine  does no t  ho ld  the  doctrines Unger ascribes to h im,  and Unger's 
brief account contains many errors . 122 
al les dessen. " as z u r  \foglichkeit e ines Dinges gehon ' ' )  Kam, .\letaphysische .i nfa ngsgru n de d e r  
.\'atu ru.'issenschaft. in 4 K.-\:->TS W E R K E  467 ( Prussian :'l.cademy ed .  1 968) Unger has  added the 
words ''and intel l ig ible: i t  describes nothing i n  the empirical \,·orld . "  He has thus  run together the 
disti nction ben,·een the t\,·o kinds of essence. miss ing precisely what is  orig inal  i n  Kant 's use of  the 
h'Ord . 
. ·\s for the rationalists. the)· did not hold that "the essence that makes u nderstanding possible also 
makes existence necessary ' '  The problem of n ecessa ry existence is bound up w i t h  the "ontological 
proof of the existence of God ."  wh ich was first put forward by St. Anselm in the ele\'emh cemury.  
This proof (which .  umi l  Kant ,  \''as one of the central problems of phi losophy) tr ied to show that 
God's essent ia l  propert ies-His  omn ipotence, His  perfection, and the l ike-entai l  H is necessary exis­
tence. ( Rough ! \  speaking, the proof runs as follows: 'vVe can conceive of an absolutely perfect being;  
but an absolutely perfect being cannot lack the  attribute of existence (or else H e  would not be per­
fect); therefore, an absolutely perfect being necessari ly exists.) Spinoza produces a version of the proof, 
see SPI:-<OZA , ETHICS pt I ,  props. 7, I I  (White-Sti rl ing trans. 1 894), but th is  proof appl ies only to 
God's essence, not to essences in general. ( Indeed , for Spinoza , as for the medievals ,  God is the only 
bei ng whose essence Involves existence, i .e . ,  He is the only being who necessari ly  exists. This is why 
Unger ' s assertion is so startl i ng .  The very first sentence i n  the Ethics, i n  the Book enti t led "On God ," 
is :  "By cause of itself, I understand that ,  whose essence involves existence; or tha t ,  whose nature 
cannot be conceived unless existing ." I n  Spinoza's system, God is the only being w hich is self-caused. 
See id . pt. I ,  prop 24 ( "The essence of things produced by God does not i nvolve existence ." ) ;  see also 
id.  pt I ,  props .'i, 7, 20.  I f  one looks to the passage of Spinoza cited by Unger, one finds, nearly 
enough, the s tandard defin i tion of essence i n  terms of necessary properties , but Spinoza's defin ition 
says nothing about  necessary existen ce :  
I sa\· that to the essence of anything pertains that, which being given , the  th ing i tself is  
necessari ly  posited, and being taken away, the thing i s  necessari ly taken; or, i n  other words, 
that, wi thout "·hich the thing can neither be nor be conceived, and which in its turn cannot be 
nor be conceived wi thout the th ing.  
!d. pt. 2,  def. 2 .  In fact ,  only a few l i nes further on Spinoza says: "The essence of man does not 
involve necessary existence; that is to say, the existence as wel l  as the non-existence of this or that man 
may or may not follow from the order of nature." !d. pt. 2 ,  axiom I .  
1 2 1 . 
We cannot decide in the abstract whether a given classification is justified.  The only standard 
is whether the classification serves the particular purpose we had in mind when we made it. 
Every l anguage describes the world completely ,  though in  its own way. On the modern view of 
nature, there is no basis for saying that one language portrays real i ty more accurately than 
another, for the only measure of the 'truth' of language i s  i ts power to advance the ends of the 
commun ities of men who speak it .  The theories of science are partia l  languages because they 
classify things i n  the world. Their claims to acceptance must therefore rest on their abi l i ty to 
contribute to part icular ends, l ike the prediction or control of events, rather than on their 
fidelity to a true world of essences. 
KP, supra note 1 ,  at 32. Unger's endnote 3 at 298 reads: "See W.V. Qui ne,  Two Dogmas  of Empiri­
cism, in From a Logical Point of View (New York, Harper, 1 963) ,  p. 44." 
1 22.  For example, Qu ine nowhere endorses the ( in  any case patent ly false) view that "every 
l anguage describes the world completely." (Think of the l anguage of elementary arithmetic .) Nor does 
Quine ever talk of a " true world," or about "the 'truth' of l anguage." (For Qui ne ,  the th ings that are 
true or false are sentences-or, more precisely ,  sentence-tokens.) Nor does he anywhere talk about 
"partial languages" (whatever those are) . Nor does he ever advance an "argument" like that found i n  
Unger's last two sentences: "The theories o f  science are partial languages because they classify things 
i n  the world. Their claims to acceptance must therefore rest on their ability to contribute to particular  
ends, like the  prediction or  control of events, rather than  on their fidelity to a true world of essences." 
I find the reasoning here unintell igible, despite the presence of the words "because" and "therefore. "  
These errors show that he has read Quine carelessly ,  a n d  the carelessness leads h im t o  a more 
serious error, contained in the middle of the paragraph: "On the modern view of nature,  there is no 
basis for saying that one l anguage portrays real i ty more accurately than another, for the only measure 
of the 'truth' of language is its power to advance the ends of the communit ies of men who speak i t . "  
Had Unger read the passage he cites more carefu l ly ,  he would have seen tha t  Quine's posi tion is not 
skeptical: 
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Unger, having discussed experience, the pre-LIBERAL metaphysic of in­
tel l igible essences, and the modern view of science, next turns his attention 
to the antinomy of theory and fact-"the riddle posed by the modern idea 
of science and nature ." 1 23 The modern idea, according to Unger, is that 
( 1 )  facts are determined by theory, not by the world; and (2) some theories 
depict the world more accurately than others . 124 In his opinion, this i s  a 
contrad iction : 
In its simplest form, the antinomy of theory and fact i s  the conflict 
of the two preceding ideas: the mediation of all  facts through theory 
and the possibil ity of an independent comparison of theory with fact. 
Each of the principles seems plausible in its formulation and absurd 
in its consequences. They contradict one another, but to qualify ei­
ther of them would seem to require a drastic revision of the view of 
nature and thought from which both are drawn. Here i s  a conun­
drum that appears to imply the incoherence of our idea of science, 
indeed of knowledge in general . 125 
Something like Unger's "antinomy" is  of course an important and well­
known puzzle in the philosophy of science. Indeed, i t  i s  a close relative126 
of an older problem, posed by Berkeley's phi losophy of perception :  If all 
our knowledge of external objects-other people, sticks ,  stones-is derived 
by sense-perception, and if there is no independent possibi l ity of compar­
ing these sense-perceptions with objects in the external world ,  then what 
Physical objects are conceptual ly imported i nto the situation as convenient in termediaries�not 
by defini tion in terms of experience, but s imply  as i rreducible posits comparable, epistemologi­
cal ly ,  to the gods of Homer. For my part I do, qua lay physicist, believe in physical objects 
and not in Homer's gods; and I consider it a scientific error to believe otherwise. But i n  point 
of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only i n  degree and not in 
kind. Both sorts of entit ies enter our conception only as cultural posits. The myth of physical 
objects is epistemologically superior to most in that it has proved more efjzcacious than other 
myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience. 
W. QuiNE, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in FROM A LoGICAL POINT OF VIEW 20, 44 ( 1 96 1 )  (em­
phasis added, footnote omitted). In the Foreword to this volume, Quine notes, " in l ikening the physi­
cists' posts to the gods of Homer . . . I was talking epistemology and not metaphysics. Posited objects 
can be rea l .  As I wrote elsewhere, to call a posit a posit is not to patronize i t ."  !d. at v i i i .  
1 23 .  KP,  supra note 1 ,  a t  1 33. 
1 24. 
I f  there are no i ntelligible essences, there i s  no predetermined classification of the world. We 
can distinguish among objects-events only by reference to a standard of distinction impl icit i n  a 
theory. It is the theory that determines what is to count as a fact and how facts are to be 
disti nguished from one another. I n  other words, a fact becomes what it is for us because of the 
way we categorize it .  . . .  
Yet we also believe that the h istory of science is progressive and that u l t imately one can 
make a rational choice among conf1icting theories about the world. Some theories describe the 
world more accurately than others. . . . The conception that there i s  a realm of things, i nde­
pendent of the mind,  and capable at some point  of being perceived as i t  truly is ,  seems neces­
sary to the notion of science. Yet this conception also appears to rely on the doctrine of intel l i­
gible essences or of plain facts, assumed to be i nconsistent with the modern i dea of science. 
Id. at 32-33 (endnote omitted). 
1 25 .  !d. at 33. 
1 26 .  See C. lvfcGINN ,  THE CHARACTER OF MIND 37-58 ( 1 982). 
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basis do we have for believing that the external world exis t s ?  If a l l  we can 
ever know is sensations, how can we justify a belief in things that are not 
sensations ? This problem (the problem of the "vei l of ideas") has been the 
starting point of all modern epistemology , and one could fi l l  many 
volumes with an account of the attempts that have been made to state it 
precisely and to obtain clarity about the exact nature of the issues in­
volved . The repl ies to Berkeley-from Dr. Johnson 's kicking the stone127 
to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason-are too well  known to need recount­
ing here; suffice it to note that no philosopher thinks that merely stating 
this problem is sufficient to show that knowledge of the external world is 
impossible. 
The modern problem of the "theory- ladenness" of observational terms 
can be stated in a way that paral lels the old problem of the external 
world: If all our evidence for a scientific  theory comes from observation, 
and if observation is inherently theory-laden (so that there i s  no possibi l i ty 
of obtaining pure observations uncontaminated by theory) ,  then what be­
comes of the notion of scientific  truth ? This well-known problem (or fam­
ily of problems) in the phi losophy of science is related to a host of other 
topics in the philosophy of mind and the phi losophy of language. L ike 
Berkeley's idealism, i t  has provoked many different analyses and solu­
tions. The most celebrated, Quine's ,  is  worth mentioning here. 
In Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Quine argues for what is  known as the 
"thesis of holism" or the "Duhem-Quine thesis," namely, that our state­
ments about the external world do not correspond to experiences in a one­
to-one fashion . 128 From this thesis, Quine draws the conclusions, first , 
that it is "folly to seek a boundary between [ the analytic and the syn­
thetic]"/29 second,  that "it  i s  nonsense, and the root of much nonsense, to 
speak of a l inguistic component and a factual component in the truth of 
any individual statement ."130 The second conclusion raises the general 
problem of the theory-ladenness of observation (or, in  Unger's terminol­
ogy , of the "mediation of all  facts through theory") ;  i ndeed, Quine's text 
is the starting point of the modern discussion. 
But Quine does not rest with these conclusions. He goes on to argue 
that the col lapse of the analytic/synthetic dist inction entai l s  epistemologi­
cal naturalism. Epistemology is to be pursued as a part of natural sci-
1 27 .  j .  BoswELL, THE LIFE o r  SAMUEL joHNSON, ANNo 1 763 ( 1 799) .  
1 28. 
[T]he total field [of science] is  so underdetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that 
there is much lat i tude of choice as to what statements to reevaluate in  the l ight of any single 
contrary experience. No particular experiences are l inked with any particular statements i n  the 
interior of the field, except indirectly through considerations of equil ibrium affecting the field 
as a whole. 
W. QUINE, supra note 1 22,  at 42-43. 
1 29 .  !d. at 43. 
1 30 .  !d. at 42. 
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ence, on a par with chemistry or empirical psychology . 1 31 Far from infer­
ring "the incoherence of our idea of science, i ndeed of knowledge in  
general ," Quine infers that we are to use science-the best science o f  the 
day-to answer philosophical questions about the foundations of natural 
science. The old epistemology goes by the board, but the enterprise of 
science remains . 1 32 
This sketch of Quine's argument wil l  suffice to bring out the salient 
point: Precisely the same considerations that militate against the separa­
bil ity of theory and observation can also be marshalled in favor of a robust 
scientific realism. Unger appears to be unaware of this possibi l i ty,  for he 
jumps straight from the contention that facts are theory-laden to the con­
clusion that the modern view of science i s  incoherent .  He seems not to 
realize that he needs an argument to support this rash leap. U nger has, in 
fact, simply presented a crude variant of a famil iar problem, label led it  an 
antinomy, and congratulated himself for having brought down the edifice 
of modern thought .  The few remarks he supplies i n  support of his conclu­
sion are so vague and equivocal that they can be used to prove the impos­
sibility of just about anything. It  is strange that Unger should have based 
his refutation of modern thought on the works of Quine and taken so l ittle 
care to verify his arguments. A simple walk across the H arvard Yard 
would have sufficed to set him straight. 
From this unpromising start, Unger goes on to give us his views on 
mathematics and physics. He pauses to praise Kant for his "alleged solu­
tion to the antinomy ,"133 then presents an analysis of the ultimate source 
of the antinomy, and finally describes a solution . 
d. The Diagnosis and the Solution 
Unger's traces the antinomy to the "radical separation of form and sub­
stance ."134 He does not explain why this "radical separation" and its 
1 3 1 .  See W. QUINE, Epistemology Naturalized, i n  ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND OTHER Es­
SAYS ( 1 969). In this essay, Quine l inks these various considerations together i n  the way I have tried to 
do here. /d. at 82.  
1 32. For instance: 
Our talk of external things, our very notion of thi ngs, i s  just a conceptual apparatus that helps 
us to foresee and control the triggering of  our sensory receptors i n  the l ight of previous tr igger­
ing of our sensory receptors. The triggering, first and last, is a l l  we have to go on.  
In  saying this I too am talking of external th ings, namely, people and their nerve endings. 
Thus what I am saying applies in  particular to what I am saying, and is not meant as  skepti­
cal. There is nothing we can be more confident of than external th ings-some of  them, any­
way-other people, sticks, stones. But there remains the fact-a fact of  science i tself-that 
science i s  a conceptual bridge of our own making, l i nking sensory st imulation to sensory stimu­
lation; there is no extrasensory perception. 
W. QUINE, THEORIES AND THINGS 1 -2 ( 1 98 1 ) . These ideas are explored at greater length i n  his 
ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND OTHER ESSAYS, supra note 1 3 1 ,  especially in the essay Epistemol-
ogy Naturalized. 
' 
1 33 .  KP,  supra note I ,  at 34. 
1 34. 
The true source of the anti nomy of theory and fact i s  the radical separation of form and 
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harmful effects are peculiar to  LIBERAL thought. One thinks immediately 
of Plato, whom Unger takes to be the originator of the doctrine of "intel l i­
gible essences," and who drew a radical distinction between the Forms 
and particulars. One wonders how he managed to escape the antinomy. 
Aristotle, too, repeatedly stresses that we cannot know the particular, only 
the universal ;  so the same question applies to h im. 1 3r; Unger continues 
with some remarks about the senses and about the anatomy of horses. 1 36 
These remarks are mistaken in laying the responsibility for "the ineffabil­
ity of the individual" at the door of modern science. The view that we can 
know only universals, not particulars, was in fact promulgated by the sup­
porters of the doctrine of "intel l igible essences"-most notably, Plato and 
Aristotle. 1 37 
Unger, having stated the antinomy, commented on K ant's fai lure to 
solve i t ,  and traced its origins to the relationship of the universal to the 
particular, now dips into the phi losophy of mathematics for a solution. 
Here it is :  
A different conception of the relation of the universal and the par­
ticular would not produce the antinomy of theory and fact . Take, for 
example, our understanding of geometrical truths. As Euclidean ge-
substance, of the universal and the particular . 
The view that i t  is necessary to attain u niversal i ty through abstraction from particul arity 
rather than through the direct e lucidation of  the particular ,  as we do in  art ,  i s  the core of the 
antinomy of theory and fact. 
!d. at 35-36. 
1 35 .  Plato, i n  the Theatetetus, in the Republic, and elsewhere, contends that knowledge i s  of the 
Forms, and not of particulars. See ARISTOTLE, PoSTERIOR ANALYTICS bk. I ,  chs. 1 -5 ,  a t  7 1  a-74b5 
[hereinafter POSTERIOR ANALYTICS] ; ARISTOTLE, M ETAPHYSICS bk. 3 ,  ch. 4 ,  at 999a26 [ hereinafter 
METAPHYSICS ] ; ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. 6 ,  ch. 3 ,  at 1 1 39 b 1 6-35 [hereinafter 
N ICOMACHEAN ETHICS] . (The last n umbers in each citation refer to the page, column,  and l ine  num­
bers of the Prussian Academy edit ion of  Aristotle; they are reproduced in the margins of most 
translations.) 
1 36. 
[ P]recisely because science has become more formal, i t  can never ful ly  describe what the senses 
see. It cannot replace their kind of knowledge. On the contrary, science must constantly go 
from substance to form, and from the particular to the universal. 
. Physics may have l ittle to say about the anatomy of horses, but even zoology w i l l  be 
i ncapable of accounting for everything that i s  pecul iar to an i ndividual horse. The ineffabi l i ty 
of the individual i s  the necessary consequence of the modern view of science. To attribute the 
l imitation simply to a stage in the development of scientifi c  knowledge i s  to misunderstand the 
way science develops. 
KP, supra note 1 ,  at 35 .  
1 37. Just  as U nger fai l s  to l ink the "true source" of the antimony to  LIBERAL  thinkers, he neglects 
to tie the al leged downgrading of the senses by modern science to LIBERALISM. The idea that sensory 
observation cannot yield knowledge of universals has an ancient pedigree. Plato, for example, argued 
that the man who seeks truth ought to "cut himself off as  much as possible from h i s  eyes and ears and 
virtually all the rest of his body, as an impediment which by i ts presence prevents the soul from 
attaining to truth and clear thinking." See PLATO, PHAEDO 65e-67a. Aristotle does not regard the 
senses so harshly; he points out that they can lead us to the universal. But he too says that "i t  is 
impossible by perceiving to understand anything demonstrable," PosTERIOR ANALYTICS, supra note 
1 35 ,  bk. I ,  ch. 3 1 , at 88a9 (Barnes trans. 1 975 ) ;  and for h im as for Plato scient i fi c  k nowledge is of 
necessary, universal, eternal connections, not of particu lars. !d. bk. I,  chs. 1 -5 ,  at 7 l a-74b5; 
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note ! 35 ,  bk. 6, ch. 3 ,  at J J 39b! 6-35. 
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ometers , we  know both perfectly and completely because the subject 
matter of our thought is pure form without substance and pure 
universal ity without particularity . Each particular example of a cir­
cle is ful ly defined by the geometrical idea of a circle. N othing can 
be known about any particular circle, except the dimension of its 
radius, that i s  not part of the knowledge of the theorem of its con­
struction . *  Such a geometry knows nothing of the issue of classifica­
tion of particulars under general categories, and therefore i t  never 
need face the antinomy of theory and fact. 
* [Unger's Endnote : ]  The example of the circle is taken from Lask, 
Fichtes Idealismus, Gesammelte Schriften , vol .  I ,  p. 45 . 1 38  
This paragraph is open to at least four objections .  First, recal l that 
Unger began by accusing science of separating universal and particular; 
he told us that the contradictions of l iberal thought arise because modern 
science pursues abstraction rather than the "direct elucidation of the par­
ticular. " His discussion of geometry i s  supposed to solve these problems 
by providing us with a new way of conceiving the relationship of univer­
sals to particulars. But his  geometrical paradigm offers us "pure form 
without substance and pure universality without particularity" -which 
sounds rather like the elimination of the particular. It  i s  unclear how to 
fit these various propositions together in such a way as to provide a solu­
tion to the "contradictions" of modern thought. 
Second, Unger' s  remarks about the philosophy of mathematics make it 
clear that he is i l l -equipped to discuss the subject. Apart from his pecul iar 
terminology ("dimension of its radius"; "theorem of its construction") ,  the 
fact i s  that, ever since the days of Klein and H ilbert, geometry ( including 
Euclidean geometry) has been intertwined with the theory of groups, and, 
l ike the rest of mathematics, i s  inextricably bound up with abstract alge­
bra-a subject whose very purpose is to classify particular mathematical 
entities under abstract structural laws . 1 39 
Third, Unger's solitary footnote i n  this paragraph is  to Emil Lask's 
book on Fichte. Fichtes Idealismus und die Geschichte is an obscure 
work, written at the turn of the century, now dated even as a work on the 
history of German Idealism, and in any case having nothing to do with 
1 38 .  KP, supra note 1 ,  at 35-36 ;  endnote at 299. 
1 39 .  Fel ix Kle in  and David Hi lbert were two eminent mathematicians of the l ate n ineteenth and 
early twentieth century. Klein is responsible for the " Erlangen Program" ( 1 872) of classify ing geome­
tries in group-theoretic terms; H i lbert is responsible for the first strict axiomatization of Euclidean 
geometry. See D. HILBERT, GRUNDLACEN DER GEOMETRIE ( 1 899) .  The field is vast, but the fol low­
ing writings give an overview of the phi losophical issues raised by the growth of abstract algebra and 
formal axiomatic systems: 0. BECKER, GRUNDLACEN DER MATHEMATIK 1 85-370 ( 1 954) ;  F.  KLEIN, 
VORLESUNGEN VBER DIE ENTWICKLUNG DER MATHEMATIK IM 1 9 . jAHRHUNDERT ( 1 926); D. HIL­
BERT, Axiomatisches Denken, Naturerkennen und Logik & Neubegrundung der Mathematik, re­
printed in GESAMMELTE ABHANDLUNCEN ( 1 935) .  Some of the relevant articles are translated in W. 
EWALD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS: BASIC TEXTS (forthcoming 1 988) ;  a general account 
can be found in M. KLINE, MATHEMATICAL THOUGHT FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES chs. 26, 
32, 36 ,  38 ,  40, 42, 43,  49 ( 1 972) 
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the developments in  mathematics and logic that have taken place in the 
past century and a half. It  is  irrelevant to the matter under d iscussion . 1 40 
Fourth , even i f  Unger's description of geometry were correct , the gen­
eral consequences he seeks to draw would not follow without a considera­
ble amount of further argument. If some feature of empirical science is 
causing you trouble (say, to take Unger's example, the anatomy of hor­
ses) ,  it is an inadequate solution to point out that that feature is absent in 
mathematics. Mathematicians are able to carry out their research without 
the use of telescopes, but this does not prove that astronomers can do the 
same. If Unger wants to generalize his mathematical specul ations i nto a 
new foundation for the sciences , he has a great deal of work ahead of him.  
e .  Recapitulation 
I have been discussing the section entitled "The Antinomy of Theory 
and Fact" for a long while .  I have done so because this short passage is 
the core of Unger's book. As the crucial step in his attempt to refute the 
"dominant elements of modern thought ," it deserves close attention. 
This brief, self-contained passage deals with the famil iar problem of 
how scientific theories relate to the world-a problem that i s  commonly 
discussed in freshman courses on the philosophy of science. In these five­
and-a-half pages, Unger makes some sweeping remarks about the defini­
t ion of experience, about Book Zeta, about Spinoza's views on  "intel l igible 
essences ," about the modern view of science, about Quine.  He states the 
"antinomy," which in fact is  a well-known problem whose complexities 
he has not understood. He compliments Kant for his "all eged solution ," 
then goes on to talk about zoology , about the anatomy of horses ,  about the 
relationship between universals and particulars, and about Euclidean ge­
ometry; these last remarks he backs up with learned footnotes to the ob­
scure and irrelevant Lask. For all the parade of learning, for all the huf­
fing and puffing, Unger i s  in control neither of the l i terature h e  cites, nor 
of his own arguments. 1 4 1  
1 40. Incidental ly,  Unger misunderstands Lask's argument; but to go into the detai ls  would take us 
too far afield. 
1 4 1 .  I should l i ke i n  this footnote t o  discuss an  issue that i s  raised by Unger's reference t o  the 
book by Lask. U nger cites many works in foreign l anguages; in particular, he cites many works from 
or about the classical period of German philosophy (say, Kant to Nietzsche), and he cites them i n  
German. B y  m y  count ,  there are in Knowledge and Politics 79 citations o f  this sort; i n  only three are 
the sources not readi ly  available in English translation. One of these footnotes is to a paragraph in  
Kant's Nachlass; the  other two, both of w hich appear i n  the  passage I have just d i scussed, a re  to the 
work by Lask. 
The only example I have been able to find in Knowledge and Politics where U nger d irectly quotes 
a work written in a foreign language i s  this :  
Shall  we not be forced to adopt the view that "the owl of M inerva spreads i t s  wings only at 
the ful l  of dusk,"* and that theory must therefore serve as the witness of h i story, wa i t ing i f  i t  
i s  modest, prophesying if  i t  is rash , bu t  denied the  power to  rebui ld? 
• [ Unger's endnote : ]  Hegel , Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, preface, Samtliche 
Werke, val. VII ,  p. 37 . 
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2 .  The Antinomy of Reason and Desire 
According to Unger, LIBERALISM 's denial of intelligible essences is di­
rectly l inked to its psychological and political shortcomings. For by re-
KP, supra note 1 ,  at  1 7 ;  endnote at 297. Unger has not i n  fact been working with the German text 
but with the standard English translation, H EGEL's PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 1 3  (Knox trans. 1 942). 
The German is :  "die Eule der Minerva beginnt erst mit der einbrechenden Diimmerung ihren 
Flug" -i.e . ,  "the owl of M inerva begins i ts O ight only at the fal l  of dusk." The phrase "spreads i ts 
wings" is not in Hegel ; it is Knox's i nvention. Apparently, U nger's habitual citation to works i n  
foreign languages, even when translations are available, stems from neither a real need to work from 
the original nor his own fami liarity wi th i t .  
Unger's argument rests upon his i nterpretation of the historical development of Western thought, 
and the plausibi l i ty of h is  work depends on what h is  fol lowers have cal led "the sheer breadth of his 
knowledge." We have, i n  the five-page section under discussion, seen what he says about Book Zeta, 
about Spinoza's view of "intel l igible essences," and about Quine.  Earl ier we saw some extremely 
quest ionable remarks about the rational ists and the empiricists; and there is more to come. But if 
Unger has only a superficial understanding of the Greeks, the rationalists, the empiricists, and the 
modern philosophers, all that remain are the classical German metaphysicians and the scholastics. 
To judge from his footnotes, Unger's knowledge of German phi losophy i s  not, in fact, very deep. 
He makes no mention of the important cont inental legal philosophers of the n ineteenth century, many 
of whose works have never been translated; and I see no evidence that he i s  acquainted with the mass 
of secondary l i terature that Hegel or Kant scholars-includ ing Anglo-Americans-are expected to 
have mastered. If he were versed in modern Kant scholarship, for i nstance, he would  not have made 
the mistakes that I d iscuss i n  note 1 20 supra. 
As for the Scholastics, Unger says, in the letter quoted in note 1 53 infra, that "the primary source 
of the conception of universals I defend is the Aristotel ian doctrine that the priests who taught me as a 
boy used to cal l  'hylemorfism' " [sicj . So perhaps he has a sol i d  knowledge of medieval phi losophy. 
We shall have to wait and see. See infra text accompanying notes 1 80-83. 
Unger's habit of cit ing obscure works i n  foreign l anguages has led to h is  reputation for knowledge 
"that can only be regarded with somethi ng approaching awe"; and th is  reputation h as given CLS one 
of i ts characteristic defenses against cri ticism-namely,  the contention, "You are not able to under­
stand the tradi t ion of phi losophy in which we are work ing." For example: 
One CLS member who asked not to be identified speculated that Dean Carrington's views 
were the fruit of frustration. "Carrington read U nger and doesn't get it ," the professor said. 
"He freaked out because of his i nabi l i ty to deal with Roberto. Unger is the least appropriate to 
be attacked as a n ih i l ist .  He's an affirmative Catholic radical social activist ." 
Kaplan, A Scholarly War of Words, Nat'! L.J . ,  Feb. I I , 1 985 ,  at  28. Unger is not, of course, respon­
sible for the anonymous comments of his supporters; but he has said similar th ings h imself. See infra 
note 1 53. 
I should like to emphasize that my criticisms of C LS are not directed against "Continental" (as 
contrasted with "Anglo-American") phi losophy. These labels do not make much sense (most of the 
great "Anglo-American" phi losophers-Frege, Carnap, Wittgenstein,  Reichenbach, and the Vienna 
Circle-were in  fact Austrians or Germans), and I am incli ned to think that Unger exaggerates the 
cleavage i n  his remarks i n  note 1 53 infra . More importantly, most of the best writ ing on the phi loso­
phy of law comes from Continental Europe, and has done so ever since Kant; Germany in particular 
has perhaps the most impressive body of jurisprudential l i terature in any l anguage, with the possible 
exception of Latin. Very few of the leading texts have been translated. An introductory reading l ist  
would include: J .  KANT, ANFANGSGRUNOE DER RECHTSI .EHRE ( 1 797) ;  P. FEUERBACH, UBER 
PH!l.OSOPHIE UNO EMPIRIE IN IHREM VERHALTNIS ZUR I'OSITIYEN RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT ( 1 804); 
F. v. SAYIGNY, UsER DEN BERUF UNSERER Zur FUR GrsETZCERUNG UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 
( 1 8 1 4) and SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN ROMISCHEN RECHTS ( 1 840); G. PUCHTA, CURSUS DER INSTITU­
TIONEN ( 1 84 1 ) ;  R. v .jHERING, ScHERZ UNO ERNST IN DER juRISPRUDENZ ( 1 885 ) ,  DER ZwECK IM 
RECHT ( 1 904), and Unsere Aufgabe, i n  1 jAHRBUCHER FUR DIE DoGMATIK DES HEUTIGEN ROMI­
SCHEN UNO OEUTSCHEN PRIVATRECHTS I ( 1 857) ;  B .  WINDSCHEID, GESAMMELTE REDEN UNO 
ABHANOLUNGEN ( 1 904); E. EHRLICH, FREIE RECHTSFINOUNG UNO FREIE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 
( 1 903); H .  KANTOROWICZ, DER KAMPF UM DIE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT ( 1 906) ;  L. NELSON, 
PHIL.OSOPHISCHE RECHTSLEHRE ( 1 920). Nineteenth-century German legal phi losophy is rarely dis­
cussed in American legal periodicals, a l though i t  had a great i nOuence on such scholars as Karl 
Llewel lyn, Roscoe Pound, and Lon Ful ler. An exception is the fi ne recent paper by J ames Q. Whit­
man,  Note, Commercial Law and the American Yolk :  A Note on Llewellyn's German Sources for the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J. 1 56 ( 1 987) ,  which contains further references. 
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jecting intelligible essences, LIBERALISM is  led to  the "principle of arbi­
trary desire" and to the "principle of rules and values . "  But the 
impossibility of reconciling these principles with the denial of i ntel l igible 
essences is precisely what causes the antinomies; and the antinomies are 
what doom LIBERAL adjudication and legislation. 142 To show that LIBER­
ALISM is sturdier than Unger says ,  I shall now consider his psychological 
and political arguments in turn. My treatment will be brisker than before. 
Unger accuses LIBERALISM of separating reason from desire, the under­
standing from the appetites . 143 H e  says that this separation compels LIB­
ERAL theorists to adopt one or the other of two moralities: the morality of 
reason or the morality of desire. But "both these theories are caught in a 
paradox, the antinomy of reason and desire ." 144 The moral i ty of desire 
fails  because every time a desire is satisfied , a new desire springs u p  to 
take its place; the morality of reason fails  because it is  merely an empty 
formalism, devoid of moral content . 145  
Modern German legal phi losophy i s  we l l  represented by R. At.EXY, THEORIE m�R JURISTISCHEN 
ARGUMENTATION ( 1 978) and THEORIE DER GRUNDRECHT£ ( 1 985) ;  and by R. D REI ER , supra note 
85. All three works contain extensive bibl iographies. Alexy's THEORI£  (which wi l l  shortly appear i n  
Engl ish translation) i s  an elaboration of the  work of Jiirgen Habermas, who is often ci ted by  CLS. 
Unfortunately, the use of H abermas by CLS has led to popu lar misunderstanding of  h i s  work.  For 
example, Time lVIagazine reported that "the crits have borrowed from philosoph ical realms outside 
legal thought, including structural ism, semiotics and the 'Frankfurt school' of such nco-Marxist theo­
rists as Jiirgen H abermas and Theodor Adorno. They propose that law i s  no more than a means by 
which unjust power relations are dressed in the costume of eternal truths." Lacayo, supra note 23 ,  at 
87. The Habermas-Alexy theory is not in fact "nih i l ist ic," and the bulk of Alexy's work i s  devoted to 
the presentation of a set of rules for rational normative argumentation. All of th is  "Continental" 
philosophy seems to me to be of very high qual ity. I should not l i ke my criticisms of  U nger or CLS to 
be misinterpreted as cri ticisms of a tradit ion with which CLS has l ittk to do, and whi ch i t  has taken 
l i ttle trouble to understand. 
1 42. 
There can be no coherent, adequate doctrine of legislation or adjudication on l i beral premises. 
'A'hen viewed together, as a set of related answers to questions of rulemaking and rule appl ica­
tion, l iberal pol it ical  and legal doctrines are l ike a spider's web with a hole. I f  one pushes over 
a thread of the web to cover the hole, another hole opens up someplace else. In the end, one 
may conclude that something is wrong w ith the spider. 
KP, supra note 1 ,  at 83; see id. at 4 1 ,  77, 79, 92-93. 
1 43.  !d. at 39. 
1 44. !d. at 49. 
1 45 .  
The morality o f  desire is paradoxical .  I t  canonizes contentment a s  the good, and defines con­
tentment as the satisfaction of desire. But contentment cannot be achieved so long as we lack 
criteria with which to judge and to order our ends. Once a desire i s  satisfied, another must 
come to take its place, for accord ing to l i beral psychology we are striv ing beings who covet as 
long as we live. There is no reason to think that the number of d issatisfied desi res d im in ishes 
over time. 
!d. at 52-53. The morality of reason is in equally bad shape: 
Coherence demands that the universal principles of the moral i ty of reason be, l ike  the golden 
rule, neutral toward the purposes of specific i ndividuals. Given the postulate of arbitrary de­
sire, there i s  no basis on which to prefer some ends to others. But as long as this formal 
neutrality is strictly maintained, the standards i t  produces w i l l  be, l ike the golden rule itself, 
empty shells. Until the shells are fil led up by more concrete principles, they are capable of 
accommodating almost any pattern of conduct and i ncapable of determining precisely what i s  
commanded or prohibited i n  particular situations of choice. Do unto others as we would have 
them do unto us, but what is i t  that we ought to want them to do unto us:> 
!d. at 53-54. 
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There are several objections to this analysis .  First, a separation of rea­
son from desire is  hardly unique to LIBERALISM . It  is a central idea in 
Greek phi losophy,146 and although there are important d ifferences be­
tween Greek and modern moral psychology , Unger does not state them 
very clearly. H is "principle of reason and desire" is so vaguely worded 
that i t  blurs the differences between the Greeks and the modern philoso­
phers as well as the differences between such modern thinkers as, say , 
Hume and Kant . 147 
Second, Unger does not show-he simply assumes-that LIBERAL 
moral theories must adopt one or the other of his two moralities. But 
many moral theories do not fal l  into either camp-for example, the ac­
count of morali ty given in H .L.A.  Hart's Concept of Law, which is based 
on a theory of human conventions. 148 
Third, the arguments Unger advances against the morali ties of desire 
and reason are, l ike his arguments against "the antinomy of theory and 
fact ," merely restatements of old controversies . The argument against the 
morality of desire is a commonplace. It  is  referred to in the phi losophical 
l iterature as "the paradox of hedonism";149 i t  was well -known to Socrates, 
and was discussed at length by the classical uti l i tarians. But Unger's ver­
sion of this old argument160 is no threat to a util itarian. S pecifically: ( 1 )  
Contentment, conceived of as a state i n  which all desires, of whatever sort, 
have been satisfied, is not the summum bonum for this tradit ion-in con­
trast to the activity of satisfying rational desires, which is a d i fferent mat-
1 46. 
"Of our unnecessary pleasures and appetites there are some l awless ones, I think, wh ich 
probably are to be found in  us a l l ,  but w hich, when controlled by the laws and the better 
desires in al l iance w ith reason, can in some men be al together got rid of, or so nearly so that 
only a few weak ones remain, whi le i n  others the remnant is  stronger and more n umerous." 
"What desires do you mean '" he said. 
"Those," said I,  "that are awakened in sleep when the rest of the soul ,  the rationa l ,  gentle 
and dominant part, slumbers, but the beastly and savage part, replete with food and wine, 
gambols and, repel l ing sleep, endeavors to sal ly forth and satisfy its own instincts. You are 
aware that in such case there is nothing i t  will not venture to undertake as being released from 
all  sense of shame and al l  reason. It does not shrink from attempting to l ie wi th a mother i n  
fancy or  with anyone else, man, god or  brute. It is  ready for any  foul deed o f  blood; i t  abstains 
from no food, and, in a word, fal l s  short of no extreme of fol ly and shamelessness." 
PLATO, REPUBLIC bk. 9, at 57 1 c  (P .  Shorey trans. 1 930) .  
1 47.  Unger formulates this principle as follows: 
The first principle of l iberal psychology states that the self consists of understanding and de­
sire, that the two are distinct from one another, and that desire is the moving, active, or pri­
mary part of the self. The mind machine, by itself, wants nothing; desire, unaided by under­
standing, can see nothing. This might be called the principle of reason and desire. 
KP, supra nott I,  at 39. I note i n  passing that one of the most inOuential l iberal pol i tical theo­
rists-Kant-rejects the idea that desire is the primary part of the self. 
1 48 .  H .L.A. HART, THE CoNCEPT OF LAW ( 1 9 6 1 ) ,  especial ly chs. 5, 6, & 8. Other moral theo­
ries that seem to me to fit uneasily i nto either camp are those of Burke, H ume, and T.H.  Green. 
1 49 .  The term originates with Sidgwick.-See H.  SIOGWICK, TH£ METHODS OF ETHICS 48 ( 1 907) 
("Here comes into view what we may call the fundamental paradox of Hedonism, that the impulse 
towards pleasure, if too predominant,  defeats i ts own aim.") .  S idgwick describes th is  paradox as "al­
most a commonplace," id. at 46; for his lengthy d iscussion of it, see id. at 1 1 9-6 1 .  
1 50.  See supra note 1 45.  
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ter altogether."' (2) Even if the utilitarian concedes that "there is no rea-
son to think that the number of dissatisfied [sic] desires diminishes over
time," it remains true that the number of satisfied desires increases. This
is both the more reasonable quantity to measure and the one that utilitari-
ans have in fact adopted. (3) There are some fairly obvious and plausible
devices whereby a utilitarian can avoid Unger's paradox (for example, by
saying that, on pain of perpetual disappointment, a successful utilitarian
life requires the cultivation of a particular second-order desire, namely,
the desire to become the sort of person who is not governed by unsatisfi-
able first-order desires-such as an insatiable greed for money or the
like). I do not myself believe that classical utilitarianism is a tenable moral
theory, and I am sympathetic to Unger's criticisms. But he does not men-
tion the serious objections to utilitarianism that have been discussed in the
recent literature;152 the one problem he does mention is minor.
Unger's argument against the morality of reason is equally familiar. It
was advanced against Kant by the German Romantics, by Hegel, by John
Stuart Mill, by Bradley, and by Sidgwick. As a consequence, every impor-
tant study of Kant's ethical writings discusses the problem; 53 and as in
the case of utilitarianism, there are many well-known and plausible
replies.
151. See H. SIDGWICK, supra note 149, at 23-26.
152. See, e.g., the contribution of Williams to B. WILLIAMS & J. SMART, UTILITARIANISM: FOR
AND AGAINST (1973).
153. H. PATON, THE MORAL LAW 74-77 (1948); 0. NELL, ACTING ON PRINCIPLE (1975).
There are further references and a helpful discussion in Professor Kronman's impressive and devas-
tating review of Knowledge and Politics. See Kronman, Book Review, 61 MINN. L. REV. 167, 183,
197-98 (1976). Kronman points out that Unger's criticisms of the two LIBERAL moralities are to be
found in Hegel. Unger replied: "The suggestion that my view is Hegelian has been made by various
people in the United States and England. Frankly, I think it is mistaken .... People interested in
philosophy who have read the book in Brazil, France, and Italy don't find it especially Hegelian at
all." Id. at 200. But this is irrelevant. Kronman is quite specific in his charge of unoriginality. He
confines it to Unger's critique of Kantian ethics and to his "vision of humanity," of which Kronman
says: "To be honest, I find very little in Unger's 'vision of humanity' which isn't already there-and
for the most part explicitly so-in Hegel's philosophy." This assertion Kronman supports with a long
string of citations to Hegel's works. See id. at 182-83. Unger ignores this documentation; instead, he
tells us:
The effort to participate in the dialogue between Christianity and modernism is one of the
ruling ambitions of the work. And the primary source of the conception of universals I defend
is the Aristotelian doctrine that the priests who taught me as a boy used to call "hylemorfism"
[sic] and which, despite what you say, is utterly alien to the dominant strands in modern
philosophy.
I write this not merely to defend myself against an unfairness which I think you have done
me, and to reject a misinterpretation of my thought, but also to make two points about the
politics of philosophical culture in the Anglo-American world .... I believe that the resources
available for the critique of liberalism have been enormously impoverished by the widespread
ignorance of Christian tradition among contemporary Anglo-American academics. One of the
consequences is to subsume under some familiar category-like Hegelianism-or some even
more general rubric-like collectivism-whatever seeks to break with liberalism and
capitalism.
Id. at 200-01. I find this reply unpersuasive. It simply ignores Kronman's citations. In view of the
facts I discussed in note 141 and that I shall discuss in text accompanying notes 180-83, the remarks
about "Anglo-American" academics ought to be taken with a considerable dose of salt.
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I do not wish to exaggerate my criticisms of this section. It does not
contain any major historical errors, and the objections Unger raises are
not pseudo-problems. But this philosophical ground is already well-
trodden, and if one wishes to show that modern moral philosophy
culminates in self-contradiction, it is not enough merely to gesture towards
two familiar and well-explored lines of attack, neither of which, despite
much effort, has succeeded.
3. The Political Antinomies
I now come to the part of Unger's argument most directly occupied
with problems of legal theory. He is going to unfold his argument that the
denial of "intelligible essences" is the source of the antinomies of liberal
political theory. Unger's argument, which I quote at length in the foot-
note, can be split into three propositions. 5
154. "[Tjhe intelligible essence of each thing in the world is its ideal. So, for example, according
to this view, there is a universally valid ideal of perfected human life. We call this ideal humanity
because it distinguishes man from all other kinds of beings. It is his intelligible essence." KP, supra
note 1, at 41.
From the start, liberal political thought has been in revolt against the conception of objective
value. [Here Unger cites to Hobbes' Leviathan.] If we were able to perceive such values, they
would become the true foundation of the social order. Public rules would be relegated to a
subsidiary role, as devices for the specification of the objective standards. . . . Even the prem-
ises of liberal psychology would be affected by an objective theory of value. Ends would be at
least as intelligible as facts. They would be things that exist in the world, like triangles, if not
like tables.
Id. at 76-77.
The doctrine that there are no intelligible essences is the ultimate basis of the principle of
subjective value. The theory of intelligible essences states that there are a limited number of
classes of things in the world, that each thing has characteristics that determine the class to
which it belongs, and that these characteristics can be known directly by the mind.
Id. at 79.
Now, however, a difficulty arises. If there are no intelligible essences, how do we go about
classifying facts and situations, especially social facts and social situations? Because facts have
no intrinsic identity, everything depends on the names we give them. The conventions of nam-
ing rather than any perceived quality of "tableness" will determine whether an object is to
count as a table. In the same way, convention rather than nature will dictate whether a partic-
ular bargain is to be treated as a contract.
Properly understood, the system of public rules is itself a language. Every rule is addressed
to a category of persons and acts, and marks its addressees off from others. To mark off is to
name. To apply the rules to particular cases is to subsume individual persons and acts under
the general names of which the rules consist. Hence, the theory of law is a special branch of
the general theory of naming.
At last, I can state the great political problem toward which I have been winding my way.
The resort to a set of public rules as the foundation of order and freedom is a consequence of
the subjective conception of value. The subjective conception of value in turn presupposes the
abandonment of the doctrine of intelligible essences. In the absence of intelligible essences,
however, there are no obvious criteria for defining general categories of acts and persons when
we make the rules. (The making of rules is legislation.) Nor are there clear standards by
which to classify the particular instances under rules when we come to the stage of applying
the rules we have made. (The application of rules is adjudication.)
Id. at 80.
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a .  The Role of Rules 
The first proposition is that "the resort to a set of public rules as the 
foundation of order and freedom is a consequence of the subjective concep­
tion of value . " 1511 One way to refute this contention is to notice that public 
rules in this sense are not unique to political orders where LIBERALISM 
prevails .  One need only reOect on the nature of adjudication in any actual 
non-LIBERAL legal system. Roman law, Canon law, and Islamic law all 
resort to public rules, and all encounter famil iar problems of jurispru­
dence. The resort to public rules is  not a consequence of a belief in the 
subjectivity of values, but of the fact that, even in the most theocratic of 
legal systems, people ( 1 )  disagree about how the values are to be applied; 
(2) need guidelines to help them decide hard cases ; and (3) need conven­
tions to sett le the issues that are not resolved by objective values. (In the 
terminology of Aquinas, we need human law to particularize matters that 
are left open by the natural law . 1 56) 
It  is  furthermore not clear what sort of metaphysical features one would 
have to add to the world in  order for people to be able to dispense with 
public rules. In particular, it is not clear that " intelligible essences" would 
help solve the problem. How are they supposed to decide a hard case or 
interpret a clause in a contract ? What would the universe look l ike i f  i t  
did contain objective values ? These are old questions; I shall  h ave more to 
say about them later . 1 57 
Moreover, nobody-least of all  the Greeks-has ever bel ieved that we 
are in possession of a standard of objective goodness so self-evident that i t  
would eliminate all moral disagreements and settle al l  legal questions 
without controversy. The Medea is not the work of a man who believes in  
a realm of "intel l igible essences" that tidily and unproblematically "clas­
sify social facts and situations";  and, like Plato and Aristotle ,  Euripides is 
well aware that nature and convention-physis and nomos-are inextrica­
bly intertangled with questions of morality. 
I t  is therefore perplexing to be told that ( 1 )  LIBERALISM's rejection of 
the "Aristotelian theory of intelligible essences" is the reason why (2) 
"convention rather than nature wil l  dictate whether a particular bargain 
is to be treated as a contract ."  In  fact, the argument for (2)  is  straightfor­
ward, and does not depend on ( 1  ) : The world contains many diverse legal 
systems, and what is  a contract in Persia is not necessarily a contract in 
Athens; nature can perhaps determine that promises ought i n  general to 
be kept/58 but only convention can dictate whether a bargain that has 
been signed at the top of the page is to be treated the same as one that has 
1 55 .  /d. 
1 56. T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE prima secundae, Question 95, Article 2 (ca. 1 265-73) 
[ hereinafter cited in  the form: S.T. 1 a2ae, Q.95, A .2 . ] .  
1 57 .  See infra text accompanying notes 1 73-79. 
1 58. As Hume believed. D .  HuME , supra note 99, bk. 3 ,  pt. 2, § 1 ,  at 484. 
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been signed at the bottom, or whether a youth of seventeen is competent to 
make a legally binding agreement .  The idea that nature might be able to 
resolve such ambiguities borders on the unintelligible, and the fact of cul­
tural diversity shows that, although some aspects of justice may be deter­
mined by nature, others must be purely conventional .  This argument is 
not particularly LIBER A L  Although it  occurs in writers such as H ume/69 
the classical statement is in Aristotle160 and Aquinas . 1 61 
b .  The Source of Subjective Values 
The second step in Unger's argument is h is  claim that "[ t ]he doctrine 
that there are no intel l igible essences is  the ultimate basis of the principle 
of subjective value ."162 Unger says:  
From the start, l iberal political thought has been m revolt against 
1 59 ld. 
1 60. 
Now of political justice. There are two forms of i t ,  the natural and the conventional .  I t  is 
natural when i t  has the same validity everywhere and is unaffected by any view we may take 
about the justice of it . I t  is conventional when there is no original reason why it should take 
one form rather than another and the rule it imposes i s  reached by agreement,  after which it 
holds good. I t  might, for instance, be agreed that the ransom of a prisoner of war shall be fixed 
at one pound, that the sacri fice in a certain r i tual  be one goat and not two sheep. Such are the 
rules prescribed by law in part icular cases . . . Some phi losophers are of the opinion that 
justice i s  conventional i n  all i ts branches, arguing that a law of nature admits of no variation 
and operates in  exactly the same way everywhere-thus fire burns here and in Persia-while 
rules of justice keep changing before our eyes. This last statement, however, needs qual i fica­
t ion. (It can hardly be true of justice among the gods.) But in this world of ours, wh i le natural 
justice undoubtedly exists, the rules under which justice i s  administered are everywhere being 
modified. 
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 1 35 ,  bk. 5, ch. 7 ,  at 1 1 43b1 9-30 (j. Thomson trans. 1 953) .  
1 6 1 .  "To pass judgement is ,  as we have sa id ,  to define or determine what  i s  just .  The just  arises 
in two ways. First, from the very nature of th ings, and this is called natural  righ t ;  second, from some 
agreement among men, and this, as we have seen,  is cal led positive right ."  S.T., supra note 1 56,  at 
2a2ae, Q.60, A.5 .  (T. Gi lby trans. 1 969) .  
I t  should be noted that Karl Llewel lyn,  the drafter of Article I I  of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
accepted a theory that is, if anything, even more "essentialist" than Aristotle's. In what Richard 
Danzig calls "perhaps the key passage in The Common Law Tradition," Llewel lyn quotes and en­
dorses the view of the nineteenth-century German jurist Levin Goldschmidt : 
Every fact-pattern of common l i fe, so far as the legal order can take i t  in ,  carries within i tself 
i ts appropriate, natural rules, its right law. This is a natural law which is real ,  not imaginary; 
i t  is not a creature of mere reason, but rests on the sol id foundation of what reason can recog­
nize in the nature of man and of the l i fe condit ions of the t ime and place; it is thus not eternal 
or changeless nor everywhere the same, but is i ndwel l ing in  the very circumstances of l i fe. The 
highest task of law-giving consists i n  uncovering and implementing this immanent law. 
For accounts of the influence of Llewelyn's essent ia l ism on the UCC, see Danzig, A Comment on the 
Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN.  L. REv. 62 1 ,  625-26 ( 1 975) ;  Note, supra 
note 1 4 1 .  Even Goldschmidt and the Natur der Sache tradition he represents follow Aristotle in 
al lowing that some aspects of the law are determined by nature and others by convent ion:  That is  the 
point of the remark that the immanent l aw i s  "not eternal or changeless nor everywhere the same." 
See generally Dreier, Natur der Sache, i n  6 H ISTORISCHES W6RTERBUCH DER PHILOSOPHIE 478 (j . 
Ri tter & K. Grunder eds. 1 984). As a general matter, any given act of legislation wi l l  contain a blend 
of the natural and the conventional. Thus, i t  i s  a matter of natural  law (even in H ume's restricted 
sense) that motorists should drive at a reasonable speed; but it is a matter of convention (even for 
Aristotle or Goldschmidt) that the speed l imi t  should be precisely 55 .  
1 62. KP ,  supra note 1 ,  a t  79. 
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the conception of objective value. * I f  we were able to perceive such 
values, they would become the true foundation of the social or­
der. . . .  Ends would be at least as intel ligible as facts. They would 
be things that exist in the world,  like triangles, if not l ike tables. The 
distinction between the objective understanding of facts and the arbi­
trary choice of goals would therefore collapse. 
* [Unger's Endnote: ] See Hobbes, Leviathan ch. 6 ("good and evill 
apparent") ,  p .  48 .  See note 1 8  to my ch. 1 . 163 
Note 1 8  to chapter 1 in turn informs us: "Perhaps the most cogent 
statement of the principle of arbitrary desire is to be found in H ume, [A J 
Treatise [of Human Nature], bk. 3 ,  pt. 1 , § 1 pp. 455-470 ."  Unger's 
argument assumes that, in the absence of intelligible essences, values must 
be subjective, desires arbitrary , and rules impossible. But he arrives at 
these conclusions by confusing the notions of subjectivity and 
arbitrariness. 
The two notions are not at all the same. To say that some prop­
erty-for instance, the pain I feel when jabbed with a pin-is subjective is 
to say that it belongs to me, a particular perceiving subject, in contrast to 
other subjects who have other experiences. To say that something is arbi­
trary is to say that it is in some sense lawless , unpredictable, capricious, 
up for grabs. Consider a few examples. The motion of the wind is  arbi­
trary; i t  is not subjective. My pain on being jabbed with a pin is subjec­
tive; it is not arbitrary. l'vfy decision, based on the flip  of a coin, to wear 
this particular necktie is both subjective and arbitrary; the fact that 
2 + 2 =4 is neither. 
These examples bring out a further point, namely, that these two words 
are not only semantically independent , but that their use varies according 
to context and background interest as well . So,  for instance , the outcome 
of the flip of a coin is arbitrary from the point of view of the fli pper, but 
not from the point of view of the laws of physics. A similar observation 
holds for subjectivity . That the sky on a cloudless day is blue i s  an objec­
tive fact if our implicit  background class of perceiving subjects is normal 
members of the human species; but i f  we take the background class to be 
al l  mammals, then the blue appearance of the sky is  a subjective (but not 
arbitrary) feature of human visual perception. In other words, a property 
that is inter-species subjective can at the same time be i ntra-species 
objective. 
Now, even the most superficial inspection of the writings of H obbes 
and Hume reveals them to have been concerned to show that the existence 
of principles of justice i s  inter-species subjective; but this does not imply 
that the principles of justice are arbitrary. H obbes and H ume were mak­
ing arguments relative to the human species as it actually exists; they did 
1 63 .  !d.  at 76-77; endnote at 306.  
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not attempt to lay down principles of justice for the angels. They conceive 
of justice as an institution that arises among humans in conditions of lim­
ited benevolence and moderate scarcity: " [ I ] f  men were supplied with 
every thing in the same abundance , or i f  every one had the same affection 
and tender regard for every one as for himself; justice and injustice would 
be equally unknown among mankind." 164 
But none of this makes the principles of justice intra-species subjective; 
nor does i t  make them arbitrary. This point is  particularly clear in Hob­
bes. Although he defines good and evil in terms of appetites and 
desires , 16r> he assumes that some desires are so universal and powerful that 
they provide a solid foundation for the principles of justice. H e  grounds 
his entire argument on the assumption that in a state of nature al l  men 
will be driven by the desire for gain ,  for safety, and for reputation into a 
war of all against al l ;  that their physical powers are so nearly equal that 
no single victor will emerge; but that their fear of death and desire for 
security will  "incline men to peace" and that "reason suggesteth conven­
ient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement ."166 
Hobbes not only assumes that these impulses are universal among 
humans, but he also assumes that the "articles of peace" are so explicit 
that they require absolute power to be lodged in the person of a single 
sovereign . 167 Intra -species , Hobbes i s  one of the most objectivist political 
philosophers who ever l ived, for on his view human nature requires that 
political sovereignty be absolute, perpetual ,  and undivided. Aristotle ,  with 
his collection of constitutions and his taxonomic interest in the different 
forms of government, is  much less strict about what human nature de­
mands, and he places a much greater emphasis on the multiplici ty of 
human conventions. 
Hume, l ike Hobbes, also assumes a more-or-less constant human na­
ture as the basis of his moral theory; and it  is odd that Unger should have 
missed this point, because a famil iar criticism of Hume accuses him of 
treating human nature as absolutely the same in all circumstances. 168 Re-
1 64.  D. HuME, supra note 99, bk. 3 ,  pt. 2 ,  § 2 ,  at 495. 
1 65 .  T. HoBBES, LEVIATHAN p t .  I ,  ch . 6 ,  at 5 5  (M.  Oakeshott ed. 1 962). Incidental ly, Hobbes 
never says "good and evil apparent ." These words do not occur in the text; they are a marginal gloss, 
which Unger has misunderstood. In the accompanying text Hobbes i s  not saying that goodness is  an 
i l lusion; he is giving a defini tion of what i t  is  for something to appear to be good or evil: "But  for so 
far as a man seeth, i f  the good in  those consequences be greater than the evi l ,  the whole chain is  that 
which writers call apparent, or seeming good. And contrarily ,  when the evil exceedeth the good, the 
whole is apparent, or seeming evil . . . . " Jd. 
1 66. Jd. pt. I ,  ch. 1 3, at  1 02 .  
1 67 .  !d .  pt .  I I ,  ch .  17 ,  at 1 32 ("And in  h im consisteth the essence of the commonwealth; which, to 
define it, is one Person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have 
made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as 
he shall think expedient, for their peace 'and common defence." ( Emphasis i n  original .  Incidental ly ,  
Hobbes used the word "person" to refer to assemblies of men as wel l  as to i nd ividuals .) 
1 68. In D. FoRBES, H uME' s PHILOSOPHICAL POLITICS 1 1 3 n . 1 ( 1 975),  Forbes correctly observes 
that the following passage "has been quoted ad nauseam" :  
Would you know the sent iments, i nclinations, and  course of l i fe of the  Greeks and  Romans)  
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gardless of  the truth of  this cnt1c1sm, the fact remams that Hume 1s ex­
plicit about what his argument entails :  
To avoid giving offence, I must here observe, that when I deny 
justice to be a natural virtue, I make use of the word , natural, only 
as oppos'd to artificial. In another sense of the word; as no principle 
of the human mind is more natural than a sense of virtue; so no 
virtue is more natural than justice. Mankind is an inventive species; 
and where an invention is obvious and absolutely necessary , it may 
as properly be said to be natural as any thing that proceeds immedi­
ately from original principles, without the intervention of  thought or 
reflexion . Tho' the rules of justice be artificial ,  they are not arbi­
trary. Nor is the expression improper to call them Laws of Nature; 
if  by natural we understand what is common to any species ,  or even 
if we confine it to mean what is inseparable from the species . 169 
This passage is one of the most famous in  Hume; since Unger takes 
Hume to have furnished "the most cogent statement of the principle of 
arbitrary desire,"170 he ought perhaps to have mentioned i t .  
Unger's failure to notice these distinctions-in particular Burne's re­
mark that "tho' the rules of  justice be artificial, they are not arbi­
trary" -is likewise fatal to his third proposition: 
c. No Essences Means No Standards 
According to Unger, in  the absence of intelligible essences there are no 
standards for making or applying rules and, therefore, no standards for 
legislation or adjudication. 
With this contention we are getting close to the heart o f  the matter. 
Charles Fried perceptively remarks that the reason Unger cries "subjectiv­
ism" is that he i s  "a disappointed super-objectivist ." 17 1  Unger's idea seems 
to be that if  values do not exist out in the world as something you can 
break your leg on, then the legal system is  entirely arbitrary. One reply to 
this line of reasoning is H ume's remark on arbitrariness; another reply 
proceeds by reflecting on the notion of  "intelligible essences ."  
I said earlier that the phrase "intelligible essences" does no t  name any 
Study well the temper and actions of the French and English: You cannot be much mistaken 
in  transferring to the former most of the observations which you have made with regard to the 
latter. Mankind are so much the same, in all t imes and places, that h istory i n forms us of 
nothing new or strange i n  this part icular. Its chief use i s  only to discover the constant and 
universal principles of human nature, by showing men in a l l  varieties of circumstances and 
situations, and furnishing us with materials from which we may form our observations and 
become acquainted with the regular springs of human action and behaviour. 
D. HUME, ENQUIRY CONCERNING H UMAN UNDERSTANDING, § 8, pt. 1 ( 1 777).  
1 69 .  D .  HUME, supra note 99, bk. 3 ,  p t .  2 ,  § l ,  at 484. 
1 70. KP, supra note 1 ,  at 300. 
1 7 1 .  Fried, The Laws of Change: The Cunning of Reason in Moral and Legal History, 9 J .  
LEGAl. STUO. 335 ,  343 ( 1 980). 
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"classical doctrine" which was "rejected" by Hobbes and his  fellow LIB­
ERALS, and that Unger uses the term to stand ambiguously for notions 
that the philosophers agree must be sharply distinguished , to wit, essential 
properties , universals, and abst-ract pa-rticulars. 172 Depending on what 
sense we give to "intelligible essences," Unger's third proposition is either 
trivial or false. 
If Unger contends that rules require either universals or essential 
properties, then his position is true. It  is also uninteresting and has no 
force against a nominalist like Hobbes. For the Hobbesian contention is 
not that there are no universals; rather, he contends that the only univer­
sals are linguistic universals . 173 But this is a different matter altogether. I f  
it is accepted that there are l inguistic universals, then there i s  no diffi­
culty in establishing the possibility of linguistic rules. One need only 
make the fol lowing empirical assumption : that human beings are enough 
alike in their subjective judgments of similarity so that, in most cases (per­
haps after a considerable amount of training) , they can agree about the 
scope of a particular term. So long as they can agree about w hat to call a 
"hawk" and what a "handsaw," i t  makes no difference whether an "intel­
ligible essence of hawkishness" exists-the fact of agreement i s  enough. 
To be sure, the categories they apply wil l  be in some sense subjective; but, 
as we just saw, this does not make them arbit-ra1y. 
On the other hand, Unger sometimes seems to take an "intelligible es­
sence" to be some sort of abstract object ("existing," he says,  "like a tri­
angle") .  But then we run up against a classical problem: that of explain­
ing how an object can provide a foundation for the application of a rule or 
for the classification of other objects. Here is a bird , and over here is an 
abstract object-the intelligible essence of hawkishness. Now, what ties 
the latter object to the former in such a way as to make the bird a hawk ? 
A rule ? But i f  that is the answer, then you might as well  accept the 
Hobbesian theory. Hobbes's theory is  that the bird is related to its name 
by the application of human standards of perceptual similarity; the "intel­
ligible essences" theory merely replaces "name" with "intell igible essence" 
and the psychological mechanism with some occult force . Or perhaps the 
two objects are related by a third object-say, "the intelligible essence of a 
hawk's being related to the intelligible essence of hawkishness . "  But i f  
that is the theory, then we are headed into an infinite regress. 
These problems are not new. Plato discusses them in the Parmenides, 
1 72.  See supra notes 1 1 9 ,  1 20 ,  1 54.  
1 73. 
Of Names, some are proper, and singular to one only th ing; as Peter, john, this man, this tree; 
and some are common to many thing� man, horse, tree; every one of which, though but one 
name, is nevertheless the name of di vers particular things; i n  respect of all which together, i t  is 
called an universal; there being nothing in the world universal but names; for the things 
named, are every one of them individual and singular." 
T. HoBBES, supra note 1 65 ,  pt. I ,  ch .  4, at 35 .  
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Aristotle in  the Metaphysics . In  consequence, every philosopher since an­
tiquity has been carefu l  to distinguish universals (l ike triangularity) from 
abstract objects ( l ike triangles) . And even if the "intel l igib le  essence of 
goodness" existed as a sort of spooky object, we would still be able to 
disagree about how to apply it ,  and we would still need rules to settle 
hard cases . So not only are the intelligible essences ontologically mysteri­
ous-they are explanatorily superfluous as well . There is a deep confu­
sion involved in  the idea that moral values could be objects ; and,  inciden­
tally ,  the locus classicus for this criticism is not in H obbes, but in 
Aristotle. 1 74 
Aristotle draws a sharp distinction between two kinds of knowledge: the 
kind of universal , necessary knowledge we can obtain in  mathematics, 
metaphysics, and the exact sciences, and the kind of rough general ization 
we can obtain in  ethics . m•  Aquinas makes similar observations. 1 76 The 
contrast with Plato could hardly be more extreme. Plato had taken mathe-
1 74 .  Speaking of the Platonic theory that ethics is based on the Form of the good,  Aristotle says: 
To examine this opinion thoroughly  belongs to an investigation at once different from the 
present one, and in many ways, inevitably, approximating more to logic. . . To speak in  a 
summary fashion, we may say first that the thesis that there is a Form either of good or indeed 
of anything else is verbal and vacuous . .  
Again, even i f  the Forms, i ncluding a Form of good exist, they are not of  the least help 
either for a good l i fe or for actions. 
ARISTOTLE, EuoEMIAN ETHICS bk. 1 ,  ch. 8 at 1 2 1 7b 1 7  -25 (M. Woods trans. 1 982) .  Aristotle devel-
oped the point more concretely in the Nicomachean Ethics: 
Even if the good which is predicated of a number of different things exists on ly  in one element 
common to them all, or has a separate existence of its own, clearly i t  cannot be real ized in 
action or acquired by man. Yet i t  is  just a good of that kind that is  the subject of  our present 
inquiry. . And there is another puzzle. What advantage in his art w i l l  a weaver or a joiner 
get from a knowledge of the absolute good ? Or how shall  a doctor or a general who has had a 
vision of Very Form become thereby a better doctor or genera l �  As a matter of fact, it does not 
appear that the doctor makes a study even of health in the abstract. What he studies i s  the 
health of the human subject or rather of a particular patient. For i t  is  on such a patient that he 
exercises his ski l l .  
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 1 35 ,  bk .  1 ,  ch .  6, at 1 096b30- 1 097a 1 3  (j . Thomson trans. 1 953) .  
1 7 5 .  
Such being the nature of our subject and such our way of arguing in  our discussions of i t ,  we 
must be satisfied with a rough outl ine of the truth,  and for the same reason we must be content 
with broad conclusions. Indeed we must preserve this attitude when i t  comes to a more detailed 
statement of  the views that are held. I t  is a mark of the educated man and a proof of his 
culture that in every subject he looks for only so much precision as its nature permits. For 
example, it is absurd to demand logical demonstrations from a professional speaker; we might 
as well accept mere probabil i ties from a mathematician .  
NI<:OMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 1 35 ,  bk. I ,  ch.  3 ,  at 1 094b 1 9-28 (j . Thomson trans .  1 953) .  For 
discussion of this passage and the previous one, see W. HARDIE, ARISTOTLE's ETHICAL THEORY chs. 
3, 4 ( 1 968); H. JoACHIM, ARISTOTLE: THE N ICOMACHEAN ETHICS 23-27 ( 1 9 5 1 ) ;  G. LLOYD ,  ARIS­
TOTLE: THE GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF HIS THOUGHT 204-24 ( 1 968);  M .  WooDS, COMMEN­
TARY TO ARISTOTLE'S EUDEMIAN ETHICS 66-92 ( 1 982).  
1 76. 
The practical reason is concerned with practical matters, which are singu lar  and contingent: 
but not with necessary things, with which the speculative reason is concerned. Wherefore 
human laws cannot have that i nerrancy that belongs to the demonstrated conclusions of sci­
ences. Nor is i t  necessary for every measure to be a l together unerring and certai n ,  but accord­
ing as it is possible in its own particular genus. 
S.T., supra note 1 56,  at l a2ae, Q.9 1 ,  A.3 (Dominican  Fathers trans. 1 9 1 2-36) ;  see a lso id. at Q.95 ,  
A.2 .  
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matical and metaphysical knowledge to be the ideal towards which the 
statesman ought to strive; his ethics is inseparable from his metaphysics. 
Aristotle not only rejects Plato's metaphysics , but denies that metaphysics 
can be the basis of ethics . H is eth ical arguments do not appeal to meta­
physical considerations, and one can accept his ethics without accepting 
his metaphysics .  
Although Aristotle, unlike Plato,  does not "base" his ethics on other 
parts of his phi losophy, he does , of course, make it  fi t in. Aristotle's ethics 
starts from a theory of human nature; his theory of human nature is ,  in 
turn, connected to his views on biology; his views on biology are connected 
to his views on teleology; and his views on teleology are connected to more 
general physical and metaphysical doctrines. These metaphysical doctrines 
unquestionably exert an i ndirect influence on his ethical system, but not 
as great an influence as Unger's argument requires. Indeed, despite the 
differences in their views of metaphysics and final causation,  the manner 
in which Hume and Aristotle approach ethics is  similar .  They have more 
in common with each other than either does with, say, Kant or H egel . 
Both assume that ethics aims at attaining "the good for man"; both as­
sume that human nature, in its broad features, is  uniform; both reject any 
appeal to supra-human moral principles. They disagree about what hap­
piness is, about the nature of the virtues, about the proper form of the 
state, and about many of the details of their ethical theories ,  but these 
disagreements are not attributable to their disagreement about 
metaphysics. 
I dwell on these facts because of their importance for Unger's argu­
ment. Recall that Unger says of the doctrine of "intell igible essences," 
first, that this doctrine's "authoritative statement" is in  Aristotle 's Book 
Zeta/77 and, second, that "this doctrine is truly a master principle, for its 
friends have drawn from i t  conclusions about language, morals,  and polit­
ics ."178 This contention is the heart of his argument; but h istorically i t  is 
without foundation. 179 
Whether Unger's contention applies any better to the Scholastics is a 
question I shall not attempt to answer. The M iddle Ages were the heyday 
of Aristotelian metaphysics; they were also a great era for political theory. 
Unger claims that " [ t ]he effort to participate in  the dialogue between 
Christianity and modernism is one of the ruling ambitions of the work. 
And the primary source of the conception of universals I defend i s  the 
Aristotelian doctrine that the priests who taught me as a boy used to call 
'hylemorfism' . . . .  "180; so one would expect h im to say something about 
1 77 .  KP, supra note I ,  at 297; see supra note 1 20 (discussing the d i fficulties of Unger's reference 
to Book Zeta). 
1 78 .  KP, supra note 1 ,  at  3 1 .  
1 79 .  See supra notes 1 1 8-20 and accompanying text. 
1 80. See Kronman, supm note 1 53 ,  at  200-01 (letter from Unger to Kronman). 
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the  medieval Schoolmen. His  work depends heavily on a contrast between 
the Aristotelian tradition and the new philosophy of the seventeenth cen­
tury; so he ought to have discussed the developments that took place in  the 
2200 years that separate Aristotle from Hobbes. In fact, the development 
of medieval philosophy does show a gradual movement from realism to 
nominalism, and from moral rationalism to voluntarism/81 but this devel­
opment is not uniform. Scotus, the first major voluntarist ,  was also the 
champion of realism; and Occam's  political tracts are largely i ndependent 
of his nominalism. 182 Nonetheless, I do not doubt that there are important 
connections between medieval metaphysics and medieval moral theory . I 
do doubt, however, that these connections are sufficient to save Unger's 
theory . In any event, Scholasticism is not a subject he discusses . 183 
E. Organic Groups 
I have now come to the end of my discussion of Unger's refutation of 
LIBERALISM . I have concentrated on this section because of its importance 
for CLS/84 because it is the philosophical heart of his book, and because a 
detailed examination of a lengthy passage seemed the fairest w ay of estab­
lishing Unger's quality as a philosopher. But before drawing my ultimate 
conclusions on Knowledge and Politics, I shall briefly consider the rela­
tionship between Unger's critique of LIBERALISM and the rest of his  book. 
The remaining chapters contain ( 1 )  a "Theory of the Welfare-Corporate 
State"1811 and (2) a positive doctrine, consisting of a "Theory of the 
Self"186 and a "Theory of Organic Groups ." 1 87 The positive doctrine 
"aims to define what a union of transcendence and immanence, autonomy 
and community, would mean." 188 The book ends with a section entitled 
"God." 189 I shall not discuss the section on God or Unger's theory of the 
social organization of the l iberal state; these i ssues have more to do with 
theology or sociology than with philosophy. Instead , I shall concentrate on 
his theory of "organic groups." 
Unger says that the solution to the antinomies of LIBERAL thought re­
quires two revolutions, one political , the other theoretical . Political ly ,  
1 8 1 .  I . e . ,  from the view that moral i ty i s  based on  reason (which is binding even on God)  to the 
view that morality is an expression of the divine wi l l .  The best i ntroductory account  of medieval 
phi losophy is 2, 3 F. CoPLESTON, A H ISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY ( 1 950 & 1 953) ;  for further details, 
see G. LEFF, WILl.IAM OF OcKHAM 6 1 4-43 ( 1 975) ;  A. WoLTER, DuNs ScoTUS ON THE WILL AND 
MoRAl.ITY ( 1 986) .  
1 82. F. CoPLESTON ,  supra note 1 8 1 ,  provides a useful account of the development of  the views of  
Scotus and Occam. 
1 83.  H is most extensive treatmen t  is a passing reference that comes in the middle of a d iscussion 
of Baroque art . KP, supra note 1 ,  at 1 22 .  
1 84.  See supra text accompanying notes 1 4-37. 
1 85 .  KP, supra note 1 ,  at 1 45-90. 
1 86. !d. at 1 9 1 -235 .  
1 87 .  !d.  at 236-95. 
1 88. !d. at 2 1 .  
1 89 .  !d. a t  290-95. 
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there must be a "transformation o f  the conditions of social l i fe ,  particu­
larly the circumstances of domination, that produce the experience of the 
contingency and arbitrariness of values ." 190 It  is important to stress that 
one of the principle aims of Unger's theory is to describe a kind of social 
l ife that will not be based u pon "domination" or "the hegemony of class 
and role ."19 1  As he says: "Until the central problem of the inner circle, 
the problem of domination, i s  resolved, the search for community is con­
demned to be idolatrous, or utopian, or both at once. " 1 92 H is attack on 
LIBERA LISM should thus not be misunderstood as an attack on l iberty . 1 93 
As for the theoretical revolution, the world needs a system of thought 
based on the "flourishing of  human nature. " 1 94 
Unger's positive theory of the good divides into two parts. The first is  
his "Theory of the Self. " This theory leads to "the notion that the good 
consists in the development of the species nature in the lives of particular 
persons ." 1911 The second part is  his "Theory of Organic Groups ."  This 
theory includes a description of "the community of l i fe ," in which individ­
uals can "discover the organic unity of each other's personal i ties ." 196 In  
his "Theory o f  the  Self," Unger attempts t o  show "that both human na­
ture and our understanding of it can progress through a spiral of increas­
ing community and diminishing domination. " 197 As Unger says: 
The previous course of the argument has justified the conclusion that 
the good is properly viewed as an actualization of human nature and 
that, when so interpreted, i t  can be pictured in two complementary 
ways. If  we consider the good as the ideal to which human striving is 
addressed and from which i t  receives its meaning, i t  can be  charac­
terized as the relationship to nature, to others, and to oneself de­
scribed by the concepts of natural harmony, sympathy, and concrete 
universality. ' ' 198 
1 90. !d. at 1 03 .  
1 9 1 .  !d. at 25 1 .  
1 92 .  /d. at 252 .  
1 93. 
Many of the l iberal thinkers were devoted to freedom, though their false metaphysical princi­
ple almost always kept them from grasping its true character. I f  for no other reason than for 
this devotion, they wil l  rank forever as heroes and teachers of the human race, and a l l  the sins 
of England wil l  be forgiven because of her services to l iberty. 
/d. at 277. 
1 94. 
The theoretical advance consists in the development of a system of thought that would enable 
us to deny the contrast of description and evaluation by taking the ends men share in  their 
groups as indications of the good or right. The in tuitive idea from which one might start is  that 
a man's choices express his nature; that common choices maintained over time and capable of 
winning ever greater adherence reOect a common human nature; and that the nourishing of 
human nature is the true basis of moral and pol itical judgment. 
/d. at 1 03.  
1 95 .  /d. at 239.  
1 96. /d. at 262. 
1 97.  /d. at 239. 
1 98 .  /d. 
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This sounds very promtsmg, and "concrete universal ity" has a splendid 
and famil iar ring199-but at this point one would l ike a bit of  detail .  
What (one wonders) about the  good considered as  a source of  more con­
crete standards of right conduct ? Unger has an answer: 
When we think of the good primari ly as a source of more concrete 
standards of right conduct , i t  may be useful to distinguish a u niversal 
and a particular good . 
Personality has two aspects: one universal, represented by sociabil­
i ty and the abstract self; the other particular,  expressed by i ndividu­
ality and the concrete self. Therefore, everyone must have both a 
universal and a particular good. The universal good is the perfection 
of the species nature in which he participates by virtue of h i s  socia­
bi l i ty and of his abstract selfhood. The particular good is the devel­
opment of the unique set of talents and capacities through which the 
species nature of mankind takes a concrete form in h im.200 
This "Theory of the Self" is all very wel l ,  as far as it goes ;  unfortu­
nately, i t  contains nothing that would be of the slightest help in solving 
any difficult moral problem. To say that moral ity is  to be fou nded on the 
"flourishing of human nature" is nothing new: Aristotle ,  H ume, and 
Rawls are of the same opinion.201 But the idea is to describe human na­
ture with enough precision so that i t  i s  possible to see what the resulting 
moral theory amounts to in practice. A morality that says nothing more 
than "Develop your species nature!" says nothing at all .  (What,  one won­
ders, would it be l ike not to develop our species nature ? )  
This problem becomes particularly acute when one turns to l egal and 
poli tical theory. Human nature might plausibly be argued to i nclude 
bipedalism, say ,  or cannibal ism, or male dominance, but not the Rule i n  
Shelley's Case o r  the Traffic Regulations of  N ew York C ity. Professor 
Unger's discussion of the political implications of his view of the good 
1 99 .  It comes from Hegel. Here i s  Bertrand Russel l 's discussion: 
Hegel's argument in  this portion of  his "Logic" depends throughout upon con fusing the "is" of 
predication, as i n  "Socrates is mortal , "  with the "is" of identity, as i n  "Socrates is the phi loso­
pher who drank the hemlock." Owing to this confusion, he thinks that "Socrates" and "mor­
tal" must be identica l .  Seeing that they are d i fferent, he does not i n fer, as others would ,  that 
there i s  a mistake somewhere, but that they exhibit "identity in d i fference." Aga in ,  Socrates is 
particular, "mortal" i s  universal. Therefore, he says, s ince Socrates i s  morta l ,  it fol lows that 
the particular is the universal-taking the "is" to be throughout expressive of iden tity. But to 
say "the particular is the universal" i s  self-contradictory. Again,  H egel does not suspect a 
mistake but proceeds to synthesize particular and universal i n  the individual , or concrete un i ­
versal. This is an example of how,  for want  of  care at the  start, vast and imposing systems of  
phi losophy are bu i l t  upon stupid and trivial confusions, which ,  but  for the almost i ncredible 
fact that they are unintentional, one would be tempted to characterize as puns.  
B. RussELL, OuR KNOWLEDGE or THE ExTERNAL WoRLD 48 n . l  ( 1 926).  
200. KP, supra note 1 ,  at 239. 
20 1 .  See NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 1 35 ,  bk. I ,  ch. 7 ;  D .  HuME, supra note 1 68 ,  § 8 ,  
pt. 1 (observe that h i s  chief contribution t o  moral phi losophy i s  entitled A Treatise of Human Na­
ture); J. RAWLS , supra note 86, at 424-33. 
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does little to dispel the problem. H e  says that his doctrine of human na­
ture leads to the "ideal of community . "202 This ideal is ,  according to Un­
ger, a regulative ideal that can never be completely realized in history ;203 
but it gives rise to a set of institutional principles that characterize the 
organic group . These institutional principles (the "community of l i fe ," 
the "democracy of ends," and the "division of labor") are supposed to 
"translate . . .  [ the ]  message [of the ideal of universal community]  i nto 
the language of political possibi l ities"204 and to "suggest how the situation 
of modern society can be used to promote the good . "20r> 
Organic groups are characterized by the following requirements. First ,  
" [  e ]ach member of the group must have face-to-face dealings with all the 
other members . "206 Second, the groups must exemplify "multipurpose or­
ganization ," for "[ u ] nless individuals deal with one another in a multi pl ic­
ity of different ways, they cannot discover the organic unity of each other's 
personalities ."207 These two requirements, Unger notes, sharply l imit the 
size of any community of l i fe .  Third, the groups must exemplify the "de­
mocracy of ends. "208 
Professor Unger does not go into very great detail about his organic 
groups. (He does not, for instance , tell us whether those people ,  l ike 
Thoreau or St. Jerome, who wish to l ive apart from organized human 
society are violating human nature . )  This lack of detail is  regrettable ,  par­
ticularly when one considers that his theory is supposed to serve as a basis 
for the political transformation of modern society. But let us try as best we 
can to imagine what a social world of organic groups would look l ike .  One 
of the chief advantages of organic groups is that they are supposed to help 
mankind to overcome "systems of domination . "  But i f  absence of  domina­
tion is the goal ,  then the members of one organic  group ought not to be 
able to dominate the members of another; and this suggests that the or­
ganic groups ought to exhibi t  a high degree of economic and political self-
202. 
When we translate natural harmony, sympathy, and concrete universality into the concepts of 
the universal and the particular good, we find once again that they can only be real ized ful ly 
by a universal community. The species nature is revealed and developed in history through the 
spiral of diminishing domination and increasing community. Thanks to that spira l  i ndividuals 
can hope to become more secure in the sense and in the expression of personality. 
KP, supra note 1 ,  at 260. 
203. !d. 
204. !d. at 260-6 1 .  
205. /d. at 259. 
206. /d. at 262. 
207 . !d. 
208. 
The democracy of ends in the organic group consists in the progressive replacement of mer­
itocratic by democratic power in the ordinary insti tutions of society and, above a l l ,  in i ts occu­
pational groups. Decisions about what to produce (whether the products be commodities, ser­
vices, or knowledge) , for which objectives to produce, and how to produce are increasingly 
defined as political and submitted to collective decision . 
/d. at 268. 
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sufficiency. So one kind of society based on organic groups might l ook like 
this : many small social units ,  each one practicing collective, non­
meri tocratic decisionmaking, and all living in independence of one an­
other. Each small group would be responsible for providing its own food, 
shelter and cloth ing; for the education of its ch ildren; for its own medical 
needs;  for its own steel and mining industries; for its automobile produc­
tion (if any) ; and so on. Obviously such a society is possible (hunter­
gatherer bands, isolated jungle societies , and the Eskimos are all exam­
ples) , but I doubt that many people would be eager to make the transi­
tion , or would regard l ife in such a society as "more expressive of human 
nature . "  And the anthropological evidence hardly supports the hope that 
such a society could di spense with "all systems of domination . "  
I presume that Professor Unger does not have this sort o f  simple social 
organization in mind , for after admitting that " [b  ]oth decentralization and 
multipurpose activi ty may exact a high price in the production of goods 
and services,"209 he says that this problem is to be dealt with by organiz­
ing society into, of all things, a "hierarchy" of organic groups,210  and he 
would allow individuals to belong to several of these groups s imultane­
ously .2 1 1  But this concession to economic real ity brings with it two 
problems for his theory. The first concerns the internal structure of the 
organic groups. The second concerns the external relations of the groups 
to each other. 
In describing the internal structure of the groups, Unger says that "the 
occupational group,  exemplified by the bureaucratic institution,"212  is a 
"promising starting point for the realization of a community of l ife . "213  
To take a concrete example, let us consider the staff of a l arge hospital. 
This is  a group sufficiently small for face-to-face encounters and suffi­
ciently diverse for "multipurpose activity ."  
Now,  there are obvious difficulties wi th administering a hospital i n  the 
non-meritocratic  way Unger says organic groups ought to be run. C learly, 
a collective decision by the entire staff about brain surgery is not desira­
ble: However such a procedure might help the staff "to u nderstand ,  to 
develop, and to manifest human nature,"214 it is  as likely as not to ki l l  the 
patient. If one wishes to retain the theory of organic groups ,  there are 
three possible responses to this problem. First, one can pursue a levelling 
policy (in the name of "eradicating domination") ;  this course would elimi­
nate the brain surgeon. Second,  one could resign oneself to a h igh degree 
of structure and "meritocratic hierarchy" in the hospital; but  this  would 
209. !d. at 265 .  
2 1 0 . !d. at 283 .  
21  I .  /d. 
2 1 2 . /d. at 264. 
2 1 3  !d. 
2 1 4 . /d. a t  243. 
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mean renouncing the "democracy o f  ends ."  Third, one could deny that the 
hospita l is capable of being run as an organic groups; ins tead , the "real" 
organic group would be smaller collectives-say, the doctors ,  the nurses, 
and the maintenance staff-such that, within each smal ler collective ,  dem­
ocratic decisionmaking could  prevai l .  But this solution s imply solves the 
problem by defining i t  away. I am unable to see that i t  has any radical 
implications. Instead of talking about "trade unions ,"  one v;ould talk 
about "organic groups," and everything else could go on as before. I do 
not see how i t  would solve the problem of domination; presumably the 
"organic doctors' group" would still make the major decisions .  
One might think that Unger's "principle of the division of labor" could 
be invoked at this point .2 1 �'>  But unfortunately his remarks on this subject 
are vague to the point of emptiness. Unger wisely concedes the necessity 
for hierarchies and for the division of labor. But he does not indicate how 
these principles are to be reconciled with his advocacy of non-meritocratic 
decisionmaking and face-to-face encounters-except to say that the solu­
tion to the problem is "straightforward . "2 16  Unger insists that his theory 
of organic groups is non-utopian,2 1 7  and assures us that "the more com­
munitarian the group becomes, the less do differentiation and community 
operate as antagonistic forces ."21 8 And his most concrete suggestions2 1 9  are 
hardly earth-shattering. They sound l ike l i fe on a kibbutz. I f  all Unger 
wants i s  for the doctors to sweep the halls once a week, and i f  he believes 
21 S .  Unger describes this principle as follows: 
The community of l i fe and the democracy of  ends describe the at tributes of sympathetic as­
sociations whose practices manifest the species nature. But these inst i tut ional princi ples fai l  to 
define the significance to the group of the individual's particular good: the perfection of h is  
talents and the affirmation of h is  sense of self. To do this is the aim of the principle of the 
division of labor. 
The ideal of concrete universality establishes the general form of the achievement of the 
particular good. The principle of the division of labor is the political embodiment o f  that ideal. 
I t  holds that the allocation of tasks should allow each individual to develop his unique disposi­
tions so as to serve and to express values or practices whose legi t imacy as signs of the species 
nature he can recognize. 
/d. at 274. 
2 1 6 . 
[O]ne has to determine how far to carry the change from meritocratic to democrat ic proce­
dures. In a sense, the answer is straightforward. The ult imate foundation of a l l  power in the 
organic group must be democratic decision. The mere possession of skil ls can never in  i tself 
justify material advantages or the exercise of power. Nevertheless, a relentless insistence on 
deciding collectively all significant matters wot..ld make work Oounder in a morass of pol i t ica l  
argument. I t  would strike at the group's capacity  to  produce anything but  complaints, exhorta­
tions, and eloquence. And i t  would undermine the possibi l i ty of  a division of  labor in wh ich 
the talents of each could be brought to frui tion, for specialization allocates meritorious power. 
ld. at 273.  
2 1 7 . /d. at 237 . 
2 1 8 . /d. at 276. 
2 1 9. Unger recommends that in organic groups ( 1 )  "[ i ]ndividuals who exercise power in one re­
spect should be subject to power in another"; (2) "[ t ]he rotation of tasks can be used as a moderating 
device"; and (3) "there may be jobs in the group whose performance is indispensable, but are gener­
ally abhorred . . or stand at too great a distance from the ideals they serve to satisfy the aspirations 
of the abstract self. The group must assume these tasks as a common burden unt i l  technical progress 
makes them unnecessary. " Id. at 275 .  
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that this procedure wil l  help their abstract selves attain concrete un iversal­
i ty, then there seems little harm or d ifficulty in attempting the experi­
ment. But Unger also stresses the impossibil i ty of achieving h i s  goals at 
any time in the history of the universe: 
[T]here is a crucial flaw in the principle of the division of labor that 
reflects the unresolved tension in the idea of concrete universal i ty 
. . . .  To be perfect, the division of labor would have to express the 
universal ends of a universal community, for only then could i t  sat­
isfy man's longing to overcome his finitude by l iving for the univer­
sal . But anything on earth that could be universal would also be 
remote from the concerns an individual has as a particular being. 
Only God , i f  He exists, would combine universality with immediate 
presence . 220 
The trouble w ith all this is that it is unclear just what Unger is  advocat­
ing: The picture he paints is little more than a blur. 
Similar problems beset the external relations of organic groups to one 
another. These external problems with Unger's proposal wi l l  arise in any 
society that is composed of a multitude of interdependent, interacting or­
ganic groups-that is, in any society not entirely composed of hunter­
gatherers. To keep one group from dominating another, and to coordinate 
the activities of the various groups, there will  have to be a state ; indeed, 
Unger says it would be best to have a world-state.22 1 This world-state wil l  
be charged with the task of "foster[ ing] concrete universality by helping 
make the allocation of tasks within each community more expressive of 
the species nature."222 Presumably for this task the world-state wi l l  need 
coercive power over the individual organic groups; presumably also the 
coordination of a world-state and an industrial world-economy wil l  re­
quire special training and skills .  Again ,  it is hard to see how Unger can 
preserve his ideal of col lective participation in all decisions, or how he wil l  
avoid dominance. Unger is not unaware of this problem. He says: 
The achievement of a democracy of ends in the sphere of group rela­
tions builds upon the idea of a hierarchy of communities. Each 
higher step or organization must reflect the same preeminence of 
democratic over meritocratic power that prevails within the organic 
group. Otherwise, the activities of these overarching institutions 
themselves wil l  represent a kind of dominance.223 
"Must reflect" i s  undoubtedly true, but Unger says nothing about how 
220. !d. at 276; see also id. at 23-24 (discussing "the impossibi l i ty of resol v ing these problems 
within history"). 
22 1 .  !d. at 284. 
222. !d. 
223. !d. at 283. 
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this feat i s  to be  carried out. Hi s  remarks sound more l ike a statement or  
evasion of  the problem than a solution. This problem afflicts h i s  theory 
generally. He is in favor of "organic  unity" and "concrete universal ity"; 
he is opposed to "hierarchy," "meritocracy ,"  and "dominance";  organic 
groups should be arranged in  "hierarchies"; labor should be divided, giv­
ing rise to "meritorious power"; communities of l i fe should allow face-to­
face encounters; meetings should not go on too long; decisionmaking 
should be collective; people should not relentlessly insist on col lective deci­
sions; jobs should be rotated; and the solution to the tension between the 
division of labor and the democracy of ends is "straightforward ."  More­
over, this theory is not utopian,  and only God can ful ly resolve the ten­
sions in concrete universality. It 's quite a jumble. In the end, what we are 
left with is a host of obvious problems, and the recommendation that we 
try to "appreciate the organic unity in each others' personal i ties" and to 
"develop the species nature in concrete universality ."  
Professor Unger is aware that his theory of organic groups i s  not  very 
preci se, and he has an explanation for this shortcoming. As he says: 
"Though our conception of thought becomes practical and evaluative, we 
can never fully bridge the gap between abstract and concrete knowledge, 
theory and prudence, science and art. That is why the doctrine  of organic 
groups remains indeterminate. "224 
I do not wish to deny the importance of speculative sociology to politi cal 
theory: Unger is entirely correct to take utopianism seriously. Ever s ince 
Plato's Republic, philosophers have tried to describe the ideal society , and 
many people-including pol it ical  leaders ranging from Thomas Jefferson 
to Chairman Mao-have urged a "return to human nature" or a social 
organization based on small groups. B ut such theories, if they are to be of 
any use, and i f  they are to present a genuine alternative to LIBERAL soci­
ety, must attempt to deal with the obvious objections; and they ought not 
to take refuge in empty fluff about our inabil ity to "bridge the gap be­
tween abstract and concrete k nowledge, theory and prudence, science and 
art ." 
I wish expli citly to note that nothing in  my crit icisms of Unger i s  di­
rected against the "leftism" of his theory. My concern is with scholarship 
and arguments, not with polit ics . Indeed, I do not find Unger's theory of 
organic  groups particularly leftist : with a few modifications ,  a few shifts 
in terminology, i t  would serve conservatives just as wel l .  If you were to 
rewrite Knowledge and Politics, replacing the words "liberalism" and 
"organic groups" with the words "liberal secular humanism" and "or­
ganic Christian communities," you would be well on the way to a tract for 
the religious right. The philosophical critique of l iberal secular humanism 
would scarcely have to be touched; the themes of tight-knit communities, 
224 .  !d. a t  23. 
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freedom from government bureaucracy , and populist democracy are al­
ready present; and the concluding sentence, "Speak, God ,"  might well 
have been written by the Reverend Pat Robertson . 
Unger is not , of course, a spokesman for the born-again , and Robertson 
would not cite Marx and Adorno. But my point is  that Unger's leftism is 
more a matter of terminology than of phi losophical argument .  That his 
work can be read in a conservative way is not surprising. O nce you have 
made "developing the species nature in concrete universal i ty" the acme of 
polit ical l ife, you face the problem of defining these fine phrases-and 
conservatives can play that game at least as well as leftists .  Many reac­
tionaries would  argue that racial prejudice, male dominance, mi l i tarism, 
heterosexuality, class distinctions, and the eating of animals belong to the 
"concrete universality" of human nature-and this argument i s  not en­
tirely without anthropological plausibil ity .  
These reflections i l lustrate a general point :  The left i s  not well-served 
by political theories that rest on emptily organic  terminology. What it 
needs is solid ,  rigorous arguments, stated with clarity and supported by 
scrupulous research. And i t  needs these virtues primarily for its own sake. 
There is not much poin t  in building a house without a blueprin t ,  or i n  
marching to  a map that nobody can read : You are a s  l ikely a s  not to set 
out in precisely the wrong direction, and to accomplish the opposite of 
what you had intended. Fortunately for the left , logic and good scholar­
ship are not the ideologically tainted product of LIBERAL I S M ,  and many 
leftist philosophers exhibit both virtues in  high measure. 22� 
Professor Unger's theory of the "community of l i fe" and his  declaration 
that the good consists in "developing our species nature in concrete 
universality" look silly if they are placed beside the work of a trained 
philosopher-if, say, one compares them to the concluding chapters of 
John Rawls's Theory of Justice. And this remark raises an i mportant is­
sue.  Unger says: "In l iberal poli t ical theory, the absence of  a view of  the 
good makes i t  impossible to justify any exercise of power at al l ,  an i mpos­
sibility underlined by the incoherence of all doctrines of legislation and 
adjudication in that system of thought."226 He also tells us  that many of 
the fai lings of LIBERALISM are the result of i ts  abandonment of the tradi­
tional Aristotelian moral psychology. But the final third of  A Theory of 
justice, the most celebrated work of l iberal poli t ical theory to have ap-
225. This is conspicuously true of the  "analytical Marxists." See G.  CoHEN,  KARL M ARX's 
THEORY OF H ISTORY: A D EFENCE ( 1 978); J ELSTER, MAKING SENSE OF MARX ( 1 985) .  See gener­
ally ANALYTICAL MARXISM (J Roemer ed. 1 986). There exist many well-reasoned critiques of l iber­
alism. E.g. , A. MAciNTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE ( 1 98 1 ) ;  C.B. MACPHERSON, THE PoLITICAL THEORY 
OF PoSSf:SSIVE lNDIVIOUALISM ( 1 962); M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF jUSTICE 
( 1 982); C. TAYLOR, 2 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS ( 1 985) ;  R. WoLFF, THE PovERTY oF LIBERALISM 
( 1 968). CLS would do a service to the cause of leftist political thought if  i t  were to emulate the clarity 
and care of these writers. 
226. KP, supra note 1 ,  at 238. 
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peared in this century,  begins with a section entitled "The N eed for a 
Theory of the Good" -and the next 1 50 pages attempt to sketch the de­
tails of a moral psychology for l iberal ism. And the primary principle of 
motivation in Rawls's moral psychology is derived , not from H obbes or 
from Kant, but from Aristotle ;  Rawls even calls i t  "the Aristotel ian 
Princi pie .  "227 
Moreover, Rawls ,  like Aristotle and many l iberal political thinkers, 
speaks in favor of a conception of society as a "union of social u nions. "228 
He too emphasizes the good of community.229 He expli citly denies2 30 that 
communities have only instrumental value, i . e . ,  that their value is mea­
sured solely by the extent to which they satisfy the aims of individuals . 231 
H e  has a much more clear-sighted real ization than Unger that, because 
no individual can real ize in a finite l i fetime all of his or her potentialities ,  
the ful l  development of an individual personality can take place only in a 
pol itical community that contains a diversity of groups pursuing a diver­
sity of activities and a diversity of conceptions of the good. Rawls also 
realizes that some of these groups will have to be smal l ,  while others wi l l  
be too large for face-to-face encounters with every other member. But ,  
unl ike Unger, he focuses his attention on the critical problem: how these 
groups are to be coordinated with each other. The principles of justice are 
the key to the solution. The various members of the society are free to live 
in  a commune in New 1v1exico, or to dwell alone in the desert , or to join 
some more conventional sort of community, but the same principles of 
justice are to govern them all . Rawls devotes the main part of h i s  book to 
227.  J .  RAWLS, supra note 86,  at 424. 
228 .  /d. at 520-29. 
229 .  
Thus we may say fol lowing H umboldt that i t  is through social union founded upon the needs 
and potentiali ties of its members that each person can participate in the total sum of the real­
ized natural assets of the others. We are l ed to the notion of the community of humankind the 
members of which enjoy one another's excellences and individuality el ici ted by free inst i tutions, 
and they recognize the good of each as an elemen t in  the complete activity the whole scheme of 
which is consented to and gives pleasure to al l .  
/d. at 523.  I t  is important to emphasize these facts about Rawls's theory, because many "communitar­
ian" critics have assumed that, when he describes the parties in  the "original posit ion," Rawls is 
advancing a theory of human nature, and that his project is to show how rational egoists could be led 
by self- interest to the principles of justice. But this is not in  fact the structure of his argument. The 
ful l  justification for the constraints on the parties in the "original position" comes only after Rawls 
has given his account of human nature in  Part I I I .  The end of the book elucidates many of the 
presuppositions about moral psychology, h uman nature, and the good that underlie Part I; for this 
reason, A Theory of justice can profi tably be studied from back to front. No careful reading of the text 
can support the "self-interest" interpretation, which seems to be the interpretation Unger favors. See 
infra note 232. For more on these matters, see Rawls, justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 
1 4  PHIL. & Pus. AFF. 223 ( 1 985) ;  R .  DwoRKIN,  LAw's EMPIRE 440 n. 1 9  ( 1 986) ;  B .  WILLIAMS, 
ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 7 8  ( 1 98 5  ) .  
230. J .  RAWLS, supra note 86, at 520-29. 
2 3 1 . Compare Unger's " Principle of Individualism," supra note 86  and accompanying text 
(wh ich he takes to be part of the "deep structure" of LIBERALISM) ,  with Rawls's discussion of "The 
Idea of Social Union" in J. RAWLS, supra note 86, at 520-29. Rawls emphatical ly rejects this 
principle. 
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the elucidation of a suitable set of principles, and devotes considerable 
energy to the problems of social stabil i ty and of a well-ordered society. In 
contrast to Unger, he sees what is  at stake and comes to grips with the 
central problem. 
I do not know why Unger does not mention these facts, or why he 
asserts that LIBERALISM has no "view of the good ." A Theory of justice 
would seem to be an obvious target for him to attack in  detai l .  But al­
though Unger is very free with his references to ancient and early modern 
philosophy, his critique of LIBERALISM says l i ttle about the work of mod­
ern liberal political theorists. He devotes a mere paragraph to " [  t ]he work 
of J. Rawls, the American moralist . "232 
I have been discussing Knowledge and Politics for many pages. Al­
though this is Unger's first book, i t  is  the most philosophically sophisti­
cated of his writings, i t  has had the most influence on C LS ,  and it  con­
tains his most complete critique of LIBERALISM. Here, if anywhere, is  the 
evidence for his claim to have "undermined the central i deas of modern 
legal thought . "  My discussion concentrated on the most i n fluential part of 
his book, particularly on "the epistemological analysis for which . . . 
Knowledge and Politics, is so justly famous"23\ but I also discussed his 
theory of "organic groups . "  
The fai l ings I have identified are of  a magnitude and a profusion that 
would never be accepted from a graduate student in philosophy, whether 
in America or in Europe. So  i t  is  perhaps not surprising that professional 
philosophers have failed to take Unger's work seriously . Despite his claim 
to have found "the context of ideas and sentiments within w hich phi loso­
phy and politics must now be practiced," despite the fact that his follow­
ers compare him to Marx, D urkheim,  Weber, and Spinoza, the phi loso­
phy journals contain scarcely a mention of Knowledge and Politics. 
This fact may leave us in some perplexity , however, as to the source of 
Unger's stature within CLS.  Perhaps his weaknesses as a phi losopher are 
outweighed by his strengths as a legal scholar. To explore th is  possibil ity, 
I now turn to his work that most directly concerns legal theory, The Criti­
cal Legal Studies Movement. 
232. 
The utilitarian and social contract versions of the substantive theory of freedom can be col ­
lapsed in to  a third. It appeals to the conception of an ideal system of procedures for l awmaking 
that al l  men might accept in self- interest and the operation of which can be shown to lead to 
certain specific conclusions about the distribution of wealth and power. The work of J .  Rawls, 
the American moral ist, i l lustrates th is  view. 
KP, supra note 1 ,  at 86 .  Compare my remarks on the "self- interest" i nterpretation of Rawls ,  supra 
note 229. 
233. Boyle, supra note 8 ,  at I 082. 
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Professor Unger's sl im book,  The Critical Legal Studies iVIovement, 
contains a statement of the goal s and methodology of C LS .  It has been an 
influential work, and was well-received by the critical legal public :  
Shortly after i t  appeared , two of his admirers compared him to Dante and 
Virgi l . 2 34 
In this book,  Unger briefly discusses the broad implications of critical 
legal thought for "normative commitment"23" and for "freedom and struc­
ture in modernist experience"236 as well as for social theory. Just as 
Know ledge and Politics claimed to have found "the context of ideas and 
sentiments within which phi losophy and pol itics must now be prac­
ticed,"237 the new work claims that CLS has discovered "the axis around 
which the most basic controversies of social theory must revolve ."238 
But the bulk of his essay is devoted to critical legal theory. According to 
Unger, traditional leftist legal theory had two ambitions, one theoreti cal ,  
the other practical : ( 1 )  to criticize the central ideas of modern legal 
thought; and (2) "the purely instrumental use of legal practice and legal 
doctrine to advance leftist aims. "239 Previous leftist movements connected 
these two activities only loosely and sporadical ly. The "critical legal schol-
234. 
His work is a unique contribut ion to modern jurisprudence. His writings are evocative of the 
heroic style and structure of Dante Al ighieri's Divine Comedy. . Virgi l ,  the embodiment of 
human reason, guides Dante through the h ideous depth of Hel l  and up the treacherous slopes 
of Purgatory. Yet Virgil h imself cannot enter Paradise; Beatrice, the personification of divine 
fai th ,  accompanies Dante on the celestial cl imax of h is  odyssey. In  a sense, Unger aims to fuse 
the roles of Virgi l and Beatrice and thus to transcend the l imitations each bears in Dante's 
account. 
Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 8 ,  at 1 49 1 .  
235 .  CLSM, supra note 2, at 648-54. 
236. !d. at 660-62. 
237. KP,  supra note 1 ,  at v. 
238. CLSM, supra note 2 ,  at 665 .  U nger describes the central theoretical result of  critica l  social 
thought as fol lows: 
The relation of these two sets of i deas-the recogni tion of the shaped character of  social l i fe 
and the denial of a metastructure-has now become the axis around which the most basic 
controversies of social theory must revolve. 
This shift in the starting points of social theory may seem on our part an act of i ntel lectua l  
self-destruction. After al l ,  the  major theoretical traditions that  have served the left unt i l  now, 
l ike M arxism and structuralism, have leaned heavily on the idea of  a metaorder i n  either its 
compulsive-sequence or its possible-worlds variant. Nevertheless, the theoretical resul t  can best 
be seen as the victory of the fundamental intention and method of critical social thought over 
sets of proposi tions that only imperfectly applied the method and expressed the i ntention. 
From the beginning the i ntention has been to understand society as made and imagined rather 
than as merely given in a sel f-generat ing process that would unfold i ndependently of the wi l l  
and  the  imagination and  that would condemn people constantly to reenact a drama they were 
unable to stop or even to understand. The method of critical social thought mirrors this i nten­
tion. I t  is the method that, interpreting the formative institutional and imaginative contexts of 
social l i fe as frozen pol i tics, traces each of their elements to the particular history and measure 
of constraint upon transformative conflict that the element represents. 
ld. I confess that I am unable to understand much of this passage or to detect in i t  any s imi larity to 
the l i terary style of Dante and Virgi l .  
2 3 9 .  !d. a t  567. 
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ars ," however, have reformulated both activities and "drawn [ them] into a 
larger body of ideas . "240 Speci fically , they have sharpened the leftist cri­
tique of formalism and objectivism and carried this crit ique "to an un­
precedented extreme. "24 1 This critique leads to their constructive pro­
gram-to what Unger cal l s  deviationist doctrine. 242 As in his  theory of 
organic groups, Unger is not very explicit about what "deviationist doc­
trine" amounts to ("We agree neither on whether this expanded or devia­
tionist doctrine can in fact be constructed nor on what exactly its methods 
and boundaries should be. ") ,243 but the general drift i s  clear: 
[T]he crucial feature of deviationist doctrine is the wi l l ingness to rec­
ognize and develop the disharmonies of the law: the con fl icts be­
tween principles and counterprinciples that can be found in any 
body of law.  Critical doctrine does this by finding in these disharmo­
nies the elements of broader contests among prescriptive conceptions 
of society. 244 
Unger sees that task of C LS as one of "working from within [ the]  legal 
tradition ,"24� of using existing " legal materials" to further radical aims.246 
The critique of objectivism and formal ism and the expansion of doc­
trine have broader implications for social theory and for "the terms of 
ideological controversy. "247 Unger cal l s  his new vision "su perli beral­
ism. "248 In Unger's "radicalized version of the social ideal ,"  
the contrast between what a social world incorporates and what i t  
excludes ,  between routine and revolution, should be broken down as 
much as possible; the active power to remake and reimagine the 
structure of social l i fe should enter i nto the character o f  everyday 
existence. 249 
240. /d. 
24 1 .  /d. 
242. /d. at 576. 
243. Unger claims that the traditional sort of doctrinal argument i s  too narrow: 
/d. 
The impl ication of our crit ique of formalism i s  to turn the d i lemma of doctrine upside down .  It 
is to say that, i f  any conceptual practice similar to what lawyers now call doctrine can be 
justified, the class of legitimate doctrinal activities must be sharply enlarged. The received style 
of doctrine must be redefined as an arbitrari ly  restricted subset of this larger class. 
244. /d. at 578; see id. at 646-47. 
245. /d. at 577. 
246.  /d. at 580. 
247. /d. at 655 .  
248. He describes i t  as follows: 
It pushes the l iberal premises about state and society, about freedom from dependence and 
governance of social relations by the w i l l ,  to the point at which they merge i nto a larger 
ambition: the building of a social world less al ien to a self that can always violate the genera­
tive rules of i ts own mental or social constructs and put other rules and other constructs i n  
their place. 
/d. at 602. 
249. /d. at 584. 
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This social ideal entails a program for "political and cultural revolu­
tion ' :  -for the "reconstruction of the state ," for the growth of "negative 
capabil ity," and for a "vision of transformed personal relations. " 2 50 
Professor Unger's argument builds upon his earl ier work, and cannot 
be understood without it. The basic formula-complaint about the state of 
modern man , criticism of traditional legal theory, delineation of a "vision" 
of transformed personal relations-is the same as in Know ledge and 
Politics. The newer work is a sketch of the view of "our movement" and 
does not purport to contain a detailed argument of the sort offered in  his 
earlier writings; i t  contains l ittle mention of philosophy or philosophers. 
The newer piece is vulnerable nonetheless to the same objections as the 
old. For example, let us examine Unger's crit ique of objectivism and for­
malism. Unger defines formalism as: 
[A] commitment to, and therefore also a belief in the possibil ity of, a 
method of legal justification that can be clearly contrasted to open­
ended disputes about the basic terms of social l i fe ,  disputes that peo­
ple call ideological , phi losophical , or visionary.251 
This definition is ,  l ike his earlier definitions of LIBERALISM and "intelligi­
ble essences ," so sloshy that he can do with it whatever he wants. For 
example, in a passage directed against Ronald Dworkin ,  he says that "the 
rights and principles school . . .  can best be understood as [an effort ]  to 
recover the objectivist and formalist position. "252 In Unger's view, "this 
school alternates confusedly between two options, both of w hich it finds 
unacceptable as a basis for legal theory."253 One option is to base the legal 
system on moral consensus; the other, to base it on a transcendent moral 
order. Unger depicts " [ t ]he third,  mediating position for which the school 
grasps" as resting on 
the deployment of a specifi c  method to reveal the content and impli­
cations of [ the moral] order: generalize from particular doctrines and 
intuitions, then hypostasize the generalizations into moral truth, and 
finally use the hypostasis to justify and correct the original material .  
The intended result of all this  hocus-pocus i s  far clearer than the 
means used to achieve i t .254 
250. !d. at 586. Unger gives the practice of law as an  example: 
For us, law practice should be, and to some extent always is, the legal defense of i ndividual or 
group interests by methods that reveal the specificity of the underlying institutional and imagi­
native order, that subject it to a series of petty disturbances capable of escalating at  any mo­
ment, and that suggest alternative ways of defining collective i nterests, collective identi ties, and 
assumptions about the possible. 
ld. at 667 
25 1 .  !d. at 564. 
252 .  !d. at 574 (characterizing both "rights and principles" and "law and economics" schools). 
253. !d. at 575 .  
254. !d. 
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As a descri ption of  Dworkin's  theory , this account is so  vague and am­
biguous as to be unrecognizable. To begin with , Dworkin cannot be clas­
sified as a "formalist" in Unger's sense, for Dworkin believes that legal 
argument is a species of phi losophical argument.2:s5 More importantly ,  
Unger's sketchy argument begs al l  the important questions .  In  effect , he 
reasons as he did in Knowledge and Politics: In order to engage in legal 
reasoning, you need some background normative theory to tel l  you how to 
interpret the statutes and to evaluate the precedents . But ,  Unger notes, 
"This is where the trouble ari ses . No matter what the content of this 
background theory , it is, i f  taken seriously and pursued to its u ltimate 
conclusions, unlikely to prove compatible with a broad range of the re­
ceived understandings . "256 This argument is fal lacious .  U nger assumes 
that if people take their pol itical theories seriously and "pursue them to 
their ultimate conclusions," stri fe wi l l  inevitably result .  H e  ignores the 
possibil ity that people might, as a matter of background political morality , 
agree on a principle of tolerance. They might choose, for example,  to ar­
gue their views on abortion in the public arena, but, whatever the out­
come, to abide by the results of the political and judicial process . As soon 
as one realizes that political theories can be self- l imiting in this way, Un­
ger's argument collapses. 
Similar considerations undermine Unger's discussion of the Anglo­
American law of contracts .257 Unger argues that the "counterprinciple" of 
fairness is incapable of regulating the regime of contract .258 Again ,  he says 
that the only way of preventing considerations of fairness " from running 
wild and from correcting almost everything is to draw unstable, unjusti­
fied, and unjustifiable l ines between the contracts that are voidable and 
those that are not."259 One might as well argue that the only way of 
preventing considerations of efficiency from running wild i s  to draw un­
stable ,  unjustifiable , and unj ustified l ines between children of s ixteen 
(who are allowed to drive a car) and their slightly younger s ibl ings (who 
are not)-or condemn a yardstick because it  is  not a micrometer. Unger 
seems not to have noticed that fai rness itself might require the construc­
tion of a regime of clear and precise rules. Exactly which system i s  set up 
may be morally indifferent-the important thing is that there be some 
system on which people can rely. Morally speaking , it is a matter of com-
255 .  See R. DwoRKIN ,  A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 9-7 1 ( 1 985) .  
256. CLSM, supra note 2 ,  at 571 .  
257.  !d. at 6 1 6-48. This part of U nger's work has recently been the subject of  a careful and 
detailed critique. See Finnis, supra note 27. 
258. 
The fairness correction must be focused and sporadic rather than pervasive i f  the  regime of 
contract is  not to be superseded by an overriding method of allocation. Yet i n  i ts  l imited and 
contract-preserving form, the correction becomes arbitrarily selective: for every s i tuat ion cor­
rected, there seems to exist another similar to it that is left untouched. 
CLSM, supra note 2 ,  at  632-33. 
259. !d. at 629. 
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plete indifference whether people drive on the left or the right; but the 
state needs to make an "arbitrary" decision about which it is to be. (And 
after that decision has been made, it is no longer a morally arbitrary mat­
ter which side of the road you drive on-not because rules make morality, 
but because morality requires you to abide by rules that have been en­
acted to protect l i fe and l imb _ ) 260 
As for Unger' s critique of "objectivism," it too suffers from excessive 
vagueness .  Unger does not , in fact, argue against objectivism; i nstead he 
appeals to the work of other scholars: 
[T]he insight required to launch the attack against object ivism-the 
d iscovery of the indeterminate content of abstract institutional cate­
gories l ike democracy or the market-with i ts far-reaching subver­
sive implications, was partly authored by a cadre of seemingly harm­
less and even toadying juri sts. Those who l ive in the temple may 
delight in the thought that the priests occasionally outdo the 
prophets .261 
He informs us further that " [h ] i storical study has repeatedly shown that 
every attempt to find the universal legal language of the democracy and 
the market revealed the falsehood of the original idea. An i ncreasing part 
of doctrinal analysis and legal theory has been devoted to containing the 
subversive implications of this discovery."262 
Unfortunately , The Critical Legal Studies Movement contains  no foot­
notes. Unger mentions the names neither of his  opponents , nor of the 
"toadying jurists" on whose works he relies. He does not say who at­
tempted to find "the universal legal language of the democracy and the 
market";  sti l l  less does he attempt to explain what this sonorous phrase 
means. 
Unger's crit ique of objectivism and formalism, then, does not amount to 
much-vague arguments backed by sweeping and undocumented asser­
tions about what "historical study has repeatedly shown." As for his posi­
tive program for "political and cultural revolution," it succumbs to the 
same objections as his theory of organic groups. His account of "negative 
capabili ty" contains a heavy dose of purple prose,263 but i t  i s  no more 
260. These points were made long ago by Aristotle. See supra note 1 60 .  They are also in 
Aquinas: 
By mutual agreement the human will can establ ish that which is just in  matters which of 
themselves do not conflict with natural justice. I t  is  here that positive right has its place. Hence 
Aristotle says that the legally just is  that which is morally neutral in  principle and can be 
decided in one way or the other, though once decided i t  remains no longer neutral . 
S.T. , supra note 1 56 ,  at 2a2ae, Q.57 ,  A.2  (T. G ilby trans. 1 97 5) .  The passage of Aristotle referred to 
is most l ikely NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 1 35 ,  bk. V, ch. 7, at 1 1 34b20. 
26 1 . CLS M ,  supra note 2, at 570. 
262. /d. at 568.  
263. 
Negative capabi l i ty is the practical and spiritua l ,  individual and collective empowerment made 
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meaningful than his talk about "natural harmony and concrete universal­
ity" in Knowledge and Politics . 264 The same is true of his "vision" of a 
new society,28�'� a vision which is supposed to provide the basis for the 
"reconstruction of the state . "288 Naturally ,  one wonders how these im­
provements are to be carried out .  Unger is ready with a three-point  pro­
gram for reforming the organization of government: 
First, the branches of government should be multiplied. To every 
crucial feature of the social order there should correspond �.;orne form 
and arena of potentially destabi l izing and broadly based confl ict over 
the uses of state power . . . .  Second, the conflicts among t hese more 
numerous branches of government should be settled by principles of 
priority among branches and of devolution to the electorate. These 
principles must resolve impasses cleanly and quickly . . . .  Third, 
the programmatic center of  government-the party in  office-should 
have a real chance to try out its programs. 287 
This is a disappointing conclusion. Unger's theoretical work started out 
with the bold claim that his discoveries place philosophy , sociology , and 
legal theory on a new foundation. The intellectual daring of  his enterprise 
is admirable, and his writing is occasionally inspired . He is eloquent in 
deploring the "loss of sel f" in modern society and effusive in depicting the 
joys of a more "organic" world; but when you ask how he plans to get 
from the one state to the other, all he has to offer is lame statements like 
"the party in  office should have a real chance to try out its programs. " 
So far, I have avoided discussing Unger's politics : M y  crit ique has fo­
cused on his philosophy and on his scholarship.  His  concrete recommen­
dations for achieving transcendental wholeness in a community of organic  
groups have been utopian and silly, but  harmless. However, t here i s  evi-
possible by the disentrenchment of formative structures. Disentrenchment means not perma­
nent instabil ity, but the making of structures that turn the occasions for their reproduction into 
opportunities for their correction. Disentrenchment therefore promises to l iberate societies from 
their blind lurching between protracted stagnation and rare and risky revolution. 
/d. at 650. 
264. See supra text accompanying notes 1 95-200 .  
265 .  
[Our theoretica l ]  ideas generate the animating vision: the conception of a society in w hich the 
effacement of the contrast between revolutionary struggles over the established order and rou­
tine deals within i t  has more ful ly  l iberated exchange, production, and personal attachments 
from the vitiating force of dominance and dependence and from the compulsions of an unex­
amined sense of possibility. 
CLSM, supra note 2 ,  at 673. 
266 .  This reconstruction is supposed to help achieve what he describes as: 
the cumulative emancipation of personal relations from the constraints of some background 
plan of social division and h ierarchy, as the recombination of qualities and experiences associ­
ated with different social roles, and as the development of an ideal of community no longer 
reduced to merely the obsessional and stifling counterimage to the quality of practical social 
l ife. 
/d. at 598. 
267. /d. at 592-93. 
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dence that this style o f  thinking about politics can go sour. There i s  a 
certain kind of high-flown, Promethean philosophy that yearns for the 
"transcendent" and the "organic," that pays l i ttle attention to practical 
details, that writes in bombastic prose, and that has on occasion developed 
embarrassing political l inks. One thinks of Martin Heidegger ,  the great 
German philosopher who publicly supported the Nazis during the Thir­
ties,268 or of Paul DeMan, the Yale deconstructionist who spent the war 
in Belgium writing anti-Semitic polemics. 
Not that all high-flown phi losophers have these links: There are nu­
merous exceptions. But, as we shall soon see, Unger cal ls H eidegger one 
of the central influences on his theory of "cultural revolution" ;269 and his 
philosophical style has more in common with the oracular philosophers 
than it does with the logical positivists and Anglo-American philosophers 
whom he deplores.270 So it is at least worth inquiring about the detai ls of 
his political recommendations. To this topic I now turn . 
IV. UNGER's PoLITICs 
Unger's three latest books are col lectively entitled Politics: A Work in 
Constructive Social Theory.271 In discussing these massive volumes,  I shall 
confine my attention to the passages that are most relevant to his politics. 
I shall attempt to indicate both why I think his theory is mistaken and 
why I am uneasy about its political drift .  
Politics is supposed to provide a new theoretical vision for the left. It  i s  
opposed at  every level to  rigidity , structure, hierarchies, n ecessity, and 
roles. I t  argues that the "liquefaction of established social structures is 
needed to develop the richness of our subjective l ife and to advance our 
attempts to reconcile more fully the enabling conditions of self­
assertion."272 Instead of rigidity, Unger's work "seeks the individual and 
collective empowerment that can result from the creation of institutional 
arrangements that undermine the forms of dependence and domination, 
and that do so in  part by effacing the contrast between routine and 
revolution. "273 
His  theory is intensely practical , and his writings are aimed not only at 
the world of speculative academia, but at the world of concrete political 
struggle. In several i l luminating passages of autobiography,274 U nger says 
268. For a popular account of the recent debate in France and Germany about Heidegger's Nazi 
past and its impl ications for modern "Continental" philosophy, see Pasquier, Le cas Heidegger: entre 
Hitler et l 'humanisme, L'ExPRESS 46 ( Feb. 5 ,  1 988) ;  see also V. FARIAS, HEJDEn;ER ET LE N Az­
ISME ( 1 987) .  
269. See infra note 3 1 9. 
270. See supra notes 1 4 1 ,  1 53 .  
27 1 .  See supra note 1 0 . 
272. FN, supra note 4,  at 586. 
273.  !d. at 25. 
27 4.  See ST, supra note 1 0, at  67 -79;  FN, supra note 4, at 604-05. 
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that h i s  book was inspired by h is  experience as  a political act I v1st in  the 
"murky but hopeful politics of Brazi l , "27� where he "took up partisan 
propaganda and intrigue, believing that grassroots popular movements 
were helpless unless they gained the means with which to participate in  
the struggle over governmental power. "276 While acknow !edging that 
" [n]obody could reasonably hope to ride to power on the crest of a wave of 
books or to reverse in the l ibrary defeats sustained in practical politics ," 
he nevertheless found that " [ i ] deas had spoiled the contest for power ,"  and 
says that he "began to feel toward the inherited radical theories a l i tt le as 
Machiavel l i  had felt toward Christianity" -with the result that he 
"wanted to write a book to set things straight ."277 He  notes that " [  m ]uch 
in  this work can be understood as the consequence of an attempt to enlist 
the intellectual resources of the North Atlantic world in  the service of 
concerns and commitments more keenly felt elsewhere. "278 Arguing that, 
in  a radical sense, "everything is politics,"279 he dreams of a new kind of 
society, to be born of a combination of the pop culture280 of "the rich , 
polished, critical and self-critical but also self-consciously disintegrated 
and Alexandrian culture of social and historical thought that now flour­
i shes in the North Atlantic democracies" and the radical pol itics of places 
l ike Brazi l ,  "a country at the forward edge of the third world,  where, at 
the time of writing, at least some people took seriously the idea that basic 
institutions, practices, and preconceptions might be reconstructed in ways 
that did not conform to any established model of social organization."281 
As he says, "If only the unsettled nations could achieve the inst itutional 
forms that might transform a temporary struggle into a lasting structure 
they would become the testing ground on which society would be more 
thoroughly cracked open to politics ."282 
One of the central notions of Unger's theory is "negative capabil­
i ty" -which he defines as "al l  the varieties of individual and col lective 
empowerment [that are] connected in one way or another wi th the mas­
tery the concept of disentrenchment or denaturalization describes ."283 
275. FN, supra note 4, at 604. 
276. ST, supra note 1 0 , at 75. This quotation, l ike the quotation infra note 3 1 9 , i s  wri tten i n  the 
second person, but the reference to U nger i s  clear. 
277. !d. at 78-79. 
278. FN, supra note 4, at 604. 
279. !d. at 3 ;  ST, supra note 1 0, at 1 5 1 -65 .  
280. See infra note 3 1 9 .  
28 1 .  FN, supra note 4, at 604. 
282. ST, supra note 1 0, at 66. 
283. FN, supra note 4,  at 279. "Disentrenchment" i s  defined as fol lows: 
One aspect of disentrenchment is the degree to which a formative context can be chal lenged in 
the midst of ordinary social l i fe. A structure is entrenched or natural ized to the extent that it 
prevents such challenge, and i t  is disentrenched or denatural ized insofar as it facil i tates the 
challenge. On an equivalent defin i tion, disentrenchment implies a shortening of the  distance to 
traverse before our context-preserving activit ies can become context-transforming act ivi t ies. I t  
i s  the relative faci l ity w i t h  which we can interrupt t h e  osci l lation between the narcoleptic 
routines and the revolutionary interludes of h istory and achieve conscious mastery in the midst 
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Unger's main thesis about "negative capability" is that "[d] isentrenchment 
of formative contexts provides societies with a range of material and in­
tangible advantages, all the way from the encouragement of the develop­
ment of productive capabili t ies to the exercise of a more conscious mastery 
over social circumstance."284 
A considerable part of Unger's work is devoted to i l lustrating the mil i ­
tary advantages of his theory28�>-to showing that "negative capabil ity" 
can help to develop "the destructive powers of society . "286 He delves into 
history to establish his thesis (one of his chapters is entitled " Plasticity or 
Death : Mamluk, Norman , and African Examples"287) and he displays an 
impressive grasp of late medieval mil itary strategy, as well as of the deci­
sive battles of Chinese and Japanese history.288 But Unger's interest in 
warfare is not merely antiquarian, and he stresses that his mi li tary theory 
applies even in an age of nuclear weapons: "In the atmosphere created by 
such a conflict, the shock of mass destruction must be fol lowed-if any­
thing can follow it at all-by efforts to impose the rudiments of order and 
to disarm the remnants of resistance, in an atmosphere in which all  estab­
l ished bonds have been torn violently apart."289 Ungerian "plasticity" is 
supposed to help a society cope with such tasks. 
Given the practical orientation of Unger's theory, i t  is  legitimate that he 
should discuss mil itary theory, but this part of his argument proves less 
than he claims. It  is  uncontroversial that a flexible, i nnovative mil itary 
machine will have the edge over an army commanded by the ossified and 
the unimaginative. But i t  i s  also u ncontroversial that mil i tary success de­
pends upon strict discipline, a clear chain of command, and obedience to 
orders-in short, upon hierarchy . Too much flexibi l i ty can be as fatal as 
too little; and Unger's arguments, while they convincingly establish the 
first platitude, do not refute the second. 
of  civic peace. 
The other aspect of disentrenchment is the relative disengagement of our practical and pas­
sionate dealings from a preexisting structure of roles and hierarchies. . . It is the l i fting of 
the grid of social div ision and ranking from our practical and passsionate relations to one 
another. 
/d. at 278-79. 
284. /d. at 279. The passage cont inues: 
/d. 
In  fact, all the varieties of i ndividual and collective empowerment seem to be connected in one 
way or another with the mastery the concept of disentrenchment or denaturalization describes. 
I cal l  these varieties of empowerment "negative capabi l i ty" when considering them in relation 
to the context change that makes them possible. Thus, we may use the poet's turn of phrase to 
label the empowerment that arises from the denial of whatever i n  our contexts del ivers us over 
to a fixed scheme of division and h ierarchy and to an enforced choice between routine and 
rebell ion. 
285. See, e.g. , id. at 282-85 .  As the ful l  t i t le suggests, half of the volume PP i s  devoted to the 
"condit ions of mil itary success"; in particular, see PP, supra note 1 0, at 1 53-2 1 3 . 
286. FN, supra note 4, at 282. The phrase recurs id. at 586, and in PP, supra note I 0,  at 1 54. 
287. PP, supra note 1 0, at 1 62.  
288. See id.  at 1 92-206. 
289. /d. at 1 56. 
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Unger provides a practical set of guidelines describing how a poli tical 
movement devoted to "context-transformation" could come to power, ei­
ther at the ballot box or in "the violent seizure of the state against a 
background of revolutionary action . "290 He discusses the necessity for 
"linking grassroots mobi l ization with the contest for governmental 
power,"291 for "encourag[ ing] mi l itant collective self organizat ion,"292 and 
for not losing the goodwill of the mass of the population. He gives instruc­
tions for the recruitment and management of the "cadres, activists ,  or  
militants [who] are the people whose relatively privi leged social circum­
stances and intimate psychological identification with the movemen t en­
able them to devote themselves to its work." He adds that " [ t ]hese mi l i ­
tants make the movement, and they can break i t . "293 As for the revolution 
itself, the cadres are instructed to draw upon "the i rrepressible ability of 
context-preserving activities to escalate into context-transforming strug­
gle."294 They "must master the practice of the disturbance-maximizing 
response."295 And, as in much previous revolutionary theory , " [ t ]he goal 
of the transformative movement is . . . to exploit the controversies that 
will inevitably take place: to expand and intensify them and to meet them 
in ways that also represent steps in the direction of the transformative 
program. "296 
This discussion is undoubtedly important from the point of view of rev­
olutionary praxis ,  and it does contain elements that cannot be found in the 
writings of Lenin or Gramsci or Trotsky or Mao Zedong, but the innova­
tions lack the precision and plausibil ity of the earlier theorists .  Too often ,  
Unger's ideas take the  form of vague directives that, i n  practical terms, 
are almost unintelligible. 297 
290. FN, supra note 4, at 432. 
29 1 .  /d. at 407. 
292. Jd. 
293 Jd. at 4 1 6 .  
294. Jd. at 424. 
295 .  Jd. at 425 .  
296 .  /d. a t  427. 
297. For example, one of Unger's recommendations is  preceded by the fol lowing reasoning: 
At the extreme of escalation of conflict a l l  rigid social relations collapse in to the twofold 
circumstance earlier described. On the one hand, society passes into the H obbesian confl ict of 
al l  against all. Each person grabs w hatever he can and gives himself to the relentless search for 
preemptive security. On the other hand, the contest of class and communal i nterests dissolves 
in to a struggle of parties of opinion, animated by alternative programmatic visions. On the one 
hand, the man in  tooth and claw steps outside the social station: all  are equalized by the brutal 
struggle for defense and self-defense. On the other hand, the successor to the interest­
determined agent is  the individual as a context-transcendent being whose commi tment to cer­
tain ideals and opinions is  not determined by his membership in  particular c lasses and commu­
nities. The strongest assertions of spiritual independence resemble the most brutish contests for 
material advantage in their power to weaken the constraints that social stations impose upon 
the will and imagination of the individual. In this circumstance of maximum conflict the per­
spective of the transformative mi l i tant becomes, in part, the standpoint of the theorist and the 
prophet. 
Then comes the practical conclusion: 
Thus, at each stage of escalation, the transformative activist must change his attitude toward 
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H aving discussed "The Nfovement i n  Quest of Power," Unger turns to 
a discussion of "The rvfovement in  Power" -of the institutional structure 
of a society that has been "cracked open to politics ." He  cal ls  the result a 
"constitutionalism of permanent mobil ization" or an "empowered democ­
racy ."298 The "constitutionalism of permanent mobil ization" is supposed 
to keep the entire society l iquid and permanently open to the "disen­
trenchment of formative contexts ."  Unger says that the traditional separa­
tion of powers will have to be abolished (it gets in the way of change);299 
and that a variety of political and economic reforms will have to be intro­
duced, of which the most novel and interesting is a system of "destabil iza­
tion rights"-rights which "protect the citizen's interest in breaking open 
the large-scale organizations or the extended areas of social practice that 
remain closed to the destabi l izing effects of ordinary conflict and thereby 
sustain insulated hierarchies of power and advantage."300 These 
destabilization rights are to be supported by the state, perhaps even a spe­
cial branch of government. Governmental action to disrupt and recon­
struct the overprotected and subjugation-producing arrangements may be 
needed not only because the people in charge of the organizations or prac­
tices at issue may be the biggest beneficiaries of the insulated h ierarchies 
but because there may be no people visibly in  charge. Such a situation is  
especially l ikely to occur when the claimant seeks to disrupt an area of  
social practice rather than a discrete organization. 301 
Unger's new theory seems to me to suffer from precisely the same af­
flictions as his old theory of "organic groups . "  That is to say, i t  i s  exces­
sively vague, and it does not convincingly answer any of the obvious ques­
tions about l ife under a "constitutionalism of permanent mobilization." 
For instance, Unger does not give any clear indication of which "social 
practices" are open to destabilization, of which roles are "up for grabs." 
He  talks about the "collective interest in ensuring that all institutions and 
practices can be criticized and revised";302 but this clearly goes too far. He 
cannot mean to destabil ize the practice of discouraging rape, the practice 
of preserving works of art from destruction, or even the practice of relia­
bly delivering the mail .  But he gives no standard for deciding w hich prac­
tices ought to be left intact and which are subject to "role defiance and 
role jumbling."303 Nor does he  say how far "trashing the script"304 i s  to 
the established system of group in terests: first finding his a l l ies within the constraints this 
system imposes and then helping to overthrow such constraints .  
!d. at 422-23. I t  is hard to see what this vague d irective means or what guidance it  cou ld offer to the 
m il itant i n  the field of  combat. 
298. !d. at 462. 
299. /d. at 455 .  
300. /d. at 530. 
30 1 .  !d. at 53 1 .  
302. !d. at 530 (emphasis added). 
303. See infra text accompanying note 3 1 5 . 
304. FN, supra note 4, at 3 1 9 .  
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proceed. These problems are not  trivial : It  makes a difference whether the 
roles you envision "jumbling" are merely those of halfoack and 
quarterback or those of halfback and mathematician. 
N1oreover, Unger's moral psychology seems based on faulty observation, 
on the assumption that people function best in times of chaos . It  is far 
from clear that "jumbling" and "destabil izing" and "l iquefaction" and 
"disturbance-maximizing" are attractive ideals, either for the individual 
or for society . Life is unstable enough as it is .  We already have AIDS ,  
nuclear weapons, atomic power plants, polit ical terrorists, auto wrecks, 
and airline crashes-not to mention cancer and heart attacks. Do we re­
ally need a Department of Destabi l ization as wel l ? Unger wants "some­
thing of the quality of the hot moments of social l ife-the periods of accel­
erated col lective mobilization-to pass into the cold moments-the 
ordinary experience of institutionalized social existence ."301) Those who 
long for the hot experience of "accelerated collective mobil ization" ought 
to contemplate what warfare and revolution have done for the quality of 
l ife in the jumbled city of Beirut. 
The problem here affects every part of Unger's theory. Just as a series 
of one-night stands does not add up to a worthwhile personal relationship ,  
just as a series of  part-time jobs does not add up  to a worthwhi le  career, 
so a series of disruptions by the Bureau of Liquefaction does not add up 
to a worthwhile scheme of human association. Unger does not real ize that 
human society and human l ives have to be patiently constructed, and for 
all his emphasis on creativity, he has not noticed that the great creative 
intel lects have taken stabil i ty where they could get it. 306 This point is  not 
confined to Einstein or Kant or Mil ton. An ordinary human being who 
wants to live a tolerable and productive l i fe has no more reason to em­
brace Unger's ideals than an architect has to join the Society for the Prop­
agation of Earthquakes. 
What is attractive in  Unger's theory-the idea of self-development and 
of the individual 's power to create new roles-seems to me already well 
catered for in traditional l iberal ism, and with far greater real ism in its 
305 .  !d. at 433. 
306. Schopenhauer made the fol lowing observation on this subject: 
Kant wrote an essay on the living forces; but I would like to write a dirge and threnode 
thereon, for their excessively frequent use in  knocking, hammering, and banging has been 
throughout my l i fe a daily torment to me. There are certainly those, quite a number in fact, 
who smile at such things because they are not sensitive to noise. Yet they are the very people 
who are also not sensitive to arguments, ideas, poetry, and works of art, in  short, to mental 
impressions of every kind; for this is  due to the toughness and solid texture of their brain 
substance. On the other hand, in  the biographies or other accounts of the persona! statements 
of almost al l  great authors, such as Kant, Goethe, Lichtenberg, Jean Pau l ,  I find complaints 
about the torture which thinkers have to endure from noise. . [ E ]minent minds have al­
ways thoroughly disliked every kind of disturbance, interruption and diversion, but above a l l  
the  violent disturbance caused by din and noise. 
2 A. SCHOPENHAUER, PARERGA AND PARALIPOMENA 642 (E. Payne trans. 1 974) .  
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psychological underpinnings-in Mil l ,  say, or von H umboldt, or in the 
final third of A Theory of Justice . 307 
Moreover, Unger has no plausible institutional account of how his pro­
fessional destabil izers are to be kept under control . If they are to make 
radical changes in people's l ives, they wil l  need a considerable degree of 
coercive power, especially i f  they have as large a charter as Unger seems 
prepared to give them. But what is to keep them from gross invasions of 
personal l iberties-particularly i f, l ike Unger, you want to do away with 
the separation of powers ? To be sure, Unger does allow for a set of " im­
munity rights" to personal security and to welfare entitlements. H e  does 
not, however, allow property rights , and he says that the immunity rights 
are to "impose a minimal rigidity upon the organization of  society."308 
But merely expressing the pious hope that rights wil l  be respected is not 
enough-not, that is ,  for a theory that claims to be about practical politics. 
Mao's constitution , l ike Stal in 's ,  guaranteed freedom of speech, freedom of 
religion, freedom of the press; but there were no institutional arrange­
ments to back up the guarantees, and i n  practice the government could do 
as i t  pleased.309 
Unger's answer to this problem is i n  effect to say that the citizens will 
get used to the new system, and that they (or their children) will eventu­
ally revise their conception of personal security: 
[ I ] f  the ideals and understanding underlying this institutional pro­
gram hold up,  people will have reason to change their views of what 
essential security consists in. They and, if not they, their children 
will discover that the security that matters does not require the 
maintenance of a narrowly defined mode of l i fe .  They reach this 
conclusion in part by finding senses and varieties of security compat­
ible with an ever greater jumbling up of distinct styles of l i fe and in  
part by  awakening to  a conception of  the personality a s  both depen­
dent upon context and strengthened through context smashing.310 
I do not find this answer even remotely plausible. As in  his earlier theory 
that we could "develop the species nature in concrete universal ity" if we 
were to l ive in "communities of l ife" and attempt "to discover the organic 
unity in each others' personalities,"31 1 Unger, rather than con fronting the 
difficulties that beset his theory, takes refuge in pious hopes and empty 
phrases. 
307. See J. RAWLS, supra note 86, at 520-29. I note i n  passing that, once again ,  Unger has 
nothing to say about "the American moral ist, J. Rawls." See supra notes 226-32 and accompanying 
text. 
308. FN, supra note 4, at 527. 
309. See, e.g. , R. EDWARDS, L. H ENKIN & A.  NATHAN ,  H UMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY 
CHINA 1 02-09 ( 1 986). 
3 1 0 . FN, supra note 4, at 5 1 4- 1 5 . 
3 1 1 .  See supra notes 1 84-232 and accompanying text. 
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I now come to the most reveal ing part o f  Unger's new work, h i s  "pro­
gram for the transformation of personal relations."31 2 He explains that: 
The authority of the radical project lies in its vision of the individual 
and collective empowerment we may achieve by cumulatively loosen­
ing the grip of rigid roles ,  h ierarchies, and conventions u pon our 
experiments in practical or passionate association. We can l i ft the 
burden of dependence and depersonalization, in part by changing the 
character of our relations, as individuals and as collectivit ies ,  to the 
institutional and imaginative frameworks of social l ife . 3 1 3  
Unger then says-this after twelve years and seven books totall ing 2 , 1 3 3  
pages-that h e  i s  going to "suggest the outline o f  a vision that needs to be 
worked out later."314  (One might think that i t  i s  a bit late in the day for 
this sort of thing-that if Unger intends his  theories to be used in practi­
cal grassroots revolutionary politics, he ought first to supply some details 
about the society he envisions. But we have seen this problem before . )  
Unger's "vision" i s  o f  a "cultural-revolutionary attack on  rigid roles";  
he cal l s  i t  "role defiance and role jumbling."315  He explains :  
The roles that deserve to be targets of this cultural-revolutionary 
subversion are, above al l ,  those that mark a place within a preestab­
lished scheme of class, communal , or gender divisions . . . .  S pecial­
ized work roles are neither i nherently suitable nor intrinsically un­
suitable as subjects for role defiance and role jumbling. The more the 
technical and the social divisions of labor present themselves in  eve­
ryday l i fe as a rigid grid of functional allocations, the more they 
deserve to be smashed up at the microlevel of cultural-revolutionary 
defiance and incongruity as well  as at the macrolevel of institutional 
innovation. 316 
Having thus described his "cultural-revolutionary program," Unger pro­
ceeds to l ist "some of the truncated but rich materials that lie at hand, 
ready to assist us in our efforts to develop this part of our programmatic 
ideas and of our transformative practice ."317 These materials are an eclec­
tic blend of two elements: international pop culture and the writings of 
"third world ultra-leftists ."318  The first element is typified by Unger's ap­
parently serious endnote (the last in his book) to the TV Guide.319 As for 
3 1 2 . FN, supra note 4, at 556.  
3 1 3. Jd.  at 558 .  
3 1 4. Jd. at  560. 
3 1 5 . !d. at 563. 
3 1 6 . !d. at 564. 
3 1 7 .  Jd. at 560. 
3 1 8 . !d. at 630-3 1 .  
3 1 9. Unger says that a major i nspiration for his theory of cultural revolut ion 
is the worldwide pop culture. One way to understand its cultural-revolutionary message i s  to 
watch and compare television soap operas in different countries. These melodramas express the 
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the element o f  ultra-left ism, one i s  not surprised, after all the talk o f  revo­
lutionary struggle and of the "constitutionalism of permanent mobiliza­
tion ," to learn that one of the "truncated but rich materials" for Unger's 
theory is the Chinese Cultural Revolution. He particularly admires the 
Maoist technique of "cri ticism and self-cri ticism":  "In the hands of its 
most radical practitioners, it became part of an attempt to chasten and, i f  
possible, to destroy the established beaureaucracies o f  party and  state and 
to produce a new man or woman, new above all in  their attitude toward 
authority . "320 This technique,  one gathers, was designed to loosen the grip 
of rigid hierarchies and to encourage new styles of "practical or passionate 
association . "  I t  worked as follows: 
The victim now appeared often as the mere pretext for the reenact­
ment of a collective denunciation of every t race that the inherited 
contrast of masses and elites had imprinted u pon the style of d irect 
personal relations. Because that contrast had amounted to a hierar­
chy of value as well as to a system of control , its subversion had all 
the seductive and l iberating force of an attack upon the distinction 
between the pure and the impure.321 
I t  i s  very important to keep in view what Unger i s  talking about and 
not to be swept away by his jargon-not to think that he i s  being "philo­
sophical" or "deep" when he i s  merely being vague. (As Wittgenstein 
used to say, "Don't treat your commonsense l ike an umbrella .  When you 
come into a room to philosophize, don't  l eave i t  outside, but bring it in 
with you ."322 ) .  
The Cultural Revolution began as  a campaign against the " four olds" 
(old ideas, old culture, old customs, old habits) .323 Let us  consider first i ts 
contributions to culture. In  Tibet , the Red Guards began by demolishing 
the Buddhist monasteries; of the several thousand temples that existed 
anxieties and longings of panicular classes and communities i n  panicu lar societies. They also 
rehearse the ancienL, sentimental ized formulas of the Christian and pagan romance. But both 
the disti nctive. local concerns and the famil iar romantic tropes come out transformed by their 
combination with role jumbling and role defiance. See TV Guide. 
!d. at 63 1 .  Other "inspirations" mentioned in the endnote are the middle works of Heidegger and 
Sartre, Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, and Kierkegaard's Either/ Or. !d. at 630. U nger adds that 
"[o]nly i n  the effons of contemporary feminist theorists and in the occasional writ ings of third world 
u ltra-leftists have I found a shared discourse that develops the speculative themes of these n ineteenth 
and twentieth cemury philosophers i nto the beginnings of a cultural-revolut ionary program." !d. at 
63 1 .  He also lists Proust, Joyce, Musi l ,  Virginia Woolf, C larice L ispector, and Chung-shu Ch'ien as 
i nOuences on his thought. !d. And in  the text he mentions Gandhi 's "method of pedagogic defilement" 
as an example of a cultural-revolutionary attack on the "contrast . . between the pure and the 
impure." !d. at 568-69. 
320. !d. 
321 . !d. 
322. L. WITTGENSTEIN ,  LECTURES ON THE fOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS 68 (Diamond ed. 
1 975) .  
323. Y. DAIYUN , To THE STORM 394 ( 1 985) .  I have relied on the books by Daiyun and Terzani ,  
see infra note 324,  because, as a Chinese Communist and a former M aoist, respectively, the ir  works 
seem less l ikely to be ideological ly biased. 
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before the Cultural Revolution , approximately a dozen sti l l  stand .  324 The 
situation in China was l i ttle better. Most of the architecture of  I mperial 
Peking was razed; little of the ancient city now remains. 3u; As for per­
sonal relations, rel igion was proscribed; Buddhist nuns and monks were 
forced to marry or to parti cipate in the destruction of their tern ples. 326 
The keeping of  pets was considered a "bourgeois" habit, and the pets 
themselves were denounced as parasites and ki l led .327 
The Maoist practice of "criticism and self-criticism" seems to have 
amounted to l ittle more than the mindless repetition of standardized "con­
fessions" of class crimes. 328 :tv1any "enemies of the people" committed sui­
cide, or perished in concentration camps, or were simply k i l led .329 
324. There are many accounts of these events .  The sources d isagree about the exact numbers, 
largely because there was no accurate count of the Tibetan monastaries that existed before the Cul ­
tural Revolution. Harrer puts the number at 3,800, of which 1 3  survive ,  H .  H ARRER,  RETURN TO 
TIBET 46 ( 1 984 ) ; Terzani ,  at 2,464, of which 10  survive, T. TERZANI ,  BEHIND THE FoRBIDDEN 
DooR 1 45 ( 1 985); van Praag at 6,000, of which two dozen survive, M. VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, THE 
STATUS OF TIBET xv ( 1 987) .  For more eyewitness accounts, see D .  NORBU , RED STAR OvER TIBET 
( 1 987 ) ;  R. TARING, DAUGHTER OF TmET ( 1 970) .  I t  is not plausible to argue that  th i s  destruction 
was undertaken for the benefit of the Tibetan masses. Many of the treasures cou ld have been sold on 
the i nternational art market, and the proceeds used to feed the populace. Nor is i t  plausible to claim 
that China was threatened by the Tibetans-a society of devout Buddhists ,  whom the Ch inese out­
numbered by more than a hundred to one. 
325. For an account of the destruction of Peking, see T. TERZANI ,  supra note 324, a t  22-59.  
Terzani ,  an I ta l ian journal ist and a former Maoist ,  spent several years i n  China :  
[ M ]any [ in  my generation] were caught i n  the i l l usion projected by Mao's Ch ina. I f  our world 
was old and imperfect, if  past hopes had turned into great delusions, here was a new 
chance . .  
Looking for the unique form of socia l ism that had al legedly been bui l t  there, I found only 
the ruins of an utterly failed experiment. Looking for the new culture that had supposedly  
sprung out  of  the revolution, I came across only the stumps of the o ld  cul ture that  had been 
methodical ly,  systematical ly destroyed in the process. 
Among the many doors Deng Xiaoping had opened were those of the concentration camps 
and reeducation schools to which some 20 mi l l ion i n tel lectuals had been sent. . . .  
I t  had been inspiring, within the protected atmosphere of Columbia U niversity i n  New 
York, to read Mao's slogans, such as "Do not cut off people's heads for, un l ike cabbages, they 
do not grow aga in ."  But it was a different matter to discover that, behind the facade of propa­
ganda, heads had rol led , people had been tortured, and that, at the end of the G reat Proleta­
rian Cultural Revolution, China was l ike a barren desert ful l  of d ispirited, d i soriented people. 
!d. at 1 0. 
326. See, e.g. , id. at 1 47. 
327. /d. at 49-50. Terzani records that "people i n  Peki ng thought that dogs were e l iminated 
because the secret police did not want to be bothered by their barking while going around at n ight to 
arrest spies, landlords and counter-revolutionaries. "  In Tibet, the Red Guards began the Cu l tural 
Revolution by k i l l ing all the dogs-by electrocution, by hanging, or by forcing Tibetans to stone them 
to death. (This  last method had a special twist. Devout Buddhists believe i n  reincarnation and are 
forbidden from k i l l i ng any l iv ing th ing, so this method had the subtle advantage of attacking their 
religion as well as their pets.) Accounts of the k i l l ing of the dogs occur repeatedly in the Tibetan 
l i terature. See id. at 1 46; H. H ARRER, supra note 324, at 46. 
328. Y. DAIYUN, supra note 323, at 1 84 ;  see T. TERZANI, supra note 324, at 248-62. 
329. Daiyun has th is  account: 
F i l led with passion for the new movement and eager to conduct the struggle against  their own 
enemies, they had forced the president of their school, famous as one of the first Chinese 
women to be educated, to climb through a narrow underground cement dra i np ipe. W hen she 
fi nally emerged, they had brutal ly beaten her to death. Most of the girls at  th i s  middle school 
were from h igh-ranking in tel lectuals '  famil ies and thus, I guessed sadly ,  fel t  compel led to 
demonstrate their commitment to revolutionary goals .  
Y. DAIYUN, supra note 323, at 1 83.  Nor was the suffering confined to China proper. The fol lowing 
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tv'laoist ideas did not work any better outside of China and Tibet. 
Mao's ally and disciple Pol Pot returned to Cambodia from Peking in 
1 966,  the year of the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution . 330 H i s  Khmer 
Rouge attempted to reform the personal relations of the Cambodians 
along Maoist l ines . 33 1  A third of the population died in the pro­
cess-somewhere between one and two mill ion people. 332 In Tibet, with a 
population of six mill ion, more than one mil l ion people died under the 
Chinese occupation. 333 The number of deaths in China proper is impossi­
ble to determine:  Reliable figures do not exist .  
I t  may be objected that i t  i s  unfair to Unger to bring up the detai l s  of 
the Cultural Revolution-that I should try to see his theory and this pe­
riod of Chinese history in the best possible light .  But this  objection is 
unsound. In the fi rst place, it would insulate any theory from criticism, 
for almost anything can be labeled a detai l-as when Jean-Marie LePen, 
the leader of the French National Front , brushed aside the use of the gas 
chambers in Hitler's Germany as a "detai l of World War I I . "  Second, 
Unger himself offers the activities of the Red Guards as a "truncated but 
rich" precedent for his "constitutionalism of permanent mobil i zation";3 34 
account by a Tibetan refugee is typical : 
I went to see the vi l lage close to Kambum where I was born. I t  was very sad; more than 
twenty of my relatives were dead. Only one cousin was st i l l  l iving, and I visited her home and 
met her child. When I asked her what happened to her father, she replied, "He is dead."  
When I asked her how and where, she d id  no t  know. Their farm had been taken and  their 
house torn down. Many of the people I talked with had such sad stories. When I asked them 
about their l i fe now, they would just cry; they had no words. Others told me how their famil ies 
and friends were ki lled, imprisoned, sent to labor camps, maimed and crippled. Some were 
beaten so severely over and over again with clubs and boards that they lost their hearing or 
sight. Others had bodies that were bent or twisted from being forced to pull heavy carts, l ike 
animals. Many were compelled to stand in public places while people were forced to pul l  their 
hair in "struggle" (thamzing) sessions. Thousands died from exposure and starvation , unable 
to survive on the worms, garbage, dead dog bones, pig food etc. which hunger drove them to 
eat. 
T. NoRBU, TIBET Is MY CouNTRY 273-74 ( 1 986) .  
330. See B. KIERNAN , How PoL PoT CAME TO POWER vi i i-xi i ,  222-24 ( 1 985) .  Shapley notes 
Pol Pot's sympathy for Ch inese Communism and suggests that Mao's "Great Leap Forward" was the 
model for Pol Pot's social reforms. R. SHAPLEY, BITTER VICTORY 222-24 ( 1 986) .  The influence on 
the Cambodian Communists of Maoist ideology is well attested i n ,  e.g . ,  H. NGoR, SuRVIVING TH�: 
KILl.ING FIELDS 20 1 ( 1 988): 
[E ]verything about the Khmer Rouge was al ien,  from China. The borrowed their ideology 
from Mao Tse-tung, l ike the concept of the great leap forward. Sending the i ntel lectuals to the 
countryside to learn from the peasants was an idea of the Chinese Cultural Revolut ion. Their 
AK-47s and their ol ive green caps and their trucks were Chinese. Even the music they played 
from the loudspeakers was Chinese, with Khmer words. 
This account is corroborated by Shawcross, The Terrible Story that Nobody Wanted to Hear, Times 
(London) ,  Mar. 27, 1 988, at G-5 .  
33 1 .  Pol Pot's revolution aimed to sever fami ly relations, B .  KIERNAN, supra note 330,  at 338,  to 
abolish property, id. at 368-7 1 ,  to abol ish markets, and to compel communal eating, id .  at 4 1 5- 1 6. 
332. Kiernan puts the figure at 1 . 5 mill ion, id. at v; Shapley at somewhere between one mi l l ion 
and two mill ion, R. SHAPLEY, supra note 330, at 1 98. 
333. See Rosenthal ,  Selling Out Tibet, N .Y .  Times, Jan.  8,  1 988 ,  at A3 1 ,  col .  6 (ci t ing report of 
U.S. Congress); the same figure i s  given by M. VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 324, at xv. It 
should be noted that these figures apply to the ent ire period s ince the Chinese i nvasion i n  1 950,  and 
not to the Cul tural Revolution alone. 
334. FN, supra note 4, at 462. 
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he thereby invites inspection of their conduct. Unfortunately, even the  
most sympathetic reading of  the  behavior of the  Red Guards-a reading 
that ignores the bludgeonings and concentrates entirely on the aspect of 
"criticism and self-criticism"-will  find  it hard to distinguish between the 
forced confessions of the Cultural Revolution and the forced confessions of 
the Stalin show trials,335 or between the destruction of Buddhist monas­
teries and the destruction of Jewish synagogues. It is  hard to detect in the 
eyewitness accounts anything of "the seductive and l iberating force of an 
attack upon the distinction between the pure and the impure ."336 
My general unease about the poli tical drift of Unger's polit ical roman­
ticism should now be apparent. The twentieth century h as suffered a 
great deal of destructiveness in the name of i ncoherent philosophical "vi­
sions ." Various l eaders have sought to bring about the Kingdom of 
Heaven on Earth-after first destroyi ng the obstacles that stood in the 
way. They have told their followers to crush : the counter-revolutionary 
Ukrainian peasants; the Jews; the monasteries of Tibet; the  "four olds"; 
or the urban population of Cambodia. In  each case, a glorious future-a 
"new man or woman"-was to be the result . 337 In each case, the offend­
ing objects were removed, but the expected glories fai led to appear. 
These pol i tical experiments share certain similarities. Let us  begin with 
the least important. All  were militant .  All were preoccupied with ques­
tions of military effectiveness. All thought earnestly about the strategy of 
polit ical revolution . All were determined to seize pol i t ical 
power-peaceful ly if possible, violently i f  need be. All had a demonology 
and used colorfu l  epithets (vampires ,  running dogs, beetles ,  CIA spies, 
toads, vipers) to describe their enemies. 
I t  is  unfortunate but not in itself worrying that Unger's work should 
share these characteristics . His vocabulary of abuse (toadying j urists, spi­
ders, slavery, prison guards, poison, groveling subjects) may be exagger­
ated, but it is no worse than the rhetoric of the American revolutionar-
335. 
Violence, brutal i ty ,  tragedy became commonplace at Beida that August. Every day and every 
night small groups of four or five would be picked up to be criticized in  their departments arid 
then paraded through the campus to "accept struggle from the masses." The targets of these 
"mass ground struggle sessions" would always be forced to balance on one of the high, n arrow 
dining hall benches and told to answer questions. lf the answers were considered u nsatisfac­
tory, the person's head would be pushed down or he would be instructed to bend low or he 
would be held in  the agonizing jet plane position, cont inual ly begging the people's pardon for 
his past offenses. 
Y.  DAIYUN, supra note 323, at 1 80-8 1 .  
336. FN, supra note 4, at 569. 
337. J .  NoRBU, WARRIORS OF TIBET 1 03 ( 1 979) .  One sceptical Tibetan was assured by a Chi­
nese Maoist, " I t  is only common sense to realize that after the Third World War,  the whole world 
will embrace socialism. After that there wi l l  be no more wars and no more governments. Even the 
Communist Party wil l  be disbanded and we will l ive in  a world of peace and plenty." !d. 
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ies;338 as  for military strategy and revolutionary subversion , they can be 
put to good uses as  well as  bad . 
But the movements I mentioned share a second set of characteristics, 
al l ,  broadly speaking, involving the lack of a sense of reali ty .  All the 
movements were based on grandiose theories. All were messianic. All ap­
pealed to the emotions rather than to reason . All offered a "vi sion" of an 
ideal new society. All believed that the "new man" was just around the 
historical corner-at most a generation or two away. All claimed to be 
"scientific ," but all were based upon theories that can only be regarded as 
the work of crackpots: Stalin rejected relativity theory and orthodox genet­
ics because of their "bourgeois" origins,339 and Hitler did not care in the 
least that his theory of Aryan racial superiority was without anthropologi­
cal foundation. There was nothing particularly profound about their theo­
ries, nothing particularly worthy of philosophical refutation.  The intellec­
tual work was based on faulty scholarship and shoddy arguments,  and the 
practi cal disasters are directly attributable to this source . 340 The utopian 
plans were straightforwardly unworkable. For the most part , the 
problems should have been obvious to common sense . 
The combination of these two elements-militancy and the lack of a 
sense of reality-is an unpromising foundation for practical politics .  Sil ly 
theories can be forgiven; so can a fascination with military strategy . But 
when a political leader asks his fol lowers to ki l l  for nonsense, he i s  un­
likely to better the lot of humanity at large. There are many examples, 
and the logic behind them is not difficult to follow. The leader will never 
get his "new man and woman," but he will certainly get resistance, real 
or imaginary, from the "parasites" and "class enemies. "  And in his rage 
against reality, he is more l ikely to attempt to exterminate the opposition 
than to question the premises of his own theory. I t  may perhaps be logi­
cally possible to combine these two elements without courting disaster; but 
history offers no example. 
If Unger is to avoid  this trap, if he is to build a plausible polit ical 
theory on the dubious precedent of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, he 
ought to proceed with a certain degree of scholarly care, both towards the 
events of the past and towards his hopes for the future. In particular, he 
ought explicitly to acknowledge the destructiveness of the C ultural 
Revolution; he ought to explain, in precise and unambiguous terms, why 
338. See generally B. BAILYN, THE ORDEAL OF THOMAS H UTCHINSON ( 1 974).  
339. Kamenka, Communism, Philosophy Under, i n  2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 1 66 (P. 
Edwards ed. 1 967). 
340. I do not deny that there are differences between these ideologies, nor do I deny that they 
have infl icted d ifferent quant ities of suffering. I t  is of course worse to k i l l  two mi l l ion people than one 
mi l l ion;  but the point I am trying to make has more to do with psychology than with statistics. 
Somebody whose political theory can accomodate the deaths of one m il l ion people i s  un l ikely to flinch 
at six or twenty; and anybody who can turn a blind eye to the extermination of Tibetan culture is 
unlikely to be moved by the exterminat ion of anything. 
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the Maoist experiment went awry; and he ought to give a persuasive ac­
count of the safeguards he intends to introduce so that h is  own theory of 
"role jumbling" and "context smashing" will  not lead to similar 
destructiveness. 
This Unger does not do. Of his safeguards I have already spoken; to his 
h istorical analysis of the C ul tural Revolution I now turn . 
Unger does indeed grant that the Revolution was a fai lu re ,  but his rea­
soning seems singularly misplaced. To his mind, the Red Guards focused 
their attentions too narrowly on the contrast between masses and elites :  
" [A] single-minded focus on these concerns to the exclusion of others nar­
rows the front on which cultural revolution can be staged and leaves un­
touched much of the structure of social l i fe . " 34 1  The trouble with the Cul­
tural Revolution is not that i t  was a moral and economic d isaster, not that 
i t  was an experiment that could not possibly have worked, but that it was 
"truncated," that i t  challenged too little of the "establ ished structure of 
social life" -not that it went too far, but that i t  did not go far enough. 
This striking thesis, contained in his discussion of "role defi ance and role 
jumbling," is  supported by another long passage devoted entirely to ana­
lyzing the history of the Cultural Revolution and the reasons for its fai l ­
ure .  Unger call s  the Revolution "a possible breakthrough i nto a di fferent 
form of industrial society, "  but regrets that the political leaders of China 
were "halfhearted and confused" in  implementing it .  H e  notes that under 
the "pol itical intensification" brought about by the Red Guards, "the 
boundaries of what could  be done to people, who could  be reached, and 
what could be attacked began to fal l  apart" -which could be interpreted 
as a rebuke, were it not that the entire passage takes the side of the i nno­
vative Red Guards against their "halfhearted" superiors. H e  describes the 
technique of "criticism and self-criticism" as "a subtle psychology of the 
way an individual can be made to render himself transparent to his fel­
lows." His chief regret is  that  the party bureaucrats called the interesting 
experiment to a halt-that "not all  surprises would be allowed to hap­
pen"-that "[t]he economy remained as if subject to bui l t- in forces but 
341 . The fu l l  comment on "el ites and masses" reads as follows: 
The crudest al locations of personal role, or the most rigid conceptions of the style of association 
suitable to each domain of social l i fe, could be accepted so long as they did not overtly involve 
the feared contrast between elite and mass. 
The ideas, attitudes, and power relations implicated in  the contrasts between mass and el i te 
or the pure and the impure do indeed act as a bar to the realization of the cultural­
revolutionary program. But the single-minded focus on these concerns to the exclusion of 
others narrows the front on which cultural revolution can be staged and leaves u ntouched 
much of the established structure of social l i fe. Stubborn fighting over the mastery of the state 
and the organization of the economy often occurs side by side with the rebirth of styles of 
personal association characteristic of an earlier, destroyed social order. 
FN, supra note 4, at 569-70. 
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only because,  at the moment of oportunity, i ts two-hearted poli tical ene­
mies had not dared invade i t  in the name of possibil i ties i t  excluded. "342 
342. Unger's quotation on the Cul tural Revolut ion i s  as follows: "The Chinese Cu l tural  Revolu­
t ion offers a contrasting case [ to the Soviet Union] :  the fai lure to achieve in fact what at one point  had 
looked like a possible breakthrough into a different form of i ndustrial society strengthened by the very 
forms of production and control that were i n i tia l ly  jeopardized." (As we shall soon see, U nger identi­
fies the time of the possible breakthrough with the h igh-point of Red Guard activ i ty . )  
The Chinese Cul tural Revolution h ighl ights the difficul ties encountered in  the course of [ a ]  
. confused and  halfhearted attempt t o  establish a stabi l ized order capable of perpetuating a 
higher measure of collective mobi l ization and context-chal lenging conflict in the midst of every­
day social l i fe. 
Consider the basic march of events. The first stage was one in which Mao and his faction 
attempted to execute an internal coup with in the el i tes . . . .  Even at its most radical ,  however, 
this commitment seems never to have al lowed for the possibi l i ty of reorganizing power on a 
radical ly new basis and institutiona l izing popular participation on an unprecedented scale. 
The second stage of the events started when the faction that had begun the quarrel with in 
the el i tes attempted to enl is t  broader mass support i n  order to do its wi l l  . The cal l  for 
mass agitation became progressively more shri l l ,  as befitted the confused, halfhearted assau l t  
on bureaucratic power. The popular response, however, soon began to  exceed the expectations 
of its architects. I ts major source of support l ay in the dispossessed (such as the temporary and 
contract workers-the Chinese underclass) and in the youth that had not yet acqu i red the 
knack of discounting the value of words. Its centers were a few cities. Its major forms of action 
were the mass demonstration and the transformation of self-criticism techniques. Self-cri t icism 
had been a subtle method for reasserting consensus and control through contained conflict-the 
very image of routine pol i tics, drawn i nto the microcosm of the enterprise, the work gang, or 
the neighborhood and supplemented w ith a subtle psychology of the way an i ndividual can be 
made to render h imself transparent to his fellows. 
At this stage, one should recal l  what these "subtle methods" amounted to in practice: U nger is talking 
about the height of the Cultural Revolution, the t ime of maximum chaos, when the Tibetan monas­
teries were being destroyed and schoolteachers bludgeoned to death. H is thesis i s  that  the Red G uards 
were reined in before their interesting experiment could turn against the bureaucrats and the estab­
l ished social structures. The passage cont inues: 
The fundamentals of power at every l evel would remain out of bounds to conflict and com­
plaint .  In the hands of the practicing cultural revolutionaries, however, self criticism became a 
device for humil iat ing al leged enemies and bureaucratic superiors; the boundaries of what 
could be done to people, who could be reached, and what could be attacked began to fal l  apart. 
One might hope that Unger would register disapproval of these Red Guard i nnovations, but the 
conti nuation of the passage makes i t  clear whose side he i s  on: 
This evolution, a paradigm of the way the very instruments of routine pol i tics may turn i n to 
the agencies of pol i tical intensification, was symbolized by the assau l t  on Liu S hao-chi ,  at once 
leader of the party eli tes and consummate theorist of the mainstream tradition of sel f-criticism. 
The widening conflict forced the politicians behind the Cu l tural Revolution and their a l l ies in 
the army to choose between two options, which presented themselves i n  ever starker and more 
dangerous contrast as agitation grew . One option was to support the i nsurrectional movement 
unequivocal ly,  attempting to lead its temper. The other was to reassert control so that the basic 
structure of party l eadership at the top levels and managerial authority at the lower ones 
would not be destroyed; the popular tumults would then not depart too far from the purpose 
original ly meant for them: that they should serve as a weapon of int imidation in an el i te 
conflict. Not al l  surprises would be al lowed to h appen. 
This reassertion of control was the death of the Cul tural Revolution: 
The definitive choice of the latter option inaugurated a th ird stage: the effort to bring events 
under control once again  . . . .  [T]he more radical factions among the pol i tical e l i tes lost any 
i ndependent channel by which to communicate with their potential  supporters below. The 
extent of the loss became clear only la ter. The nonarmy radicals found themselves reduced to 
the condition of favorites at court with a tenure dependent on the survival of their master. 
Unger does not mention the destructiveness of the Red Guards; nor does he expla in  what constraints 
they were under. (The eyewitness accounts do not sound as though the constraints cou ld have been 
very severe.) He brushes aside the question whether M ao's cultural  i nnovations might have worked, 
and simply asserts that the experiment never was properly tested: 
So, once the assertion of control had taken place, the Cultural Revolution as a mass movement 
was lost. . . [Y]ou do not have to believe that anyone in the Cultural Revolu t ion-elites or 
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This argument is wildly unpersuasive, and for reasons that go to  the 
heart of Unger's theory. Unger, recal l ,  is trying to sel l  the ideals of "con­
text smashing" and "role jumbling" and "disentrenchment," ideals which 
he finds partially exemplified in  the Chinese Cultural Revolution . Now, i t  
seems to many observers ( including the present Communist leaders of 
China) that these ideals themselves are precisely what was amiss with the 
Cultural Revolution-that urging the masses to smash the contexts of so­
cial existence inevitably leads to chaos , and that, if  the Red Guards had 
not been reined in, the disaster would have been even worse. Certainly 
there is  ample evidence for this view : The Maoist experiment has been 
tried in China, Tibet, and Cambodia, and the results have not been fel ici­
tous . But Unger dissents from this view. He bel ieves i n  the context­
smashing ideal and regrets that "not all surprises were allowed to hap­
pen."  Perhaps he i s  right. But at the least he should say what surpri ses he  
has in mind and offer an argument to  show that a more zealous pursui t  of  
h i s  ideals would have produced the "new man and woman" for which he 
yearns. As matters stand,  he i s  merely brushing aside the empirical evi­
dence against his  theory . (I note in passing that ,  for all h i s  praise of the 
Red Guards, Unger has noth ing to say about the suffering caused by their 
experiments in human relations, nothing to say about the cultural destruc­
tion: These matters are passed over in silence . )  
Similar problems with Unger's ideal s are evident i n  his  long discussion 
of "The Spirit of the Constitution."  Unger describes a "typical example" 
of the esthetic presentation of the ideals of "empowerment" and "context 
smashing" -ideals that his constitution i s  meant to serve. The example i s  
Abel Gance's 1 934 film about Napoleon: 
masses-was close to coming up w i th workable a l ternatives, or even that such plans of associa­
tion as they might have found would have represented a change for the better. The poin t  is 
that no alternatives were real ly put to the test and that the collective process of searching for 
them was paralyzed close to the start. 
Here, then is a case of fai lure in breakthrough toward an al ternative mode of socia l ism and 
industrialism . .  
i\ much more immediate factor i n  the outcome, however, was the i l lusion of an  el i te faction 
that thought i t  could have i t  both ways with mass mobi l ization, that i t  could use the agitated 
populace at will as a club with wh ich to beat i ts enemies at the center of power, and yet keep 
this mass fol lowing from posing any serious chal lenge to the basic structure of power . .  
Just as the l iberal identification of freedom and efficiency wi th a very deta i l ed system of 
vested rights played a crucial part in the nineteenth-century American events d i scussed i n  an  
earlier section, so  too the  equation of the  impersonal needs of organized power and national 
development with the maintenance of a concrete system of vested rights performed an equal ly 
important role in this episode of twentieth-century Chinese h istory. But  whereas the American 
belief was largely a mistake that helped cause the resul t  i t  did not describe, the Ch inese belief 
more :ruly described a situation. This truth, however, had been brought i n to being by an 
i l lusion, the i l l usion of those who tried to play fast and loose with mass mobil izat ion. The 
economy remained as if  subject to bui l t- in forces but only because, at the moment  of opportu­
ni ty ,  its two-hearted pol it ical enemies had not dared invade i t  in the name of possib i l i t ies i t  
excluded. 
!d. at 2 4 1 -46.  
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There he  is-the great hero, the  man of  wi l l ,  embodying to the high­
est degree the rage of transcendence and the transformative vocation . 
He refuses to take the established contexts of action for granted and 
repeatedly smashes, or threatens to smash ,  them . He combines an 
acute insight into the opportunit ies and dangers of his situation with 
an abil ity to imagine possibi l i ties that the logic of this s i tuation ex­
cludes .  He  conducts himself within the establ ished world as i f  he 
possessed secret knowledge, and indeed he does. 
The context smasher puts himself into situations that others would 
regard as ridiculous and demeaning (e .g . , Napoleon 's awkward and 
self-deceiving pursuit of the philanderer Josephine) .  He doesn't  feel 
tainted; he just doesn't give a damn. For one thing, his efforts are all 
turned toward his great enterprise and away from the petty ambi­
tions and fears of ordinary l i fe .  For another thing, he transvalues the  
hierarchies of  his  contemporaries: his greater freedom from the con­
text enables him to judge by another hierarchy of value .  Therefore, 
he appears to be shameless when he is in fact guided by an alterna­
tive moral vision. This vision does not merely replace one hierarchy 
of values by another; it partly l iberates moral judgment from the 
constraining effect of any clearly defined hierarchy . 343 
The tone of this passage i s  already disturbing, not least because the tri­
umph-of-the-will theme reminds one of several other European polit ical 
leaders, all of whom were in power in 1 934 .  But the passage continues :  
Then there are the piercing eyes, the intense, wild expression that 
the man of wi l l  shares with all the secondary characters and even the 
ordinary mobs drawn into the momentous events he commands. It  
reminds you of those books of nineteenth- and early twentieth cen­
tury photographs of Chinese, Japanese, and Russians. The subject 
looks into the camera with the same crazed expression . Perhaps his 
disquiet comes from the unfamiliarity of the camera, which seems to 
puncture the shel l  of social routine and produce a moment of dazed 
incongruity in which the familiar l imits and aims of action fal l  away 
and deeper, wordless concerns rise up . . . .  The fierce-eyed subjects, 
amid their ornate or ragged trivia, look as i f  they had seen beyond 
the photographer and their circumstance to a reality previously hid­
den from their eyes. They had seen something of the God who says, 
No man sees me and lives.344 
Unger does not say precisely which photographs evoke this  response in 
himself; but they certainly sound very interesting. I have a lready men­
tioned what I find disquieting about the anti-real ity approach to politics, 
and merely note its presence as the passage continues: 
343 .  !d. at 5 8 1 -82. 
344. !d. at 582. 
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Similarly, in  the  Gance fi lm ,  the  actors looked at the  moving camera 
as the exotic photography subjects had looked at the st i l l  one. The 
revolutionary interlude replaced with advantage the Western shock. 
All the way from the transcendent man of wil l  to the  agitated 
crowds, the participants seem in touch with another, h igher reality,  
with the things you see and feel when one conditional world has 
been destroyed and another not yet emerged , as if this crack in the 
finite provided a glimpse into the absolute. At any moment ,  th is  con­
text-breaking brio might be converted into an idolatrous delusion : 
people might treat their particular h istorical endeavors as i f  these 
undertakings were themselves the absolute. Such were the risks and 
complications of a more radiant vital i ty .345 
The rhetoric in this passage is out of control-overblown,  i f  i t  is  meant as 
a fi lm review. One must wonder what it is  doing in a book entit led Polit­
ics . The answer is that Unger's discussion is not about the aesthetics of 
film or about the h istorical Napoleon ,  but about the dictators of the 1 930's 
and the "agitated crowds" that fol lowed them.346 
Unger's attitude is certainly not one of undiluted approval. The entire 
passage is entitled "empowerment imagined and perverted. " 347 The fi lm, 
he says, "shows the extraordinary force of this longing [ for the  empower­
ment ideal ] and the perverse forms it assumes when left unrealized in the 
ordinary lives of ordinary men and women. "348 Moreover, " [ t ]hese fanta­
sies are not even meant to be l ived out. When, in exce ptional circum-
345. !d. 
346. Unger says that in  "the antinovelistic style of works of art like these" the aesthetic of em­
powerment "reached its most crudely and overtly political but also most reveal i ng form." !d. at 584. 
He devotes pages 582-83 to discussing the pol i tical implications of the Gance fi lm ;  part of this d iscus­
sion is quoted infra note 356. The references to movements that exempl ified "pseudorevolutionary 
national ism" and "the cult of warlike force" seem to me entirely clear. 
Unger's more abstract discussion of "empowerment" occurs in  the previous section, entitled "The 
Spirit of the Constitution: The Ideal of Empowerment." He  says of his constitution that " [ i ] ts  higher 
spiritual significance consists in the assertion of transcendence as a diurnal context smashing," and he 
describes "empowerment" as follows: 
[T]he ideal effect and demand of the constitution upon personality consists in the accum ul ation 
of three mental tendencies, a l l  of which meet in  the practice of fantasy and enactment. The 
first tendency is the accentuation of desire, of i ts scope and intensity. This goal holds for desire 
in  general ,  whatever its specific a im or relative weight. It applies ,  however, with special force 
to those desires that aim at particular aspects of freedom itself. For such desires differ from 
others in contributing directly to the central experience of human empowerment.  They do 
not-at least not inevitably-destabi l ize the regime within which the ord inary person can ex­
perience this enhancement of the wi l l  nor do they have the qual i ty of an obsessional fix i ty that 
crowds out other desires. The second mental disposition is the enlargement o f  the imagination. 
The person imagines a broader spectum of circumstances within which desires can be satis­
fied. . . The third mental tendency is the broadening of the actual opportuni ties to reali ze i n  
practice t h e  transformed desires produced b y  t h e  first two tendencies. Such expansion saves the 
enhancement of the wi l l  and the i magination from issuing in  a self-destructive experience of 
constantly frustrated i nsatiabi l i ty .  
!d. at 579-80. The only place where Unger gives a concrete example of empowerment is in  the 
discussion of the Gance fi lm. 
347. !d. at 58 1 .  
348. !d. 
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stances, people have taken them seriously and acted upon them, the results 
have often been disastrous. " 349 
But al though Unger admits that such pol itical ral l ies have risks ,  he 
cal ls  them "the risks and complications of a more radiant vitality. "360 Not 
everybody would put the point in quite this way. Indeed , there are several 
possible answers to the question, "What is wrong with a fascist 
ral ly ?"-and it makes a great difference which one you choose. 
One answer worth considering is that "the frenzied pursuit of the 
transformative vocation"361-the untramel led striving for what Unger 
calls empowerment and Aristotle cal ls  incontinence-is itself a pol it ical 
and moral vice. With this answer we are on fami liar phi losophical 
ground, for there is nothing particularly modern about the "transcendent 
man of will" Unger describes, or about his "display of impenitent gran­
deur . "362 One thinks of Mil ton's Satan , striving against God and reality, 
transvaluing the moral hierarchies ("Evil be thou my good"353) , and "em­
bodying to the h ighest degree the rage of transcendence" :  
To reign is worth ambition, though in Hel l :  
Better to  reign in Hel l  than serve in Heaven . 364 
Aristotle would regard the Napoleon-Hitler-Mussolini psychology de­
picted in the Gance fi lm as unworthy of emulation, and he would regard 
the following passage as a chi ldish delusion: 
All the way from the transcendent man of will to the agitated 
crowds, the participants seem in touch with another, higher real i ty ,  
with the things you see and feel when one conditional world has 
been destroyed and another not yet emerged, as if this crack in the 
finite provided a glimpse into the absolute.366 
But Unger's analysis i s  not that of Aristotle . He does not object to the 
empowerment ideal , but to the way i t  is  distributed-to the fact that the 
audience are merely passive spectators, that their longing for the "psycho­
logical experience of empowerment" is " left unrealized in the ordinary 
l ives of ordinary men and women. "366 His constitutionalism of permanent 
349. !d. 
350. !d. at 583. 
35 I .  !d. 
352.  Jd. at 584. 
353 .  J MILTON, PARADISE LosT bk. 4, L 1 1 0 ( 1 667). 
354. Jd. bk. 1 ,  lL  262-63. 
355 .  FN, supra note 4,  at 582-83. 
356. His analysis i s  as follows: 
The leader achieved empowerment in a basical ly different fashion from the other people. H e  
alone took events by the hand and thereby realized the transformative vocation i n  a l l  its 
purity. 
The exceptionalism of the leader was connected, obscurely but signi ficantly,  to the form of 
his h i storical enterprise. In different degrees and in  di fferent ways, pseudorevolu t ionary na-
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mobili zation is supposed to do better-to "do justice to the human heart ," 
and to make "the experience of empowerment . . . real rather than 
vicarious. "357 
As with his  analysis of the Cultural Revolution , Unger tiptoes past the 
historical evidence against his  ideal of "empowerment. " The twentieth 
century offers several examples of polit icians whose ral l ies fi t Unger's 
description of the Gance fi lm,  and there is abundant reason to think that 
their lack of moderation , their lack of balance, their determination to 
smash through every impediment was the cause of the ensu ing havoc. But 
Unger wants more "frenzied pursuit of the transformative vocation" 
rather than less. I see no reason to believe that the practical consequences 
would be an improvement on the i l l -conceived experiments of the past. 
Nor do I find this particular "vision" attractive. A mob rally in which 
each member of the mob tries to exemplify "the rage of transcendence" i s  
a meeting most people would rather not attend-even if  i t  could be kept 
peaceful ,  and no matter how much "radiant vital i ty" the "context­
breaking brio" might offer. Unger has allowed himself to be carried away 
by his vision of a society without h ierarchies ,  a society in  which there wi l l  
be no constraints on self-development ,  and in  which "role jumbling" and 
"context smashing" wil l  enable us  "to develop the richness of our subjec­
tive l ife ."  Although he does explicitly say that individuals should have a 
(minimal) set of rights to personal security, he pays too l i tt le  attention to a 
practical set of safeguards .  I t  i s  disheartening to see h im propounding a 
theory that i s  intended to guide grassroots political struggle,  that promi ses 
to enhance "the destructive powers of society ,"358 that contemplates the 
tional ism and  i t s  surrogates involved the  superimposition of a communal ideal u pon social  
hierarchies that this ideal  simultaneously adjusted and preserved. Such movements often em­
braced the cult of warlike force, wielded by the col lectivity under the guidance of the l eader. 
Thus, the psychological experience of empowerment was to be realized through socia l  forms 
that constrained or negated the d ifferent aspects of freedom. Yet empowerment meant freedom 
if it meant anything. Here was a social experience at war with i tself: a monstrous equivoca­
tion, already prefigured in the circumstance of followers whose access to the sense of empower­
ment paradoxically depended upon their submission to a leader or upon their absorption i n  a 
crowd. 
/d. at 583. 
357.  
1\ driving force of the constitutional program is  the desire to do justice to the human heart, to 
free it from indignity and satisfy i ts h idden and insulted longing for greatness i n  a fashion i t  
need not be fearful or  ashamed of. To th i s  end ,  the experience of  empowerment must be made 
real rather than vicarious. I t  must be reconciled with the ordinary needs and attachments of 
ordinary people. And i t  must be freed from its corrupting associations with the cult of leaders 
and of violence. 
/d. at 584-85. 
358. The hundred or more pages he devotes to war and revolution are fiercer in tone than they 
need be, and remarks l ike his observation on the mi l itary defeat of the Normans ("Thei r defeat 
pleases as much as it i nstructs," PP, supra note 1 0, at 1 64-65) could conceivably give h i s  readers the 
wrong impression. Even if  Unger himself would balk at the idea of k i l l ing for "negative capabi l i ty," 
his fol lowers in the third world might be forgiven for misunderstanding his i ntentions. H is strident 
rhetoric is , to say the least, injudicious, and one wishes he had done more to temper the m i l i tant 
aspects of his theory. 
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possibil ity of violent revolution , that envisions a regime o f  "destabil ization 
rights," and that offers Nlao' s Cul tural Revolution as a "rich" source for 
his "vi sion" of an assault on the roles that "deserve to be smashed up at 
the microlevel of cul tural-revolutionary defiance and i ncongrui ty as well 
as at the macrolevel of institutional innovation"-particularly when all 
this is backed by weak arguments, by an unconvincing moral psychology, 
and by historical scholarsh ip that does not mention the excesses of the 
Cultural Revolution. 
The scholarly inaccuracy and the general argumentative confusion that 
have dogged Unger's work since Knowledge and Politics are hardest to 
excuse when they ignore and absolve mass ki l l ing and cultural destruc­
tion; and here Unger has been remarkably lax.  
V. CONCLUSION 
I shall now try to bring together my main conclusions; but fi.rst a word 
about the reasons for U nger's success. Throughout this Article I have 
been critical of his writings, but I do not mean to imply that they contain 
nothing to admire. Unger writes with enormous energy and displays a 
passionate concern for social change-perhaps, at times, too passionate. In  
an age when academic moral philosophy i s  often dedicated to dry analysis 
or to justifying the status quo-or , at any rate, appears, on superficial 
inspection, to be so dedicated-it is refreshing to see a thi nker who strives 
to imagine radical alternatives; and it is  easy to understand why he has 
won such a devoted following. 
But passion and political good intentions are not enough. There must 
also be some sort of solid intellectual foundation before Unger can plausi­
bly claim to have "undermined the central ideas of modern legal thought 
and put another conception of law in their place ."  My aim in this Article 
was to evaluate Unger's philosophy and to assess the truth of this claim. 
My methodology was straightforward: I proceeded seriatim through his 
most important writings, and at each stage I discussed his central argu­
ments and his central scholarly arguments. I began with a detailed discus­
sion of Knowledge and Politics. This is  Unger's most influential book. I t  
is  the book on which his reputation for learning i s  based. I t  claims to have 
discovered "the context of ideas and sentiments within which philosophy 
and politics must now be practiced."  It contains the most sophist icated 
argument by a C LS theorist for the exciting thesis that "no coherent the­
ory of adjudication is possible within l iberal pol itical thought . "  So it is  
well  worth close inspection. 
For Unger's work to be useful to professional philosophers i t  would 
have to contain either some reliable scholarshi p  or some plausible and 
original arguments. I examined in detail Unger's scholarship  and showed 
that he understands neither the Plato-Aristotle-Aquinas tradition he ap-
754 The Yale Law Journal [Vol .  97 :  665 
plauds , nor the "l iberal " Hobbes-Hume-Kant- Rawls tradition he de­
plores. His learned footnotes are wildly undependable, even on the sources 
that are most central to his work. These errors are fundamental , they 
occur in great profusion , and they cover every major period of Western 
philosophy. 
As for his arguments , it wil l  suffice to recall a single example. I dis­
cussed at length the central passage of Knowledge and Politics , the "An­
tinomy of Theory and Fact ,"  where Unger employs a "third and yet un­
defined mode of explanation that stands beyond the boundaries of formal 
logic and causal i ty" to show that "the dominant and central element in 
modern thought" culminates in a simple logical contradiction-a contra­
diction which shows the "incoherence of our idea of science, indeed of 
knowledge in general . "359 It  is  hard to imagine a more astonishing claim,  
or  a claim that stands in greater need of argument-and i t  is  hard to 
imagine a less adequate argument than the one Unger provides. Worse, 
his "antinomy" rests on an elementary misunderstanding of Quine's phi­
losophy of science-a misunderstanding that could easily have been recti­
fied by walking across the H arvard Yard to seek Quine's opinion. The 
refutation of modern thought surely deserved this much checking. 
His  refutation of LIBERALISM, in  its broad outlines, turned out to be an 
attack on a straw-person: It i s  directed against a set of six vague and self­
contradictory principles that no one ever held. And his specifi c  arguments 
against the principles turned out to be mere restatements of  well-known 
problems, intertwined with some elementary confusions about subjectivity 
and the problem of universals .  Unger's positive suggestion that we wil l  be 
enabled to "discover the organic unity in each other's personal i ties" if we 
live in "communities of l i fe" is hopelessly vague-and the vagueness is 
hardly remedied by his explanation that "we can never ful ly  bridge the 
gap between abstract and concrete knowledge, theory and prudence, sci­
ence and art. That is  why the doctrine of organic groups remains 
indeterminate."  
The tone of Unger's book i s  we l l  suited to i t s  content ,  and reinforces 
one's general impression of grandiloquent eccentricity. He tel ls us we need 
a society that wi l l  be based upon "natural harmony, sympathy and con­
crete universality"; he uses terms l ike "spiders" and "prison guards," 
"poison" and "tyranny," "secret empire" and "grovel l ing subjects" to 
characterize the leading thinkers and intellectual movements of  the last 
four centuries; and he ends by saying, "Speak, God." He deals in upl ift 
rather than arguments, edifi cation rather than scholarship; and he  seems 
not to have understood either the history or the difficulty of the problems 
he discusses . Given the low q uality of his central scholarly references and 
of his central arguments, i t  is  unlikely that he elsewhere soars to the level 
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o f  Spinoza or Virgil o r  Marx. Professional philosophers can perhaps be 
forgiven for not taking his work seriously. 
I next discussed Unger's famous article on CLS .  As an intellectual per­
formance, it lags behind the standards of Knowledge and Politics . The 
fi rst book contains a recognizable argument; the article is  more of a ram­
ble through the views of "our movement ."  The book contains footnotes; 
the article does not. The book purports to show that law is impossible in 
modern society; the corresponding passages in the article are much thinner 
and repeat many of his earlier mistakes . Finally, having discussed Unger's 
principal contributions to philosophy and to legal theory , I turned to his 
concrete political recommendations as expressed in the central passages of 
his recent Politics. I criticized his theories of "negative capabil ity" and 
"context smashing," of the "constitutionalism of permanent mobilization ," 
of "role defiance and role jumbling," of "cultural revolution. "  
Despite many shifts of terminology and position, Unger's visionary 
writings all suffer from the same flaw, namely, a lack of careful thought 
about the practical implications of his proposals .  In this respect, as his 
theories have become more concrete, his recommendations have become 
less plausible with the years. His  early theory of "organic groups," for all 
its emptiness, was, practically speaking, ha�mless; but the military theo­
rizing in Politics, the remarks on violent revolution, his admiration of 
"smashing" and "trashing" and the sort of "empowerment" embodied in 
Gance's film about Napoleon, the praise of Mao's Red Guards and of the 
"rage of transcendence"-all this, if taken seriously and acted upon, has 
the potential of causing serious harm. I do not wish to dispute the sincer­
ity of Professor Unger's desire for a better universe; but he is more likely 
to achieve his goal i f  he takes a bit more scholarly and argumentative care 
than he has hitherto displayed. 
This remark suggests a word of advice to legal reformers generally. It  is 
of course true that the present legal system contains many genuine evi ls .  
The reformers are entirely right to be concerned with social justice. They 
are right to reject "the calculations of Holmes' 'bad man,' who is con­
cerned with law only as a means or an obstacle to the accomplishment of 
his antisocial ends."360 They are right to deplore the cynicism, greed, and 
opportunism that undoubtedly exist in the legal profession and in  society 
at large. But amateur philosophy and ill-considered rhetoric are more 
l ikely to hinder their cause than to assist it. For the implicit message of 
slogans like "Law Is  Nonsense" and "Trashing Is  Scholarship" and 
"Everything Is Politics" i s  that careful philosophical argument-rational 
discussion about law and justice-is a sham, a deception, not worth the 
effort: In the end, law is nonsense, and so is philosophy. Ironically, there 
360. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1 685 ,  
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is nothing new about this particular philosophy of law. It  was already old 
hat long before Nero put Seneca to death , and it provides the best of all 
possible justifications for economic exploitation and political oppression . It 
is preci sely the legal philosophy of the "bad man"-of the person who 
would rather make a profit or win an election than listen to "philosophi­
cal" speculations about right and wrong. 
The only way to make progress against this sort of cynicism, the only 
way to make the legal system more just, is  by patient,  piecemeal ef­
forts-by the sort of hard thought that has always been characteristic of 
the best work in law and philosophy. Nothing will come of fundamentally 
frivolous speculations about "organic groups" and "intelligible essences" 
and "disentrenchment of formative structures" -however attractive such 
theories may appear to the gull ible .  
I have argued that, far from having "undermined the central ideas of 
modern legal thought," Unger does not live up to the standards of ordi­
nary good scholarship ,  and in his philosophical writings he is far out of  
his depth . Certainly Unger is not  in a strong position to denounce his  
col leagues in the legal academy for having "degraded" history and 
"abased" philosophy and "perverted" the social sciences :  
Having failed to persuade themselves of all but the most equivocal 
versions of the inherited creed, they nevertheless clung to its implica­
tions and brazenly advertised their own failure as the triumph of 
worldly wisdom over intellectual and political enthusiasm. H istory 
they degraded into the retrospective rationalization of events .  Philos­
ophy they abased into an inexhaustible compendium of excuses for 
the truncation of legal analysis. The social sciences they perverted 
into the source of argumentative ploys with which to give their arbi­
trary though stylized policy decisions the blessing of  a specious 
authority. 
When we came, they were like a priesthood that has lost their 
faith and kept their jobs. They stood in tedious embarrassment 
before cold altars. But we turned away from those altars, and found 
the mind's opportunity i n  the heart's revenge.361 
As with this passage, so with Unger's philosophy as a whole: It tries very 
hard to impress, and it is not impressive. 
36 1 .  CLSM,  supra note 2 ,  at 675 .  
